ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL, HEALTH CAPITAL, AND THE LABOR MARKET by Hokayem, Charles
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
University of Kentucky Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 
2010 
ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL, HEALTH CAPITAL, AND THE 
LABOR MARKET 
Charles Hokayem 
University of Kentucky, charles.hokayem@uky.edu 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Hokayem, Charles, "ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL, HEALTH CAPITAL, AND THE LABOR MARKET" (2010). 
University of Kentucky Doctoral Dissertations. 23. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/gradschool_diss/23 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Kentucky Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
CHARLES HOKAYEM 
 
 
 
 
The Graduate School 
University of Kentucky 
2010 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL, HEALTH CAPITAL, AND THE LABOR MARKET 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________  
 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION  
________________________________________  
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
College of Business and Economics  
at the University of Kentucky  
 
By  
Charles Hokayem 
Lexington, Kentucky  
Director: Dr. James P. Ziliak, Carol Martin Gatton Chair in Microeconomics and  
Director of the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research 
University of Kentucky 
Lexington, Kentucky  
2010  
Copyright © Charles Hokayem 2010 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL, HEALTH CAPITAL, AND THE LABOR 
MARKET 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays concerning the effects of human capital and 
health capital on the labor market.  Chapter 1 presents a structural model that incorporates a 
health capital stock to the traditional learning-by-doing model. The model allows health 
to affect future wages by interrupting current labor supply and on-the-job human capital 
accumulation. Using data on sick time from the Panel Study Income of Dynamics the 
model is estimated using a nonlinear Generalized Method of Moments estimator. The 
results show human capital production exhibits diminishing returns. Health capital 
production increases with the current stock of health capital, or better current health 
improves future health. Among prime age working men, the effect of health on human 
capital accumulation is relatively small. Chapter 2 explores the role of another form of 
human capital, noncognitive skills, in explaining racial gaps in wages.  Chapter 2 adds 
two noncognitive skills, locus of control and self-esteem, to a simple wage specification 
to determine the effect of these skills on the racial wage gap (white, black, and Hispanic) 
and the return to these skills across the wage distribution.  The wage specifications are 
estimated using pooled, between, and quantile estimators.  Results using the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 show these skills account for differing portions of the 
racial wage gap depending on race and gender.  Chapter 3 synthesizes the idea of health 
and on-the-job human capital accumulation from Chapter 1 with the idea of noncognitive 
skills in Chapter 2 to examine the influence of these skills on human capital and health 
capital accumulation in adult life.  Chapter 3 introduces noncognitive skills to a life cycle 
labor supply model with endogenous health and human capital accumulation.  
Noncognitive skills, measured by degree of future orientation, self-efficacy, trust-
hostility, and aspirations, exogenously affect human capital and health production.  The 
model uses noncognitive skills assessed in the early years of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics and relates these skills to health and human capital accumulation during adult 
life.  The main findings suggest individuals with high self-efficacy receive higher future 
wages. 
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1 A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF LIFE CYCLE LABOR SUPPLY WITH 
ENDOGENOUS HEALTH AND HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Labor economists have long documented the importance of human capital in labor 
market outcomes. Whether in the form of formal schooling or on-the-job training, human 
capital plays a crucial role in the development of wages and wealth over the life cycle 
(Card 1999). While education remains the most studied form of human capital, labor 
economists have studied human capital accumulation on the job through a learning-by-
doing process (Ben-Porath 1967; Heckman 1976; Shaw 1989; Imai and Keane 2004). 
Learning-by-doing refers to the skills individuals acquire through working on the job 
separate from the skills acquired through formal schooling. As an individual spends more 
time on the job, more skills are acquired, leading to higher future income. Learning-by-
doing models have generally ignored the role of health, or health capital, during this 
process. At the same time health economists have established the role of health in 
determining how much an individual works but have largely ignored the impact of health 
on acquiring skills on the job (Currie and Madrian 1999). If health determines how much 
an individual works and how much an individual works determines the skills acquired on 
the job, then variations in health will influence human capital accumulation and, 
subsequently, future income. This process suggests an interaction between health and 
human capital that has generally not been addressed in the health or labor literatures. This 
chapter combines these strands of literatures by introducing health in the spirit of 
Grossman (1972) to the standard learning-by-doing model.  
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This chapter develops a structural life cycle model to study the interaction 
between health and human capital before the retirement years. The basic idea is that a 
poor health shock has the direct effect of lowering labor supply in the current period 
which in turn reduces the amount of human capital gained on the job, resulting in an 
indirect effect of lower future wages. Set in a stochastic lifecycle framework, the model 
assumes an individual chooses hours worked, medical consumption, and nonmedical 
consumption to maximize lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint, a healthy time 
constraint, and production functions for human capital and health capital. The human and 
health capital production functions generate time nonseparabilities in the intertemporal 
budget constraints because stocks only depreciate gradually over time.  The model 
assumes individuals face uncertainty about future realizations of health, tastes, prices, 
wages and interest rates.  The forcing variable in the model is the assumption of 
exogenous health shocks that have a direct effect on sick time, which in turn affects 
optimal consumption and leisure choices.  The estimation strategy follows a two step 
procedure. The first step estimates the human capital and health capital production 
parameters. The second step incorporates the production function parameters to estimate 
utility parameters using a nonlinear generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator 
derived from the solution to the individual's optimization problem.  
To focus on the working years of the life cycle the model uses data on working 
male head of households from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) who are 
between the ages of 25 and 60, spanning 1989-2003 waves. An innovation in the model is 
the incorporation of an often underutilized question about annual sick time into the 
standard time budget constraint, creating a budget constraint for healthy time. With this 
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new healthy time budget constraint an individual can allocate healthy time to work or 
leisure. Since medical out-of-pocket expenditures are not always available in the PSID, 
the estimation adds the imputation of medical out-of-pocket expenditures from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey as an input into the production of health. 
The results show human capital production increases with the current stock of 
human capital at a decreasing rate which is in accord with diminishing returns to the 
human capital stock. Health capital production increases with the current stock of health 
capital, or better current health improves future health. Health has a relatively small role 
in interrupting the on-the-job human capital accumulation process. The model produces 
plausible estimates of the intertemporal substitution elasticity for consumption with the 
average between -1.51 and -0.88. Future work will address the measurement error in 
health and will also carry out counterfactual policy simulations. Simulations that compare 
the human capital and wage paths of individuals who experience different health shocks 
will illustrate the importance of good health. With the recent emphasis on health care 
reform simulations on subsidizing the price of medical care will provide insight into the 
effects of government health care policies on human and health capital accumulation.  
Initial predictions suggest a government policy subsidizing medical out-of-pocket 
expenditures causes individuals to have better health, accumulate more human capital, 
and earn higher wages in the long run.  
1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 Health and Labor Supply Literature 
Grossman's (1972) model of health capital and the demand for health remains the 
most important theoretical contribution to health economics and serves as a framework 
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for modeling health in this chapter. Grossman's model combines the idea of health as a 
capital stock with Becker's (1965) time allocation model. An individual inherits a stock 
of health that depreciates over time while purchasing medical care and devoting time to 
health investment (e.g. exercise) to replenish this stock. A time allocation constraint sums 
work time, sick time, time spent producing health, and time spent producing the 
household commodity. In this model the consumer maximizes a utility function that 
depends on the consumption of healthy days and a household commodity subject to a 
standard lifetime budget constraint which includes the purchase of medical care, labor 
income, and asset income. A consumer demands healthy days for two reasons: (1) 
consumption (sick days create disutility) and (2) investment (healthy days determine the 
time available for market and nonmarket activities and reduce time being sick). These 
two reasons for healthy days lead to a pure consumption model and a pure investment 
model. Human capital in this model is education and is taken as exogenous. Human 
capital differs from health capital in that human capital affects a consumer's productivity 
while health capital affects time spent being productive. Working with the pure 
investment version of this model Grossman derives health supply and demand functions 
whose intersection determines the optimal stock of health. The Grossman model forms 
the basis for reduced form estimation of the demand for health, demand for medical 
services, and health investment (Grossman 2000). The model also serves as motivation 
for empirical studies of health on labor supply to consider health as endogenous since it 
implies a conditional labor supply function that depends on the endogenous health stock 
(Currie and Madrian 1999). While the Grossman model provides a reason for health 
economists to study the relationship between health and education, it only treats human 
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capital as exogenous and does not address human capital accumulation on the job 
(Grossman 2000; Grossman 2006).  
Empirical testing of Grossman's model generally involves estimating reduced 
form demand equations for health, medical services, and health investment. The most 
common equations to estimate are demand for health and demand for medical services. 
These equations are functions of the model's exogenous variables: wage rate, price of 
medical care, the stock of human capital (education), and age. Grossman's investment 
model predicts the following signs: (1) demand for health equation: wage rate (+), price 
of medical care (-), human capital (+), age (-); (2) demand for medical services equation: 
wage rate (+), price of medical care (-), human capital (-), age(+). An increase in the 
wage implies a higher return to healthy time, so individuals demand for health and 
medical services increases with the wage.  Standard microeconomic theory suggests the 
demand for health and medical services will fall with an increase in the price. Education 
improves the efficiency of investment in health, so more educated individuals require less 
inputs (e.g. medical services) to achieve a given level of investment.  More educated 
individuals also receive a higher return for a given level of health, so they will demand 
higher levels of health.  The depreciation rate of the health stock rises with age and raises 
the cost of holding the capital stock, so older individuals demand less health.  The rising 
depreciation rate with age implies older individuals will also invest more in health by 
demanding more medical services.  This feature of the model corroborates the 
observation that the elderly purchase more medical care as their health deteriorates.  
Grossman fits these equations to 1963 US data using either restricted activity days or 
work-loss days as a measure of healthy time and personal medical expenditures as a 
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measure of medical care use. With no data on medical prices, Grossman's main 
independent variables are wage rate, family income, years of schooling, and age. 
Grossman finds the predicted signs on education, wage rate, and age in the health 
equation. However, he only finds the predicted sign of age in the medical services 
equation. The signs on wage and education are not consistent with the investment model. 
Wagstaff (1986) tests the pure investment and pure consumption versions of the 
Grossman model using the 1976 Danish Welfare Study. Realizing the multidimensional 
nature of health Wagstaff uses the multiple indicators-multiple causes technique 
(MIMIC) to condense nineteen different health measures into a single measure of 
unobserved health stock. Wagstaff calls a version of his model with assets and lifetime 
wage rates a pure investment model and a version without assets and lifetime wage rates 
a pure consumption model. His estimation of the health demand function in the pure 
investment model produces the correct signs on wage rate, schooling, and age. His 
medical care demand function with physician visits produces a negative coefficient on 
schooling which, unlike Grossman's results, is consistent with the pure investment model. 
Erbsland, Ried, and Ulrich (1995) also use the MIMIC technique but with 1986 West 
German Socio-Economic Panel data. They rely on four self-reported indicators of the 
unobserved stock of health. Their results are consistent with Grossman's pure investment 
model. In their health demand function schooling is positive while age is negative. In 
their medical services demand function based on general practitioner visits, age is 
positive and schooling is negative. 
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Sickles and Yazbeck (1998) estimate a structural model of life cycle leisure 
demand with health production. They focus on the impact of health-related spending and 
variations in leisure demand on the production of good health for the older population. 
Their model incorporates temporal nonseparability in leisure, health, and consumption 
along with intertemporal nonseparability in health. A distributed lag of past health affects 
current health accumulation in the same way as Hotz, Kydland, and Sedlacek (1988) 
allow intertemporal nonseparability of leisure. Individuals in their model choose leisure, 
health-related consumption, and health-neutral consumption. Health production depends 
on health-related consumption and leisure. They estimate their model using nonlinear 
generalized method of moments on a panel of older men (age 58-63) from the Retirement 
History Survey 1969-1979. The Quality Well-Being Index serves as a continuous 
measure of health. It combines scales measuring mobility, physical activity, social 
activity, and self-assessed health status. Overall, Sickles and Yazbeck estimate positive 
health-related consumption and leisure elasticities, suggesting health-related consumption 
and leisure lead to better health. The health-related consumption elasticity (change in 
health due to change in health-related consumption) is estimated around .03, so a 10 
percent increase in health consumption leads to about a 0.3 percent improvement in 
health. This small effect supports the finding of “flat-of-the-curve” medicine in the health 
literature.1  The corresponding leisure elasticity ranges from .23 to .69, so a 10 percent 
increase in leisure leads to a 2.3 to 6.9 percent improvement in health. Sickles and 
Yazbeck find individuals have a short memory of past health on current utility, and past 
health is important to current health, implying a role for dynamics in the health 
production process. 
                                                            
1 “Flat-of-the-curve” medicine refers to the small marginal impact of medical services on health status. 
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Gilleskie (2010) studies an individual’s daily decision to miss work and/or visit 
the doctor during an acute illness episode. Gilleskie estimates a discrete choice structural 
model with the goal of understanding the differences between men and women when 
making decisions about being absent from work and seeking medical care during an 
episode of illness.  The model allows for the presence of a sick leave policy that replaces 
lost income and a health insurance policy that provides varying coinsurance rates.  
Individuals face a probability of contracting an illness that depends on health status and a 
probability of recovering from an illness that depends on work absences, physician visits, 
and length of current illness.  Medical care occurs only when an individual is sick.  
Seeking preventative treatment is not allowed.  Gilleskie estimates the model on a sample 
of employed men and women age 25-64 from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure 
Survey.  Individuals in the sample have illnesses that last less than 22 days. Examples of 
illnesses include the common cold, the flu, strep throat, and bronchitis.  Gilleskie’s 
results suggest sickness creates disutility for men and women.  An additional dollar of 
income provides less utility when sick than well for men and women.  Absences are more 
productive than medical care as they raise the probability of recovering from an illness by 
as much as 3 percent.  Absences and seeking treatment are complements in recovering 
from an illness.  Individuals in poorer health recover slower from an illness.  Women are 
more likely than men to suffer from an illness for which they choose to miss work or seek 
medical treatment.    
Gilleskie uses her structural model to simulate several policy experiments that 
change the availability of sick leave, health insurance, and the price of medical care.  
Overall, the policy experiments highlight the differences in responses between men and 
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women.  Changing from no sick leave coverage to sick leave coverage induces men to 
take more absences (45 percent increase) than women (11 percent increase).  In a policy 
providing physician visits at no cost compared to a policy where individuals pay the full 
price of care men increase their medical consumption by 20 percent per illness episode 
while women increase their medical consumption by 15 percent. 
1.2.2 Health and Labor Supply 
Most of the labor literature addresses the effect of health on static labor supply 
with little attention on health and life cycle labor supply, the exception being research 
that examines health around the age of retirement (Currie and Madrian 1999; French 
2005; Bound, Stinebrickner, and Waidmann 2010). This literature highlights two 
important issues with health and labor supply: the treatment of health endogeneity and 
the measurement of health.  
Currie and Madrian (1999) extensively review the labor literature connecting 
health to labor market behavior. Their review focuses on the impact of health on wages, 
earnings, hours worked, labor force participation, and type of work. There seems to be no 
work on the effect of health on human capital accumulation and little work on life cycle 
labor supply. Two estimation issues in this literature are the endogeneity of health and the 
measurement error in health. Motivated by the Grossman model they emphasize the need 
to consider health endogenous. They also highlight the endogeneity associated with 
measurement error in health. Often used self-reported health measures suffer from 
endogeneity in that healthier individuals tend to work more. Self-reported measures are 
also problematic due to nonrandom measurement error. Individuals who don't work or cut 
down their hours worked could be more likely to report poor health to justify their labor 
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market behavior. Individuals could also misreport their health to stay in government 
assistance programs. Self-reported measures may also be affected by whether the 
individual has sought treatment. A large part of the literature has documented this 
nonrandom measurement error. 
From their review Currie and Madrian (1999) draw a few conclusions about hours 
worked and labor force participation. Overall, they note that studies tend to find a larger 
positive effect on hours worked than wages. Studies treating health as endogenous tend to 
find a smaller effect of health on hours worked than studies that treat health as 
exogenous. Better health also improves labor force participation, but there is wide 
disagreement on the size of this effect. The estimated effects of health on labor market 
outcomes vary and are sensitive to identification assumptions and the way health is 
measured.2  The samples in the literature tend to focus on older white men.3 They 
acknowledge the need to take a structural approach to connecting health to labor market 
behavior with the use of a health production function like Sickles and Yazbeck (1998). 
They also suggest future work should use more general samples. 
Hum, Simpson, and Fissuh (2006) and Hum, Simpson, and Fissuh (2008) directly 
examine health on life cycle labor supply and employment with panel data on Canadaian 
men during the working years of life. Hum, Simpson, and Fissuh add a health stock to the 
                                                            
2 Health measures can fall into the following categories: (1) self-reported health; (2) health limitations on 
the ability to work; (3) functional limitations such as problems with activities of daily living (ADL's); (4) 
presence of chronic or acute conditions; (5) utilization of medical care; (6) clinical assessment of a 
condition; (7) nutritional status; and (8) expected or future mortality. 
 
3 Two exceptions are Berger (1983) and Berger and Fleisher (1984) which examine spousal health and 
labor supply using couples during the working years of life.   
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standard life cycle labor supply model and derive employment and labor supply functions 
which they estimate using logit and tobit models, respectively. They define employment 
as having hours worked greater than zero. Both specifications address the endogeneity 
and mismeasurement of health, two concerns raised by Currie and Madrian (1999), using 
an approach developed by Bound, Schoenbaum, Stinebrickner, and Waidmann (1999). 
The approach uses exogenous demographic variables (age, education, mother's 
education) and more objective health measures (functional limitations and work limiting 
functional limitations) to instrument for a self-reported rating of personal health 
(excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor). The instrumenting equation is either a probit 
model or an ordered probit model. The probit model covers good health and poor health 
with good health including excellent, very good, or good ratings and poor health 
including fair or poor rating. The ordered probit covers all health ratings. Both 
employment and labor supply specifications also allow for unobserved heterogeneity 
through fixed effects and control for sample selection bias due to unobserved wages. 
Hum, Simpson, and Fissuh (2006) and Hum, Simpson, and Fissuh (2008) fit these 
equations with panel data of men age 21-65 from the Canadian Survey of Labor and 
Income Dynamics (SLID) for 1996-2001. The authors claim the Canadian data offer the 
advantage of studying health effects on labor supply in the context of universal health 
coverage which avoids any confounding price effects due to varying health insurance 
coverage that would occur in the United States.4 Overall, the effect of health on hours 
worked or employment is smaller when health is treated as endogenous and even smaller 
when using fixed effects. For the pooled sample and exogenous health the estimated 
                                                            
4 While Hum, Simpson, and Fissuh claim there are no confounding price effects, they ignore differences in 
waiting times and access that can affect the price of care. 
11 
 
marginal effect of good health is a labor supply increase of 783 hours per year (43.5% of 
total hours worked by all men). Treating health as endogenous produces an estimated 
marginal effect of 486 hours (27.0% of total hours worked by all men). When including 
fixed effects, the estimated marginal effect falls to 119 hours and 91 hours for exogenous 
and endogenous health, respectively. Comparing these estimates suggests the bias from 
unobserved heterogeneity is larger than the bias from endogenous health. Unlike the 
previous literature that focuses on older men, Hum, Simpson, and Fissuh (2008) analyze 
subsamples by age group. The impact of health on hours worked is significant for all age 
groups (age 25-34, age 35-50, age 51-65) not just older men as previously studied. The 
effect increases across age groups with older men experiencing the largest marginal effect 
(marginal effect of good health: age 25-34: 4.2%; age 35-50: 4.3%; age 51-65: 6.0%). 
1.2.3 Human Capital and Labor Supply Literature 
The learning-by-doing model in the labor literature extends the standard life cycle 
labor supply model by allowing human capital investment through a learning-by-doing 
process. Learning-by-doing builds on the work of Ben-Porath (1967), Weiss (1972), and 
Heckman (1976). Human capital investment occurs as a by-product of market work. 
More hours on the job leads to more human capital. Unlike the standard model where the 
wage is exogenous, the wage in the learning-by-doing model depends on the level of 
human capital stock and the rental rate of the human capital. Since the human capital 
stock depends on hours worked, past labor supply decisions can affect the wage. This 
model adds an additional trade-off: the individual must consider the increase in utility by 
reducing current hours worked against the increase in future wage that occurs from 
learning on the job. 
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Shaw (1989) estimates a structural learning-by-doing model using a sample of 
men age 18-64 from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the years 1967-
1980. Shaw formulates the individual's problem in a dynamic programming framework 
and derives an Euler equation for the consumption and leisure choice. Her estimation 
strategy follows a two-step process. In the first step she estimates a wage equation by 
nonlinear instrumental variables to recover the unobserved rental rate on human capital 
and parameters of the quadratic human capital production function. The second step 
incorporates the estimated rental rates and human capital production parameters into the 
estimation of the Euler equation by generalized method of moments. The second step 
exploits orthogonality conditions from rational expectations to estimate parameters of the 
translog utility function.5  Shaw finds strong evidence in favor of endogenous wages, that 
is, current hours worked positively affect future wages. A temporary 25 percent increase 
in hours of work increases the following year's wages by 12.8 percent. In addition, she 
presents simulation results showing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor 
supply is not constant across the life cycle; instead, it rises over the life cycle.6  An 
increasing intertemporal elasticity of substitution implies younger workers are less 
responsive to wage or tax changes than older workers. 
Imai and Keane (2004) extend Shaw (1989) by using a more computationally 
intensive estimation procedure to estimate a similar model. Their technique uses a 
numerical dynamic programming technique to solve the individual's optimization 
                                                            
5 Shaw's estimation and identification method is similar to Hansen and Singleton's (1982) generalized 
method of moments estimation of consumption Euler equations. 
6 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply describes the percent change in hours worked 
due to a percent change in the wage. 
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problem and embed this solution in a simulated maximum likelihood estimation. This 
procedure allows for measurement error in wages, hours worked, and assets. Unlike 
Shaw who does not specifically estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, Imai 
and Keane choose a utility function that identifies a point estimate. Their data, a sample 
of white males from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), produce an 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution estimate of 3.82. This estimate suggests a 1 
percent increase in the wage leads to a nearly 4 percent increase in hours worked. This 
estimate far exceeds estimates from the microliterature which range from 0.37 to 0.88 
(MaCurdy 1981; Altonji 1986). Imai and Keane attribute the stark difference to previous 
studies omitting human capital accumulation.  
Shaw (1989) and Imai and Keane (2004) do not address the role of health in 
learning-by-doing models. These studies provide a theoretical framework for 
incorporating health into a labor supply model with human capital. Their estimation 
methods give a useful starting point for developing an estimation and identification 
strategy to estimate structural parameters for a model that includes health. This model is 
described in the following sections. 
1.3 Model of Health, Human Capital Accumulation, and Life Cycle Labor Supply 
The model draws on elements from the health and labor literatures by combining 
health capital with human capital through a learning-by-doing technology. It allows 
health to enter utility directly and act as a constraint on behavior. An individual 
maximizes a standard utility function that is additively separable over time and is defined 
over leisure ( ), nonmedical consumption ( ), and the stock of health ( ). In each 
period,  
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, ,  
Income comes from two sources, asset income ( ) and labor income ( ). 
This income can be spent on nonmedical consumption and used to purchase medical 
services ( ) at the price . Putting income and expenditures together gives the 
following intertemporal budget constraint: 
1   Asset Accumulation  
The observed wage ( ) is the product of a human capital stock ( ) and the 
unobserved rental rate on human capital ( ), so unlike the standard labor supply model 
the wage is endogenous.  
  Wage Equation  
In each period an individual inherits a stock of human capital which depreciates at 
rate . Human capital evolves in a similar way as health capital. Next period's human 
capital is the previous period's stock less depreciation plus new investment. New 
investment occurs on the job through learning-by-doing that depends on hours worked 
and the levels of human and health capital, , , . Human capital evolves 
according to  
1 , , , ,   Human Capital Accumulation  
In each period an individual inherits a stock of health capital ( ) which 
depreciates at rate  and can be replenished by devoting time to health,  (e.g. 
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exercise), and purchasing medical services. Leisure and medical services enter a health 
production function,  , . F7F  Health capital then evolves according to  
1 , , , Health Capital Accumulation   
Individuals also have healthy time ( ) which can be allocated across two 
activities: leisure ( ) and work ( ). The healthy time constraint becomes 
 (Healthy Time Constraint) 
In addition, total time (T) is the sum of healthy time ( ) and sick time ( ), so  
  Total Time Constraint  
The individual’s optimization problem can be represented in a dynamic 
programming framework with state variables, , , , and choice variables 
, , . 
, , max
, ,
, , , ,  
. . 1   Asset Accumulation  
  Wage Equation  
1 , ,
, ,   Human Capital Accumulation  
1 , , , Health Capital Accumulation  
                                                            
7 The concept of leisure in this framework differs from leisure in the standard labor supply model where 
leisure represents nonmarket time. The Grossman (1972) model separates total time into time for work, 
time for health, time for producing the household good, and time for sickness.  The ideal set of data would 
consist of time divided into these categories.  Time diary data are not available for the years used in the 
estimation.  Leisure in this framework is meant to capture time input into health production.  
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  Healthy Time Constraint  
  Total Time Constraint  
Like other life cycle labor supply models the source of uncertainty in this model 
comes from unknown future realizations of tastes, prices, wages, and interest rates 
(MaCurdy 1983).  This model does not make assumptions about the form of the 
distributions generating the uncertainty.  Unlike other models of life cycle labor supply, 
this model adds uncertain health shocks through sick time.   also follows a distribution 
of unknown form.  The individual in this model does not know when she will be sick.   
characterizes acute illnesses that an individual cannot anticipate such as the common 
cold, food poisoning, and the flu.8  acts as an exogenous shock to the total time and 
healthy time constraints.9   
The optimization problem can be simplified by substituting the wage equation and 
time constraints. With choice variables ,, , and   the optimization problem can now 
be written as 
, , max
, ,
, , , ,  
. . 1   Asset Accumulation  
, ,   Human Capital Accumulation  
, , Health Capital Accumulation  
The first order conditions with respect to , , and  : 
                                                            
8 Gilleskie (20 ) also considers acute illnesses.   
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10
9 This idea of   affecting the time constraint is similar in spirit to the literature on fixed time costs and 
labor supply (Cogan 1981).   
:  , 1 0    1  
:  , 1 , , 0   2  
: 1 , 0   3  
A subscript represents a partial derivative with respect to that variable at time t. For 
example, ,  and , .   Equations 1 and 2 are most similar to conditions 
in life cycle labor supply models.  Equation 1 is the standard Euler equation for 
consumption and describes the optimal consumption over time. Equation 2 shows the 
effect of endogenous human capital and health capital accumulation in the last two terms.  
Without endogenous human capital and health capital accumulation, these terms are zero, 
and Equation 2 reduces to a condition similar to the standard labor-leisure condition from 
the static labor supply model where  is replaced by .  Equation 3 describes the 
optimal amount of medical consumption. The first order conditions can be combined with 
envelope conditions for the state variables , ,  to solve the optimization problem. 
The following equilibrium condition characterizes the solution to the optimization 
problem.10 
, , 1 , ,
,
,
,  
,
,
,
, ,
,
,
, 0   4  
                                                            
10 See Appendix for derivation of solution to the optimization problem. 
18 
 
Under rational expectations, eq(4) has zero expectation at time period t, so realizations of 
future variables imply 
, , 1 , ,
,
,
,  
,
,
,
, ,
,
,
,   5  
where  is the forecast error at time t.  Rational expectations implies 0, so 
any information at time t is not useful in forecasting future variables.  This orthogonality 
between  and the information at time t will be exploited to estimate the structural 
parameters of the model. 
1.4 Econometric Specification 
A two step estimation strategy is used to estimate the structural parameters of the 
model. In the first step quadratic human capital and health production function 
parameters are estimated with ordinary least squares. The second step incorporates these 
production function parameters in a nonlinear Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation of the equilibrium condition (5) to identify utility parameters.   
The specification for the human capital production function, , , , is 
quadratic in its arguments. The quadratic specification represents the concave nature of 
earnings over the life-cycle: 
, ,  
,  
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 The vector , , , , , , , ,  contains the structural 
parameters of the human capital production function.  is an exogenous time-specific 
growth rate of human capital common to all individuals, and ,  is an individual-specific 
component of human capital growth. This specification differs from Shaw (1989) in its 
inclusion of health into the human capital production function.  As written, the human 
capital production function can not be directly estimated since the stock of human capital, 
, is not observed.  Wages are observed, so the specification can be rewritten in terms of 
wages using the relationship, . Making the substitution  gives a 
specification that can be estimated 
         
  ,  
This specification of the wage equation relates future discounted wages to current 
hours worked, current discounted wages, and current health.  It is estimated using 
ordinary least squares, setting 1  .11  This specification of a dynamic wage 
equation with hours worked is similar to the standard Mincer equation.  The Mincer 
equation is derived from a lifecycle earnings model with a human capital stock where an 
individual maximizes the present discounted value of earnings.  The equation is a 
quadratic function of one’s labor market experience, typically approximated by years of 
potential experience (Card 1999; Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 2006; Polachek 2008).  
The learning-by-doing model represents an alternative approach where an individual 
                                                            
11 Attempts to estimate annual rental rates were unsuccessful. 
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maximizes lifetime utility instead of wealth and incorporates the traditional labor leisure 
supply model into the human capital acquisition process which relies on hours worked 
(Polachek 2007).  The Mincer equation has been estimated with years of tenure on-the-
job in place of years of potential experience.  Tenure on-the-job would represent an 
approximation to hours worked.   
The marginal product of hours worked ( , ), marginal product of human capital 
stock ( , ), and the marginal product of health capital stock ( , ) come from 
differentiating the quadratic human capital production function 
,   2  
, 2   
, 2  
Health capital production, , , , follows a quadratic specification similar 
to human capital production. The health capital production is specified as 
, ,  
,  
where the vector , , , , , , , ,  represents the structural parameters 
of health capital production.  is an exogenous time-specific growth rate of health capital 
common to all individuals, and ,  is an individual-specific component of health capital 
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growth. The corresponding marginal product of medical expenditures ( , ), leisure ( , ), 
and health stock ( , ) are 
, 2  
, 2  
, 2  
The specification of the utility function follows a translog form. The translog 
utility function is quadratic in its arguments and represents a local second-order 
approximation to any utility function. It also does not impose the restrictions of additivity 
or homothecity associated with other common utility functions, such as CES or Cobb-
Douglas (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau 1975). The exact specification is 
, , ln ln ln ln ln ln  
ln ln ln ln ln ln  
The vector , , , , , , , ,  represents the structural 
parameters of the utility function. Identification of these parameters requires a 
normalization, so 1.  Due to the form of the equilibrium condition (5)  and  can 
not be identified so are set to zero.  Differentiating the translog utility function gives the 
marginal utility of leisure ( , ) and the marginal utility of nonmedical consumption 
( , ) as 
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,
1 ln 2 ln ln
 
,
ln 2 ln ln
 
Substituting the corresponding marginal utility and marginal product functions 
into the equilibrium condition produces a highly nonlinear equation that can be 
parameterized by Γ , , , . Γ is the vector of unknown population parameters. 
 and  are estimated from the human capital and health capital production functions in 
the first step, and  is set to .95, leaving the utility parameters to be estimated in the 
second step.12  Let  be the vector of variables entering the ith individual's equilibrium 
condition in period t. The ith individual's equation can be represented by 
, ; , ,  
Rational expectations implies information in the information set Ω  is not useful 
in forecasting future variables, so 
, ; , , · 0 
where  contains elements of Ω .   The orthogonality between , ; , ,  and  
is exploited to estimate  in a GMM estimator.  With panel data of T years for each 
individual population orthogonality conditions are derived by averaging over time, 
1
, ; , , , , ; , , 0 
The sample analogs of these population conditions are constructed by averaging over a 
random sample of N individuals, so  
                                                            
12 The production and utility parameters can be estimated at one time as a system.  Attempts to estimate the 
system were computationally infeasible. 
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1
, , ; , ,  
The GMM estimator of  minimizes the quadratic form  or  
argmin  
where the   is a symmetric positive definite weighting matrix.  is unknown so is 
replaced by  constructed from the residuals of a nonlinear two stage least squares 
(NL2SLS) procedure, allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity. 
 
1.5 Data Construction 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) serves as the main data source for 
estimating the structural model.  The PSID offers the advantage of covering a 
representative sample of U.S. individuals during the working portion of the life cycle.  
The PSID started with 4,800 families in 1968 and with efforts to follow all family 
members now contains over 7,000 families.  Interviews occur annually for 1968-1996 
and biennially for 1997-2007.  The PSID consists of three samples: the original Survey 
Research Center (SRC) sample, the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) sample, and 
the Latino sample.  The original SRC sample represents the U.S. population while the 
SEO sample serves as a supplementary low income subsample.  The Latino sample, 
added in 1990, accounts for the changing nature of immigration in the U.S.  This chapter 
excludes the SEO and Latino samples.  Individuals are drawn from the SRC sample from 
1989-2003 who meet the following criteria: (1) in family at time of interview; (2) head of 
household; (2) male; (3) not self-employed; (4) employed; (5)work at least 3 years; (6) 
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age between 25 and 60; (7) real annual food consumption between $520 and one-third of 
real annual family income; (8) annual hours worked at least 100; and (9) real hourly wage 
between $2/hour and $200/hour.  Limiting the sample to male head of households of 
working age avoids issues with labor force nonparticipation and joint labor supply 
decisions.  The sample selection criteria produce an unbalanced panel.  This analysis 
treats the panel as continuous for the period 1989-2003 (ignoring biennial interruptions) 
and considers missing person-year observations as missing conditionally at random.   
The PSID collects a variety of information on the labor market and 
socioeconomic characteristics of each household.  Questions about annual family income 
and annual hours worked refer to the previous calendar year.13  Food consumption also 
refers to the previous calendar year.  Total annual food consumption includes food at 
home, food delivered to the home, eating out, and the value of food stamps.  Total food 
consumption, deflated by the food component of the Consumer Price Index (2008 base 
year), is one of the consumption measures in the model. The PSID collects food 
consumption each survey year with the exception of survey years 1988 and 1989.  For 
survey years after 1993, the PSID stopped reporting annual values for food at home, food 
delivered, eating out, and the value of food stamps.  For these years annual amounts were 
created by annualizing the amount reported according to the reporting period (daily, 
weekly, biweekly, monthly, and monthly).  An alternative consumption measure in the 
model is a nondurable consumption measure imputed from food consumption reported in 
the PSID.  The appendix describes the imputation procedure.   
                                                            
13 Annual family income with negative values after 1993 is set to 1 to match the PSID bottom coding of 
family income in previous years. 
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The hourly wage rate depends on whether the worker is hourly or salaried.  For 
hourly workers the PSID gives the reported wage rate.  For salaried workers the PSID 
reports an hourly rate that depends on the salary and the pay period (weekly, biweekly, or 
monthly).  For these workers the PSID constructs a wage adjusted for a fixed number of 
hours each pay period instead of using the actual hours worked.  For example, a salaried 
worker paid weekly has an hourly rate that is the salary divided by 40 hours.  Salaried 
workers paid biweekly, monthly, and yearly have salaries divided by 80, 160, and 2,000 
hours, respectively.  All wage and income data are deflated by the personal consumption 
deflator using a 2008 base year.   
Questions about annual sick hours and self-rated health serve as measures of 
healthy time and the health stock, respectively.  PSID respondents report the amount of 
work missed due to own illness for the previous year.  Specifically, the PSID asks “Did 
you miss work because you were sick?  How much work did you miss?” The PSID 
calculates the annual sick hours as weeks ill times 8 hours for the first 8 weeks and times 
60 hours for any weeks thereafter.  Beginning in 1994 the PSID did not calculate annual 
sick hours, so annual sick hours are created by applying the same formula to the number 
of reported days, weeks, or months missed due to own sickness.  The PSID self-rated 
health question began in 1984 and asks “Would you say your health in general is 
excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?”14 These responses are converted to a four point 
scale in the following way: 1 (Fair or Poor); 2 Good; 3 Very Good; and 4 Excellent. 
                                                            
14 The self-rated health question in the PSID has been used in the recent health literature.  Fletcher and 
Sindelar (2009) and Fletcher, Sindelar, and Yamaguchi (2009) are examples. 
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Other variables necessary for the model are the interest rate and medical out-of-
pocket expenditures.  The interest rate in the model reflects the after-tax annual 3-month 
Treasury bill interest rate based on a marginal federal tax rate from the NBER TAXSIM 
module.15  Medical out-of-pocket expenditures are imputed using data from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey. The appendix explains the imputation procedure for 
medical out-of-pocket expenditures. 
  After imputing consumption and health expenditure data and applying the sample 
selection criteria, the analysis sample contains 15,236 person-year observations and 
covers 1989-2003.  Table 1.1 displays summary statistics. The sample consists of males, 
who are mostly white, have completed almost 14 years of education, and on average are 
39 years old.  These men earn an average hourly wage of $25.15/hour and work about 
2,300 hours each year.  With an average health status just under 3, health in the sample is 
about “Very Good.” Individuals take just over 35 hours of sick time each year and spend 
almost $2,900 on medical out-of-pocket expenditures.  Figure 1.1 shows the distribution 
of sick hours for the sample.  A large number of individuals are concentrated at zero sick 
hours.  Sick hours at the 25th and median percentiles are zero while sick hours at the 75th 
percentile are 32.  The second panel of Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for the sample 
by sick hours (sick hours equal to zero, sick hours between zero and the 75th percentile, 
and sick hours greater than the 75th percentile).  Men with sick hours between zero and 
the 75th percentile have the highest average hourly wage ($25.84), are in the best health 
(3.14), and spend the most on medical out-of-pocket expenditures ($2947).  Average 
health and work hours are the lowest among men with sick hours greater than the 75th 
                                                            
15 The marginal federal tax rate comes from the NBER TAXSIM module using head of household, labor 
income, and number of children as input variables. 
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percentile (health statuts of 2.90, work hours of 2209).  Several variables must be scaled 
to facilitate the computation of the model.  Leisure, hours worked, and healthy time are 
divided by 1,000.  Total food consumption and medical out-of-pocket expenditures are 
divided by 10,000.  The hourly wage and age are divided by 100. 
1.6 Results 
 Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 show the estimation of the human capital and health 
capital production functions using ordinary least squares.  Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.  Columns 1 and 2 of each table provide parameter 
estimates for the base specifications while columns 3 and 4 introduce education and 
demographic heterogeneity.  This interaction with education and nonwhite allows 
education and nonwhite to shift the production functions.  Both human capital 
specifications clearly show a concave relationship between current wages and future 
wages.  Assuming the wage represents the human capital stock, , the results show 
human capital production increases with the current stock of human capital at a 
decreasing rate, suggesting decreasing marginal productivity of the human capital stock.  
Education augments the future wage through the quadratic current wage.  Overall, the 
insignificant parameter estimates for health suggest health plays a relatively weak role in 
interrupting the human capital accumulation process.  The specification without 
heterogeneity suggests for a given level of human capital health improves human capital 
accumulation.  Both health capital specifications indicate better current health improves 
future health. The specification without heterogeneity shows for a given level of health, 
more out-of-pocket medical expenditures improves future health.  Both specifications 
show for a given level of health more time devoted to leisure also improves future 
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health.16  The effect of current health on future health is larger for nonwhite men.  The 
effect of out-of-pocket medical expenditures on future health is smaller for nonwhite 
men. Nonwhite men experience differing quadratic effects of current health (negative) 
and out-of-pocket medical expenditures (positive) on future health.   
 Tables 1.4-1.9 show the nonlinear generalized method of moments estimation of 
utility parameters.17 These tables follow the same layout as Table 1.2 and Table 1.3.  
Columns 1 and 2 are based on the estimated production parameters without heterogeneity 
while columns 3 and 4 are based on production parameters that allow heterogeneity.  The 
coefficient on leisure is set to 1 for identification of the remaining parameters.  The tables 
differ in the timing of the instrument set.  Table 1.4 and Table 1.7 use contemporaneous 
instruments; Tables 1.5 and Table 1.8 add (t-1) instruments; Table 1.6 and Table 1.9 add 
(t-2) instruments.  Tables 1.7-1.9 report utility parameters based on nondurable 
consumption and contemporaneous instruments.  The instrument set used in the 
estimation includes leisure, food consumption, wage, health status, medical expenditures, 
the after-tax interest rate, age, education, region dummies, nonwhite, number of children, 
family size, annual time dummies, interactions between leisure and food consumption, 
wage and health status, health status and leisure, medical expenditures and health status, 
leisure and medical expenditures, and age and education.  Squared values of food 
consumption, wage, health status, medical expenditures, age, and leisure are also 
included.   
                                                            
16 This result is broadly consistent with Ruhm (2000) who finds recessions are good for your health.  As the 
economy enters a downturn, individuals work less hours and have more leisure time, making it less costly 
to pursue time intensive health production activities such as exercise. 
17 The nonlinear optimization uses the Newton-Raphson method. 
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Table 1.4 shows leisure exhibits strong diminishing returns with and without 
heterogeneity which agrees with Shaw (1989) who estimates a similar model without 
health effects.  Introducing heterogeneity produces a positive coefficient on the 
interaction with leisure and consumption, suggesting they are complements.   
When evaluated at the sample means, the marginal utility of consumption is negative 
with and without heterogeneity.18  More educated individuals receive less utility from 
leisure.  Adding time t-1 instruments maintains the strong diminishing returns on leisure 
(Table 1.5).  In the specification without heterogeneity the negative coefficient on the 
interaction between health and leisure suggests they are substitutes while the positive 
coefficient on the interaction between health and consumption suggests they are 
complements.  Education still lowers utility through leisure.    
Table 1.6 which uses instruments from time t, time t-1, and time t-2 produces the 
most precise parameter estimates.  Marginal utility of consumption at the sample mean 
values is negative with heterogeneity but positive without heterogeneity.19  Consumption 
and leisure are substitutes in both specifications.  Leisure still exhibits strong diminishing 
returns. The specification without heterogeneity suggests consumption exhibits 
diminishing returns while health and consumption are substitutes.  The specification with 
heterogeneity shows health and leisure are substitutes, and the size of the interaction 
between health and consumption diminishes. Consumption and leisure are decreasing in 
the level of education. 
                                                            
18 The flexibility of the translog utility function has the property of producing negative marginal utility.  
Marginal utility of consumption with and without heterogeneity evaluated at the sample means is -0.002 
and -0.004, respectively. 
19 With heterogeneity marginal utility of consumption is -0.001 and without heterogeneity marginal utility 
of consumption is 0.001. 
30 
 
Tables 1.7-1.9 replaces food consumption with nondurable consumption as the 
consumption measure and parallel the instrument sets used in Tables 1.4-1.6.  Compared 
to the parameter estimates based on food consumption the alternative consumption 
measure tends to preserve the sign of parameter estimates, but the estimates are more 
precisely estimated.  The trend of switching signs continues for the parameter estimates 
for the interaction between health and leisure.  The parameter estimates suggest the effect 
of the interaction between health and consumption is small.  As in other specifications, 
leisure exhibits strong diminishing returns and education lowers utility through leisure.   
 Tables 1.4-1.9 report test statistics for the Sargan test for the validity of 
overidentifying restrictions.  The p-values from the Sargan test in Tables 1.4, 1.5, 1.7, 
and 1.8 do not reject the model specification without heterogeneity; however, they do 
reject the model specification with heterogeneity, suggesting invalid instruments or a 
misspecified utility function.  The p-values in Table 1.6 and Table 1.9 based on 
instruments from time t, time t-1, and time t-2 do not reject the model specification.   
Tables 1.4-1.9 also report the sample mean and median values of the 
intertemporal substitution elasticity for consumption (ISE), a common calculation in life 
cycle labor supply models.  The ISE is simply minus the inverse of the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion, or  
 
The ISE describes the proportional change in consumption expenditure needed to keep 
the marginal utility of wealth constant given an anticipated 1 percent change in prices.  
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The magnitude of the ISE increases as additional instruments are added to the instrument 
set.  Without heterogeneity the mean and median values of the ISE range from -1.51 to    
-0.83 and from -1.56 to -0.88, respectively.  Adding heterogeneity reduces the ISE with 
the exception of the specification that includes t-2 instruments.  In this specification the 
mean ISE is -4.08.  Using the nondurable consumption measure and contemporaneous 
instruments with no heterogeneity gives a mean ISE of -0.91 and a median ISE of -0.92.  
The mean value of -0.91 implies a 1 percent equiproportionate increase in all prices leads 
to a 0.91 percent reduction in consumption.  Adding heterogeneity produces a positive 
ISE, implying an increase in all prices leads to an increase in consumption.  Most of the 
other specifications using the nondurable consumption measure and additional instrument 
sets imply an increase in prices lowers consumption.   
 Table 1.10 and Table 1.11 show income, compensated, uncompensated, and 
Frisch substitution elasticities based on food consumption and nondurable consumption 
using an instrument set containing time t, t-1, and t-2 values (Table 1.6 and Table 1.9).  
The procedure to calculate the implied income, compensated, and uncompensated effects 
follows MaCurdy (1983).  Let  represent the Hessian matrix of the utility function and 
,  be the marginal utility of income.  In addition, define the price vector as 
, , , where  is the price of consumption normalized to 1 and ,  is the real wage.  
The implied income, compensated, uncompensated effects are  
  (Income Effects) 
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  (Compensated Effects) 
  (Uncompensated Effects) 
where .  These implied effects are evaluated at the mean of the data and 
converted to elasticities.  For these calculations full income is defined as healthy time 
times hourly wage; labor income is hours worked times hourly wage; and nonlabor 
income is full income less labor income.  Since the translog utility function can produce 
negative marginal utilities, negative marginal utilities are set to zero.  The elasticities in 
columns 1 and 3 are based on parameter estimates without heterogeneity while the 
elasticities in columns 2 and 4 are based on parameter estimates with heterogeneity.  The 
positive nonlabor income elasticities suggest consumption is a normal good; however, for 
labor supply most of the nonlabor income elasticities suggest leisure is an inferior good.  
The labor supply elasticities near zero suggest an inelastic labor supply curve.   The 
positive compensated and uncompensated elasticities for consumption suggest an 
anticipated increase in the wage leads to a rise in consumption.  Most of the Frisch 
specific substitution elasticities are positive, implying consumption and leisure are 
substitutes. 
1.7 Policy Simulations 
A major advantage of adopting the structural approach is the ability to conduct  
policy simulations.  Since the model connects health to wages through human capital 
accumulation, it can provide a sense of how much current health capital accumulation 
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affects future wages, or how health investments today may payoff over a longer period. 
Specifically, it can be used to study the effects of a government subsidy on medical out-
of-pocket expenditures.  If health insurance reduces the cost of health care, the simplest 
way to represent health insurance would lower out-of-pocket medical expenditures.  
Figure 1.2 shows a prediction of giving individuals an additional $2,000 per year to spend 
on medical out-of-pocket expenditures.  This additional $2,000 is considered exogenous 
without regard to how it is financed.  The predictions are nonstochastic and are derived 
from the health capital and human capital production parameters.  They do not account 
for any effects on hours worked, leisure, or consumption.  The top panel of Figure 1.2 
illustrates how the health stock reacts to the additional medical expenditures and provides 
a comparison to the actual health stock.  Predicted health always exceeds actual health.  
The bottom panel of Figure 1.2 shows the predicted human capital stock, represented by 
the wage, begins at the same level as the actual human capital stock and gradually 
improves over time until it almost doubles compared to its initial level.  These predictions 
suggest lowering the price of health care to spur health investment can possibly provide 
long run benefits in the form of increased health and human capital accumulation. 
1.8 Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter presented a structural model of life cycle labor supply with a 
learning-by-doing technology, allowing for health to interrupt the human capital 
accumulation process.  This model fills gaps in the health and labor literatures by 
introducing health to the traditional learning-by-doing model and by introducing on-the-
job human capital accumulation to the health literature.  Using data on male head of 
households from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics covering 1989-2003, the model's 
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Euler equations are estimated using nonlinear generalized method of moments.  The 
estimation takes advantage of sick time data in the PSID to construct a healthy time 
budget constraint for each individual. 
The model produces estimates of the average intertemporal substitution elasticity 
for consumption between -1.51 and -0.83. The results show human capital production 
increases with the current stock of human capital at a decreasing rate which is in accord 
with diminishing returns to the human capital stock.  Health capital production increases 
with the current stock of health capital, or better current health improves future health.  
Health seems to have a relatively small role in interrupting on-the-job human capital 
accumulation.  The weak role of health could be due to using self-reported health.  Self-
reported health measures akin to the one used in this chapter are known to be endogenous 
(Currie and Madrian 1999; Bound, Schoenbaum, Stinebrickner, and Waidmann 1999).  
Measurement error in the health will produce estimates that are biased toward zero.  This 
measurement error in health may be mitigated with more objective health measures found 
in the PSID such as activities of daily living.  In addition, converting the self-reported 
health measure to a four point scale assumes a linear relationship in health status that may 
not hold.  For example, “excellent health” rated as 4 may not be twice “good health” 
rated as 2.  An ordered probit can be used to relax the assumption of linearity in the 
health measure; however, introducing additional nonlinearity, especially in the dependent 
variable for health production, presents other challenges to estimating the structural 
model. 
The model admittedly omits health insurance.  The availability of health insurance 
is certain to influence an individual’s out-of-pocket expenditures on medical care as well 
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as access to health care.  Incorporating health insurance into the model estimation can be 
easily done by including an indicator variable for the presence of health insurance 
coverage in the health production function specification.  Data limitations prevent the 
inclusion of health insurance in the model.  Unfortunately, the PSID does not always ask 
questions about health insurance coverage.  The PSID only began asking individuals 
about health insurance coverage beginning in 1999 which is near the end of the sample 
time frame.   
 The health and labor supply literatures have suggested and documented 
differential health effects by age (Grossman 2000; Hum, Simpson, and Fissuh 2006, 
2008), so future analyses should allow for heterogeneity in age.  Estimating the model on 
different age groups is one way of introducing heterogeneity to the analysis.  One 
possibility would estimate the model on three age groups (age 25-34; age 35-44; age 45-
60). 
Future work will conduct additional policy simulations, allowing for stochastic 
health shocks.  Since the model connects health to wages through human capital 
accumulation, it will be used to simulate the outcomes of two hypothetical individuals 
who only differ in initial health status.  The model can compare the wage and human 
capital paths over time of an individual who begins with good health to an individual who 
begins with poor health.  Similarly, the model can compare the paths of an individual 
who experiences different timing of health shocks.  An individual experiencing poor 
health early in their work career will differ from the same individual experiencing poor 
health later in their work career. 
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   With so much attention on health care reform the model can provide insight into 
the effects of government health care policies on human capital accumulation.  
Specifically, the model may illustrate the human capital effects of a government subsidy 
on medical out-of-pocket expenditures, allowing for stochastic health shocks.  If health 
insurance reduces the cost of health care, the simplest way to represent health insurance 
would lower expenditures.  The model allows the study of how lowering expenditures 
would affect the accumulation of health capital and human capital.  Lowering 
expenditures to spur health investment can possibly provide long run benefits in the form 
of increased health and human capital that has not been previously documented. 
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 1989-2003 
Variable (n=15,236) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Wage (2008 dollars)  25.15 17.85 2.22 199.15 
Work hours 2271.36 512.97 132 5840 
Sick hours  35.04 121.92 0 2500 
Leisure hours  6453.60 507.08 2920 8628 
Healthy hours  8724.96 121.92 6260 8760 
Health status  2.99 0.86 1 4 
Food Consumption (2008 dollars)  9119.98 4132.38 557.43 48685.99 
Medical Out-of-pocket (2008 dollars)  2880.47 1097.82 -441.34 20968.69 
After-tax interest rate  3.94 1.25 1.70 9.30 
Age  39.12 8.36 25 60 
Education (years)  13.84 2.20 4 17 
Number of children  1.13 1.15 0 8 
Family Size  3.18 1.34 1 10 
Northeast  0.20 0.40 0 1 
North Central  0.31 0.46 0 1 
South  0.31 0.46 0 1 
West  0.18 0.38 0 1 
White  0.93 0.26 0 1 
Nonwhite 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Married 0.83 0.38 0 1 
 
  
38 
 
Table 1.1 (continued) 
Variable 
Sick Hours 
Equal to Zero
Sick Hours 
Between 
Zero and 75th 
Percentile 
Sick Hours 
Greater than 
75th 
Percentile 
Wage (2008 dollars)  25.07 25.84 25.19 
Work hours 2301.04 2305.26 2208.75 
Sick hours  0.00 16.02 105.58 
Leisure hours  6458.96 6438.72 6445.68 
Healthy hours  8760.00 8743.98 8654.42 
Health status  3.03 3.14 2.90 
Food Consumption (2008 dollars)  9237.68 9040.64 8905.94 
Medical Out-of-pocket (2008 dollars)  2891.48 2947.29 2848.55 
After-tax interest rate  3.88 3.94 4.05 
Age  39.66 37.56 38.31 
Education (years)  13.71 14.28 14.02 
Number of children  1.12 1.27 1.13 
Family Size  3.19 3.28 3.13 
Northeast  0.19 0.20 0.22 
North Central  0.32 0.35 0.31 
South  0.32 0.29 0.28 
West  0.17 0.16 0.19 
White  0.92 0.96 0.93 
Nonwhite 0.08 0.04 0.07 
Married 0.84 0.87 0.80 
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Table 1.2 Human Capital Production Parameters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
α0 (wt ) 0.976*** (0.108) 1.174*** (0.205) 
α0 (wt) (educ)   -0.00313 (0.0119) 
α0 (wt) (nonwhite)   -0.0537 (0.0702) 
α1 (wt2) -0.393*** (0.0393) -1.200*** (0.259) 
α1 (wt2) (educ)   0.0586*** (0.0174) 
α1 (wt2)(nonwhite)   -0.0308 (0.103) 
α2 (wtNt) 0.0395 (0.0366) 0.00219 (0.0354) 
α3 (Nt) -0.00486 (0.0119) 0.0371 (0.0370) 
α3 (Nt)(educ)   -0.00222 (0.00272) 
α3 (Nt)(nonwhite)   0.0189 (0.0203) 
α4 (Nt2) 0.00229 (0.00225) -0.00824 (0.00788) 
α4 (Nt2)(educ)   0.000674 (0.000633) 
α4 (Nt2)(nonwhite)   -0.00421 (0.00419) 
α5 (Ht) 0.00224 (0.00812) -0.0103 (0.0343) 
α5 (Ht)(educ)   0.00131 (0.00249) 
α5 (Ht) (nonwhite)   -0.00591 (0.0191) 
α6 (Ht2) -0.00148 (0.00132) 0.000847 (0.00644) 
α6 (Ht2)(educ)   -0.000124 (0.000482) 
α6 (Ht2)(nonwhite)   0.000964 (0.00328) 
α7 (HtNt) -0.00146 (0.00310) -0.000776 (0.00316) 
α8 (wtHt) 0.0553** (0.0241) 0.00410 (0.0257) 
τ1989 -0.00318 (0.0219) -0.0331 (0.0263) 
τ1990 0.00635 (0.0222) -0.0239 (0.0263) 
τ1991 0.00266 (0.0223) -0.0266 (0.0267) 
τ1992 0.0124 (0.0220) -0.0178 (0.0264) 
τ1993 -0.00140 (0.0218) -0.0315 (0.0263) 
τ1994 -0.00234 (0.0218) -0.0333 (0.0262) 
τ1995 -0.00317 (0.0218) -0.0343 (0.0262) 
τ1996 0.00381 (0.0219) -0.0273 (0.0263) 
τ1997 0.0176 (0.0219) -0.0133 (0.0262) 
τ1998 0.0174 (0.0219) -0.0131 (0.0264) 
τ1999 0.00505 (0.0219) -0.0252 (0.0263) 
Observations 15236  15236  
R-squared 0.884  0.892  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Columns 3 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
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Table 1.3 Health Capital Production Parameters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
θ0 (Ht )  0.450*** (0.0944) 0.562** (0.241) 
θ0 (Ht) (educ)   -0.00690 (0.0162) 
θ0 (Ht) (nonwhite)   0.240* (0.132) 
θ1 (Ht2)  -0.00904 (0.00673) -0.0436 (0.0406) 
θ1 (Ht2)(educ)   0.00266 (0.00292) 
θ1 (Ht2)(nonwhite)   -0.0445* (0.0249) 
θ2 (HtLt) 0.0315** (0.0126) 0.0274** (0.0129) 
θ3 (Lt)  -0.167 (0.126) -0.226 (0.195) 
θ3 (Lt)(educ)    0.00835 (0.00950) 
θ3 (Lt)(nonwhite)   -0.0593 (0.0698) 
θ4 (Lt2) -0.000181 (0.00903) 0.00293 (0.0180) 
θ4 (Lt2)(educ)   -0.000384 (0.00110) 
θ4 (Lt2)(nonwhite)   0.00316 (0.00759) 
θ5 (Mt)  -1.098* (0.652) -0.461 (1.075) 
θ5 (Mt)(educ)    -0.0444 (0.0509) 
θ5 (Mt)(nonwhite)   -1.276* (0.685) 
θ6 (Mt2) -0.126 (0.0994) -0.898 (1.209) 
θ6 (Mt2)(educ)   0.0627 (0.0732) 
θ6 (Mt2)(nonwhite)   2.618* (1.451) 
θ7 (HtMt)  0.173*** (0.0622) 0.0911 (0.0731) 
θ8 (LtMt)  0.149 (0.0950) 0.111 (0.111) 
τ1989 2.099*** (0.495) 1.965*** (0.522) 
τ1990 2.084*** (0.495) 1.956*** (0.522) 
τ1991 2.091*** (0.494) 1.960*** (0.522) 
τ1992 2.099*** (0.494) 1.958*** (0.522) 
τ1993 2.050*** (0.494) 1.927*** (0.522) 
τ1994 2.078*** (0.495) 1.947*** (0.522) 
τ1995 2.065*** (0.495) 1.936*** (0.522) 
τ1996 2.107*** (0.494) 1.971*** (0.522) 
τ1997 2.104*** (0.494) 1.953*** (0.521) 
τ1998 2.036*** (0.494) 1.884*** (0.522) 
τ1999 2.093*** (0.494) 1.948*** (0.522) 
Observations 15236  15236  
R-squared 0.954  0.955  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Columns 3 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
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Table 1.4 Utility Parameters Using Time t Instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
γ0  (ln Lt )  1.00  1.00  
γ0  (ln Lt) (educ)   -0.0097*** (0.0023) 
γ0  (ln Lt) (nonwhite)   -0.1668 (0.4874) 
γ1  (ln Ct)  0.0016 (0.0013) -0.0015*** (0.0007) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (educ)   -0.00001 (0.00001) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (nonwhite)   -0.0117 (0.0166) 
γ2  (ln Lt ) (ln Ct)  -0.0009 (0.0007) 0.0009*** (0.0003) 
γ3  (ln Lt ) 2  -0.2732*** (0.0084) -0.2326*** (0.0083) 
γ4  (ln Ct ) 2  0.00001 (0.00002) 0.0076 (0.0781) 
γ6  (ln Ht ) (ln Lt )  0.0238 (0.0225) -0.0062 (0.0126) 
γ7  (ln Ht ) (ln Ct) -0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.00003) 
ISE (mean)  -0.83  -0.02  
ISE (median)  -0.88  -0.15  
Sargan test [df] 
 (p-value) 
36.34[31] 
(0.23) 
 43.45[27] 
(0.02) 
 
Observations 15236  15236  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Columns 3 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
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Table 1.5 Utility Parameters Using Time t and t-1 Instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
γ0  (ln Lt )  1.00  1.00  
γ0  (ln Lt) (educ)   -0.0049*** (0.0008) 
γ0  (ln Lt) (nonwhite)   -0.1250 (0.0821) 
γ1  (ln Ct)  0.0006 (0.0005) -0.0001 (0.0004) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (educ)   0 (0) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (nonwhite)   -0.0018 (0.0022) 
γ2  (ln Lt ) (ln Ct)  -0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0001 (0.0002) 
γ3  (ln Lt ) 2  -0.2602*** (0.0036) -0.2517*** (0.0028) 
γ4  (ln Ct ) 2  0.00001 (0.00001) 0.0005 (0.0034) 
γ6  (ln Ht ) (ln Lt )  -0.0368*** (0.0121) 0.0103 (0.0083) 
γ7  (ln Ht ) (ln Ct) 0.0002*** (0.0001) -0.00001 (0.00001) 
ISE (mean)  -1.08  0.01  
ISE (median)  -1.10  -0.16  
Sargan test [df] 
 (p-value) 
56.92[65] 
(0.75) 
 77.59[61] 
(0.07) 
 
Observations 12903  12903  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Columns 3 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
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Table 1.6 Utility Parameters Using Time t, t-1, and t-2 Instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
γ0  (ln Lt )  1.00  1.00  
γ0  (ln Lt) (educ)   -0.0023*** (0.0009) 
γ0  (ln Lt) (nonwhite)   -0.1264 (0.2984) 
γ1  (ln Ct)  0.0049*** (0.0009) 0.0051*** (0.0005) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (educ)   -0.0001*** (0.00001) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (nonwhite)   0.0133 (0.0191) 
γ2  (ln Lt ) (ln Ct)  -0.0028*** (0.0005) -0.0023*** (0.0002) 
γ3  (ln Lt ) 2  -0.2735*** (0.0032) -0.2385*** (0.0054) 
γ4  (ln Ct ) 2  -0.0002*** (0.00003) -0.0003 (0.0004) 
γ6  (ln Ht ) (ln Lt )  -0.0018 (0.0104) -0.0589*** (0.0149) 
γ7  (ln Ht ) (ln Ct) -0.0006*** (0.0002) 0 (0.00002) 
ISE (mean)  -1.51  -4.08  
ISE (median)  -1.56  -0.03  
Sargan test [df] 
 (p-value) 
97.37[96] 
(0.44) 
 87.73[92] 
(0.61) 
 
Observations 10570  10570  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Columns 3 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
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Table 1.7 Utility Parameters Using Time t Instruments and Nondurable 
Consumption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
γ0  (ln Lt )  1.00  1.00  
γ0  (ln Lt) (educ)   -0.0084*** (0.0023) 
γ0  (ln Lt) (nonwhite)   -0.1474 (0.3622) 
γ1  (ln Ct)  0.0038** (0.0021) -0.0024*** (0.0012) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (educ)   0.00001 (0.00001) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (nonwhite)   -0.0268 (0.0264) 
γ2  (ln Lt ) (ln Ct)  -0.0020** (0.0011) 0.0014*** (0.0006) 
γ3  (ln Lt ) 2  -0.2781*** (0.0079) -0.2356*** (0.0080) 
γ4  (ln Ct ) 2  0.00002 (0.00003) 0.0795 (0.1120) 
γ6  (ln Ht ) (ln Lt )  0.0366** (0.0214) -0.0126 (0.0119) 
γ7  (ln Ht ) (ln Ct) -0.0005** (0.0003) 0.0001** (0.0001) 
ISE (mean)  -0.91  0.76  
ISE (median)  -0.92  0.30  
Sargan test [df] 
 (p-value) 
34.98 [31] 
(0.28) 
 41.89 [27] 
(0.03) 
 
Observations 15236  15236  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Columns 3 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
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Table 1.8 Utility Parameters Using Time t and t-1 Instruments and Nondurable 
Consumption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
γ0  (ln Lt )  1.00  1.00  
γ0  (ln Lt) (educ)   -0.0051*** (0.0008) 
γ0  (ln Lt) (nonwhite)   -0.2011 (0.1264) 
γ1  (ln Ct)  0.0006 (0.0009) -0.0004 (0.0007) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (educ)   -0.00001 (0.00001) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (nonwhite)   -0.0043 (0.0067) 
γ2  (ln Lt ) (ln Ct)  -0.0003 (0.0005) 0.0003 (0.0003) 
γ3  (ln Lt ) 2  -0.2609*** (0.0038) -0.2502*** (0.0026) 
γ4  (ln Ct ) 2  0.00001 (0.00001) -0.0032 (0.0048) 
γ6  (ln Ht ) (ln Lt )  -0.0342*** (0.0130) 0.0080 (0.0081) 
γ7  (ln Ht ) (ln Ct) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0 (0.00001) 
ISE (mean)  -1.14  -3.66  
ISE (median)  -1.08  0.39  
Sargan test [df]  
(p-value) 
58.65[65] 
(0.70) 
 76.85[61] 
(0.08) 
 
Observations 12903  12903  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Columns 3 and 4 include observed heterogeneity.  
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Table 1.9 Utility Parameters Using Time t, t-1, and t-2 Instruments and Nondurable 
Consumption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
γ0  (ln Lt )  1.00  1.00  
γ0  (ln Lt) (educ)   -0.0033*** (0.0009) 
γ0  (ln Lt) (nonwhite)   0.0252 (0.4233) 
γ1  (ln Ct)  0.0123*** (0.0021) 0.0097 (0.0011) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (educ)   -0.0001*** (0.00002) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (nonwhite)   0.0051 (0.0443) 
γ2  (ln Lt ) (ln Ct)  -0.0069*** (0.0013) -0.0044*** (0.0004) 
γ3  (ln Lt ) 2  -0.2790*** (0.0039) -0.2369*** (0.0055) 
γ4  (ln Ct ) 2  -0.0005*** (0.0001) -0.00003 (0.0008) 
γ6  (ln Ht ) (ln Lt )  0.0164 (0.0125) -0.0473*** (0.0153) 
γ7  (ln Ht ) (ln Ct) -0.0010*** (0.0003) -0.00002 (0.00004) 
ISE (mean)  -5.70  -1.30  
ISE (median)  -1.75  -1.12  
Sargan test [df] 
 (p-value) 
98.32[96] 
(0.42) 
 96.10[92] 
(0.36) 
 
Observations 10570  10570  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Columns 3 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
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Table 1.10 Elasticities Based On Food Consumption 
 Consumption Labor 
Elasticity (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income Elasticity 1.52 1.83 0.01 -0.02 
     
Compensated Elasticity 0.00002 0.006 0.001 0.02 
     
Uncompensated Elasticity 1.13 0.73 0.001 0.02 
     
Frisch specific substitution 
elasticity 
0.01 -0.03 0.001 0.02 
Elasticities based on parameters from model with t, t-1, and t-2 instruments and are 
evaluated at the mean values of the data. Columns 1 and 3 do not include heterogeneity.  
Columns 2 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
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Table 1.11 Elasticities Based On Nondurable Consumption 
 Consumption Labor 
Elasticity (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income Elasticity 0.95 0.88 0.02 0.01 
     
Compensated Elasticity 0.00002 0.0007 0.002 0.01 
     
Uncompensated Elasticity 0.72 0.40 0.002 0.01 
     
Frisch specific substitution 
elasticity 
0.04 0.01 0.003 0.01 
Elasticities based on parameters from model with t, t-1, and t-2 instruments and are 
evaluated at the mean values of the data. Columns 1 and 3 do not include heterogeneity.  
Columns 2 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
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Figure 1.1 Distribution of Sick Hours 
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Figure 1.2 Prediction of Additional Medical Out-of-Pocket Expenditures 
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2  NONCOGNITIVE SKILLS AND THE RACIAL WAGE GAP 
2.1 Introduction 
Economists have established the importance of cognitive ability and human 
capital in determining the returns to education and other behaviors.  Sociologists and 
psychologists have focused on the role of noncognitive skills in social outcomes.  
Noncognitive skills refers to a type of human capital, or “psychological capital,” 
describing a person’s self-perception, work ethic, ethical orientation, and overall outlook 
on life.20 Common sense suggests these noncognitive skills certainly influence an 
individual’s productivity along with cognitive skills.  Economists typically account for 
noncognitive skills in an error term of an estimating equation, claiming personality traits 
are difficult to measure or are just unobservable.  They address these unobserved skills 
using an error component model on panel data that relies on fixed effects or random 
effects.  Sociologists and psychologists have constructed measures of noncognitive skills 
that allow a researcher to control for some of the unobserved heterogeneity.   
Much effort has been expended on studying the racial wage gap.  Common 
explanations for the racial wage gap include employer and consumer discrimination, 
varying school quality, and differences in premarket factors.  Neal and Johnson (1996) 
show the black-white wage gap shrinks after including a premarket factor, cognitive 
skills, in a parsimonious wage equation.  While it is apparent that cognitive skills are an 
important premarket factor to consider, it seems natural that noncognitive skills may be 
an important factor as well.  Economists are developing a better understanding of the 
importance of these skills for educational attainment and economic success in the general 
                                                            
20 ter Weel (2008) and Heckman (2007) expand the definition of noncognitive skills beyond psychological 
and behavioral traits to include time preference, risk aversion, and preference for leisure. 
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population (Coleman and DeLeire, 2003; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006).  Less 
understood is the impact of these skills among subgroups of the general population, 
specifically racial groups.   
This chapter investigates the role of noncognitive skills in explaining racial gaps 
in wages.  Noncognitive skills, measured by locus of control and self-esteem, are added 
to a simple wage regression from Neal and Johnson (1996) to examine their effect on the 
wage gap.  The analysis extends the racial wage gap and noncognitive skills literatures by 
studying the effect of noncognitive skills on wage gaps across the entire wage 
distribution.  Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
(NLSY79) spanning 1991-2006 this chapter estimates wage regressions based on three 
estimators: a pooled estimator, a between estimator, and a quantile estimator.  The wage 
regressions take advantage of the timing of when noncognitive skills and wages are 
measured in the NLSY79.  The wage regressions relate cognitive and noncognitive skills 
measured at the beginning of the NLSY79 before individuals enter the labor market or 
begin post secondary schooling to wages measured later in life.  The various model 
specifications capture the separate and simultaneous effects of cognitive and 
noncognitive skills on the wage gap.   
Ordinary least squares results show noncognitive skills account for a small 
portion of the male black-white wage gap when measured at the mean of the wage 
distribution.  Noncognitive skills have differing effects for black women.  Ordinary least 
squares results show locus of control shrinks the gap, but self-esteem widens it.  After 
controlling for cognitive and noncognitive skills, there still exists a significant return to 
noncognitive skills.  External individuals earn less, and individuals with higher self-
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esteem earn more.  Quantile regressions controlling for cognitive and noncognitive skills 
suggest the black-white male wage gap persists at all points of the wage distribution 
while the black-white female wage gap exists at only the highest portion of the wage 
distribution.  Hispanic men earn less than white men at lower quantiles but earn more at 
higher quantiles.  After controlling for cognitive and noncognitive skills, Hispanic 
women always earn more than white women across the entire wage distribution.  In 
addition, after controlling for cognitive skills and noncognitive skills, the return to 
cognitive skills exceeds the return to noncognitive skills across the entire wage 
distribution.   
2.2 Noncognitive Literature and Racial Wage Gaps 
Economists began studying the role of noncognitive skills over three decades ago.  
Bowles and Gintis (1976) find that low skill markets contain employers that place a 
higher value on noncognitive skills.  Edwards (1976) finds blue-collar supervisors prefer 
these skills over cognitive skills, while Mueser (1979) shows noncognitive skills are just 
as important as cognitive skills in determining wages.   
 Andrisani (1977) specifically examines the effect of locus of control on wages 
and occupational attainment in black and white men.  Locus of control, measured by the 
Rotter Scale, gauges the degree of internal or external control an individual has over their 
life.  It describes the extent to which individuals believe they have control over their lives 
through self-motivation or self-determination (internal control) as opposed to the extent 
that the environment (chance, fate, luck) controls their lives (external control) (National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 2007).  Andrisani uses a sample of young and middle aged 
men taken from the National Longitudinal Survey in 1968 and 1969. He studies how 
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locus of control relates to wages and occupation two years after they are measured to 
determine the subsequent effect of attitude.  He includes locus of control in a standard 
earnings equation with common controls (education, tenure, experience, region, 
urban/rural, etc.).  Locus of control among both racial groups has similar payoffs--more 
internal individuals have higher wages.  Differences exist in occupational advancement.  
Younger white men experience a stronger effect of being internal on occupational 
advancement than younger black men.   
 Duncan and Morgan (1981) replicate Andrisani’s work with data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  Since the PSID does not directly ask the Rotter 
Scale, Duncan and Morgan match answers to open ended questions coded by PSID staff 
in 1968 to components of the Rotter Scale and use the answers as a measure of self-
efficacy.  They examine the effects of self-efficacy on wages two and four years later.  
Unlike Andrisani, they find no significant effect on either young black or young white 
men two years later; however, they find a positive significant effect for white men four 
years later.   
 Goldsmith, Veum, and Darity (1997) recognize that wages and self-esteem are 
determined jointly, so they estimate two equations with locus of control and self-esteem 
data from the 1987 and 1980 NLSY79.  In their specification, self-esteem directly enters 
the wage equation while locus of control directly enters the self-esteem equation, so locus 
of control only indirectly affects wages through self-esteem.  Their equations are 
identified through strong exclusion restrictions.  The wage equation leaves out locus of 
control, and the self-esteem equation leaves out local labor market conditions.  Unlike 
previous studies, Goldsmith, Veum, and Darity control for cognitive ability through the 
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1980 Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) score.  Their findings suggest self-esteem 
has a stronger positive effect on wages than human capital, and locus of control 
significantly affects self-esteem.  They interpret their findings as “psychological capital” 
affecting wages in two ways: directly through self-esteem and indirectly through locus of 
control.  In addition, they find blacks earn less, and higher wages lead to better self-
esteem.   
 Coleman and DeLeire (2003) develop a theoretical model connecting locus of 
control among teenagers to educational attainment through expectations on the return to 
education.  Their model implies more internal teenagers, who believe their current actions 
influence future outcomes, are more likely to make investments in education.  Their 
model offers a test of whether locus of control is just a proxy for ability.  If locus of 
control simply proxies for ability, then internal teenagers, both high school dropouts and 
high school graduates, will expect better outcomes.  Coleman and DeLeire test their 
theory with the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS) data by regressing 
educational attainment (high school or college completion) on locus of control measured 
in the eighth grade. While they show internal teenagers are more likely to graduate from 
high school, they do not explain any racial differences in this effect.  Race variables only 
enter as additional controls in their estimation.  
In a replication study with different data Cebi (2007) tests Coleman and DeLeire’s 
model with educational attainment data from the NLSY79 and examines the effects of 
noncognitive skills on wages.  Cebi uses locus of control measured in 1979 to explain the 
probability of graduating from high school and attending college in 1982.  Her results 
differ from Coleman and DeLeire.  After controlling for AFQT score, she finds no 
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evidence that locus of control predicts high school graduation or attending college.  She 
also finds a small significant return to locus of control in year 2000 wages, so more 
internal individuals earn more later in life.  Also, the black wage gap shrinks after 
accounting for AFQT and locus of control.  Cebi’s analysis focuses on a pooled sample 
of men and women and studies the effect of noncognitive skills at the mean of the wage 
distribution.  Cebi only considers locus of control as the measure of noncognitive skills.   
Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov (2005) document differences in noncognitive 
skills among black, Hispanic, and white children as measured by the antisocial behavior 
index in the children of the NLSY79 cohort.  They show environmental differences 
account for the majority of the minority-white gap in noncognitive skills.  This work only 
addresses the differences in early childhood and does not relate these differences to 
wages. 
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) provide an extensive treatment of 
noncognitive skills.  They develop a statistical model to describe the importance of 
cognitive and noncognitive skills in determining schooling, work experience, wages, 
occupational choice, and a number of risky behavioral outcomes.  Though they do not 
address differences among racial groups, they advance the economic noncognitive 
literature in two important ways.  First, they consider the simultaneous effects of 
cognitive and noncognitive skills on a variety of outcomes beyond just the standard labor 
market and educational outcomes.  Second, they develop a methodology that accounts for 
the endogeneity of schooling and measurement error in test scores.  In this context 
schooling may cause higher test scores.  Their methodology uses a common set of latent 
cognitive and noncognitive factors to determine each outcome of interest.  In addition, 
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they estimate a test score equation for each cognitive and noncognitive measure that 
depends on the level of schooling at the time of the test and the appropriate latent factor.  
Allowing schooling to enter this equation controls for its influence on the test score.  
They utilize the AFQT score, Rotter Scale, and Rosenberg Self-Esteem score from the 
NLSY79 in estimating their model.  They present evidence that schooling affects both 
measures of cognitive and noncognitive abilities, so it is important to control for this 
effect.  They focus their analysis on the differences between men and women, not racial 
differences.  
  Urzua (2008) estimates a structural model of schooling choice, labor market 
behavior, and incarceration to examine the importance of unobserved cognitive and 
noncognitive abilities in explaining the black-white gaps in these outcomes.  Specific 
labor market behavior includes wages, earnings, and hours worked.  The model addresses 
the endogeneity of schooling choice because individuals make schooling decisions based 
on differences in returns to schooling.  Measurement error in cognitive and noncognitive 
abilities is handled in a similar way as Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), and the 
analysis uses the same measures of these skills in the NLSY79 as in Heckman, Stixrud, 
and Urzua (2006).  Urzua finds black-white differences in the unobserved abilities for 
both cognitive and noncognitive distributions.  For schooling choices, hours worked, and 
wages,  noncognitive abilities matter more for blacks than for whites.  Unobserved 
noncognitive abilities do not account for much of the black-white wage or earnings gap; 
however, unobserved noncognitive abilities do play a stronger role in explaining the gap 
in incarceration rates.  Urzua simulates the effect of assigning blacks white characteristics 
to study how the gaps in wages, earnings, schooling, and incarceration change.  When 
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blacks have the white distribution of unobserved cognitive abilities, they attain equal or 
better education levels as whites, and the gap in wages and earnings falls by about 40 
percent, smaller than the literature which claims a 50-75 percent reduction when 
observed cognitive ability is controlled for.  Urzua only studies the black-white wage and 
earnings gap at the mean and does not consider the gap at other points of the wage or 
earnings distributions.  Giving blacks the white distribution of unobserved noncognitive 
abilities does not change the wage or earnings gap by much.  So, it is unobserved 
cognitive ability that explains racial gaps in schooling attainment and labor market 
outcomes.  When blacks have the white distribution of unobserved cognitive and 
noncognitive abilities, they achieve the lowest level of incarceration rates. 
 This chapter presents wage regressions relating noncognitive skills measured 
during the teenage years before individuals enter the labor market or begin post 
secondary schooling to wages measured later in life.  This chapter extends the 
noncognitive literature in several ways.  First, the analysis examines the effect of 
noncognitive skills on the wage gap for Hispanics, not just blacks.  Second, the analysis 
considers the racial wage gap for each gender and race combination.  The noncognitive 
literature has typically focused on differences between men and women without 
examining racial differences within gender.  Third, the analysis extends the racial wage 
gap and noncognitive skills literatures by going beyond the wage gap measured at the 
mean of the wage distribution.  The analysis studies the effect of noncognitive skills on 
wage gaps across the entire wage distribution.   
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2.3 Model Specification 
The model specification for this chapter draws from the literature on race 
differences in premarket human capital and wages (O’Neill 1990; Maxwell 1994; 
Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov 2005).  Neal and Johnson (1996) carefully test a 
theory in this literature that relates the black-white and Hispanic-white wage gap to 
differences in the skills measured by the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) at labor 
market entry.  The specification for this chapter incorporates noncognitive skills as an 
additional premarket factor in the model presented by Neal and Johnson (1996).  The 
simple specification is of the following form: 
ln , ,
, , , / , /
 
where wagei,t  is the real wage of person i in year t in 2009 dollars, adjusted by the 
personal consumption expenditures price index.   and  are dummy 
variables for black and Hispanic racial groups (white is the omitted category) while  
is the person’s age.  ,  is the score from AFQT in 1980 and serves as a measure 
of cognitive skills.  The AFQT is constructed from summing scores on sections 2-5 of the 
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Test (ASVAB): arithmetic reasoning, word 
knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and numerical operations.  The raw AFQT score 
is then normalized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.   
  is a noncognitive measure in 1979 or 1980.  The AFQT score is 
commonly used by economists, but the measures of noncognitive skills are less common 
and warrant further discussion.  Two measures of noncognitive skills are used: the Rotter 
Scale and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.  The Rotter Internal-External Locus of 
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Control Scale, administered in 1979, is a four item questionnaire designed to measure the 
degree to which a person has control over their life through self-motivation or self-
determination (internal control) as opposed to the extent that the environment (i.e., 
chance, fate, luck) controls their life (external control) (NLSY documentation 2007).  A 
higher score reflects a more external person. The four item questionnaire consists of these 
statement pairs listed below: 
1. Rotter 1  
a. What happens to me is my own doing 
b. Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction my life is 
taking 
2. Rotter 2 
a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work 
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead, because many things turn out to be 
a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow 
3. Rotter 3 
a. Getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck 
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin 
4. Rotter 4  
a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me 
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role 
in my life 
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The first statement in each pair corresponds to an internal control item while the 
second statement corresponds to an external control item.  A person chooses one of the 
paired statements and decides if the chosen statement is much closer or slightly closer to 
their opinion of themselves.  Together these two answers generate a four point scale for 
each paired item.  The Rotter score is the average over the four paired items (Rotter 1, 
Rotter 2, Rotter 3, and Rotter 4).  The Rotter score is normalized in the same way as the 
AFQT score.21 
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, administered in 1980, is a 10 item scale that 
measures the self-evaluation that an individual makes and characterizes the degree of 
approval or disapproval toward oneself (NLSY documentation 2007).  A higher score 
corresponds to higher self-esteem.  A person answers the following ten statements of 
approval or disapproval with strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree: 
1. I feel I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities 
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of 
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself 
9. I certainly feel useless at times 
                                                            
21 This averaging of the paired item scores and normalization of the Rotter score follows Heckman, Stixrud, 
and Urzua (2006). 
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10. At times I think I am no good at all 
 
The Rosenberg score averages the responses over the ten statements.  This average is also 
normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. 
 Four variations of the specification are estimated:  
1. Black, Hispanic, Age 
2. Black, Hispanic, Age, AFQT, AFQT2  
3. Black, Hispanic, Age, Noncog,  Noncog2 
4. Black, Hispanic, Age, AFQT, AFQT2, Noncog, Noncog2 
 
These specifications are meant to capture the separate and simultaneous effects of 
cognitive and noncognitive abilities.  As a robustness check, specifications that replace 
AFQT with components of AFQT are estimated.  Specifications that interact race with 
cognitive skills and noncognitive skills to allow for differing returns by race are 
estimated.  In addition, specifications that control for region (South and nonsouth) and 
interact region with cognitive and noncognitive skills are estimated.   
The key idea from Neal and Johnson (1996) is these factors are measured before 
labor market entry to eliminate any effects due to worker choices or labor market 
discrimination.  These specifications omit education, experience, and occupation, 
commonly included regressors in an earnings specification, because they are also 
endogenous.  Including these common regressors biases the effect of race on wages if 
discrimination against blacks or Hispanics causes them to make occupation or education 
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choices different from whites.  Following Neal and Johnson the sample is limited to 
individuals born after 1961 who are 18 or younger when they took the ASVAB test.  
Individuals in this group most likely have not entered the labor market or begun 
postsecondary schooling when they took the ASVAB test. Not including individuals who 
are over 18 eliminates any influence of schooling or the labor market on the AFQT score.  
In addition, following Neal and Johnson (1996) only individuals with wage observations 
between $1 and $75 are considered.     
2.4 Estimation Methods 
  The variations of the simple model specification are estimated using a pooled 
estimator, a between estimator, and a quantile estimator.  The pooled estimator includes 
annual time dummy variables for 1992-2006, so the specification becomes 
ln , , ,  
This specification is estimated using ordinary least squares with clustered standard errors 
to correct for the longitudinal structure of the NLSY.  The standard errors account for 
repeated observations of individuals over time.   
The between estimator is the ordinary least squares estimator on individual time 
means of the data, or  
ln ′  
where ln ∑ ln ,  and similarly for other variables.  The between 
estimator averages the individual data over time, keeping one observation per individual.  
This smoothing offers the advantage of reducing any measurement error associated with 
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the wage and an improvement in efficiency. This specification is also estimated using 
ordinary least squares but with heteroskedastic robust standard errors. 
 Unlike the ordinary least squares estimator which estimates the conditional mean, 
the quantile estimator estimates the conditional quantile of the wage as a linear function 
of the observables.  Formally, the quantile estimator solves the minimization problem 
min ln , ,′  
where ·  represents the ’th quantile “check” function, or absolute value function.  
Each specification is estimated for deciles .10, .20, .30, .40, .50, .60, .70, .80, .90  
on the pooled data and the time-averaged data used for the between estimator.  Standard 
errors are estimated using the nonparametric bootstrap with 100 replications. 
2.5 Data 
The data in the analysis come from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 (NLSY79).  The NLSY79 contains 12,686 individuals between the ages of 14 and 
21 at the time of the first interview in 1979.  The NLSY79 collects information on labor 
market outcomes as well as cognitive and noncognitive abilities.  The interviews occur 
every year for 1979-1994 and every two years for 1996-2006.  This analysis uses wage 
observations beginning with 1991 when sample ages were 26-29 and ending with 2006 
when sample ages were 41-45.  The NLSY79 reports an hourly wage if the individual is 
an hourly worker and reports an hourly wage; otherwise, the NLSY79  calculates an 
hourly wage rate from earnings and hours worked (NLSY documentation 2010).  As 
mentioned before, the cognitive measure comes from the AFQT score calculated from the 
ASVAB taken in 1980.  The noncognitive measures come from the Rotter Scale for locus 
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of control and Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale administered in 1979 and 1980, respectively.  
Each specification is estimated for men and women separately and covers the years 1991-
1994 (annually) and 1996-2006 (biennially). 
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the entire analysis sample, and Table 
2.2 shows summary statistics by gender and race.  Relatively more men than women 
comprise the sample with the majority of the sample white (52%) followed by black 
(29%) and Hispanic (19%).  Blacks earn an average hourly wage below the sample 
average hourly wage of $16.72 (2009 dollars) while whites earn an average wage above 
it.  Figure 2.1 displays kernel density estimates of the standardized AFQT, Rotter, and 
Rosenberg scores by racial group and by gender.  The horizontal and vertical scales are 
the same for ease of comparison.  The white AFQT distribution is clearly shifted to the 
right when compared to the other distributions.  On average whites scored highest on the 
AFQT test (standardized average .32), and blacks scored the lowest (standardized 
average -.45).   The black and Hispanic Rotter distributions share a similar shape while 
the white Rotter distribution contains more mass less than zero, suggesting whites are 
more internal than the other groups.  The Rosenberg Self-Esteem distributions reveal 
Hispanics have the lowest self-esteem while whites and blacks have similar self-esteem 
distributions.  White men and women scored highest on the AFQT test followed by their 
Hispanic and black counterparts.  Comparing locus of control for men shows Hispanic 
men are the most external with white men being the most internal.  Black women are the 
most external followed by Hispanic and white women.   
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2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results   
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present ordinary least squares regressions for the pooled data 
and the time-averaged data.  These results cover the ten survey years for 1991-2006, 
corresponding to the sample age beginning at 26-29 and ending at 41-45.  The four 
specifications are estimated by gender (columns 1-4, men; columns 5-8, women). 
Columns 1 and 5 show the specification without cognitive or noncognitive measures; 
columns 2 and 6 add the cognitive measure; columns 3 and 7 add the noncognitive 
measure; and columns 4 and 8 add both cognitive and noncognitive measures.  The first 
subtable uses the Rotter Scale while the second subtable uses the Rosenberg Scale. 
In Table 2.3, first subtable (Rotter Scale) the black racial gap follows the same 
pattern discovered by Neal and Johnson (1996).  Adding AFQT score dramatically 
reduces the magnitude of the negative coefficient on black men (column 2).  For black 
women adding AFQT produces this effect too.  The Hispanic coefficient on men falls and 
switches signs for women, qualitatively matching Neal and Johnson’s results for 
Hispanics.  Comparing the black and Hispanic coefficients for men in column 3 that 
includes the Rotter Score to column 1 shows very little change (about 1 percent 
reduction), so noncognitive skills cannot account for much of the wage gap.  This agrees 
with Andrisani (1977) who could not find a large difference in the return to noncognitive 
skills between white and black men.  The black coefficient for women after adding the 
Rotter Score (column 7) falls by about 2 percent, suggesting noncognitive skills account 
for a larger portion of the wage gap.  After controlling for both sets of skills (columns 4 
and 8), there still exists a return to cognitive skills for both men and women.  For 
noncognitive skills men and women experience a significant return.  The negative sign on 
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the Rotter coefficient implies more external individuals receive lower wages.  This return 
to internal individuals is consistent with Andrisani’s (1977) analysis of earlier NLS data 
and Cebi’s (2007) analysis of 2000 NLSY79 data.22   
Noncognitive skills, as measured by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale in the 
second subtable, slightly widen the black wage gap for men (column 3) (1 percent) but 
for women the gap widens more (column 7) (3 percent).  When including self-esteem, the 
Hispanic gap for men falls by 2 percent, but there is no significant effect on the Hispanic 
gap for women.  When including AFQT and self-esteem, men and women receive a 
positive, significant return to self-esteem. The return to women is higher.  The positive 
coefficient means higher self-esteem translates to higher wages later in life.  This positive 
relationship agrees with Goldsmith, Veum, and Darity (1997) who conduct their analysis 
with NLSY79 data from 1987.  Like locus of control self-esteem seems to only 
significantly affect wages in a linear way. 
Table 2.4 presents the same analysis using time-averaged data.  The between 
estimator produces coefficient estimates that are qualitatively similar to the estimates in 
Table 2.3.  Noncognitive skills measured by either the Rotter Scale or Rosenberg Scale 
change the black wage gap for men (column 3) by a small amount (1 percent reduction).  
Locus of control changes the wage gap for Hispanic men by a 1 percent reduction, but 
self-esteem reduces the gap by 2 percent.  Noncognitive skills have differing effects for 
black women.  Locus of control shrinks the gap by 2 percent, but self-esteem widens it by 
2 percent.  The Hispanic coefficient for women remains insignificant whether including 
                                                            
22 Cebi (2007) defines the Rotter Scale, so a higher score implies a more internal individual.  This analysis 
follows the NLSY documentation which defines the Rotter Scale in the opposite way, so the coefficients in 
this analysis will have the opposite sign as those reported in Cebi (2007). 
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locus of control or self-esteem.  After controlling for AFQT and locus of control, men 
and women experience a significant return to locus of control.  After controlling for 
AFQT and self-esteem, men and women experience a significant return to self-esteem.  
Women now face a lower return to self-esteem than men.   
2.6.2 Quantile Regression Results 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 corroborate the main finding of Urzua (2008) that noncognitive 
skills can not account for much of the black-white wage gap for men measured at the 
mean of the wage distribution.  Tables 2.5-2.8 extend the analysis presented in Tables 2.3 
and 2.4 to examine effects at various quantiles of the wage distribution.  Tables 2.5 and 
2.6 show quantile regressions with locus of control and self-esteem, respectively, 
estimated on the pooled data.  Figure 2.2 shows the change in the wage gap after adding 
noncognitive skills.  It plots the difference in the black and Hispanic coefficients between 
Specification 1 and Specification 3.  Cognitive skills are mainly responsible for the 
reduction of the wage gap in Table 2.5 for men and women.  Locus of control does not 
greatly affect the magnitude of the wage gap for black and Hispanic men at any quantile 
(reduction of 1-2 percent); however, locus of control does affect the gap for black and 
Hispanic women.  For black women locus of control accounts for a portion of the wage 
gap at quantiles 20-40 (about 2 percent reduction). This portion grows for quantiles 50-80 
to about 5 percent at the 80th quantile and falls to about 3 percent at the 90th quantile.  For 
Hispanic women locus of control accounts for a portion of the wage gap (about 2 percent 
reduction) in the upper quantiles (60 -90) too.  Self-esteem (Table 2.6) has differing 
effects on the wage gap for black men across the wage distribution.  The wage gap for 
black men falls by 1-2 percent when including self-esteem at some quantiles but mostly 
widens or does not change.  For Hispanic men self-esteem closes the gap at most 
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quantiles with the greatest reduction at the 10th and 70th quantiles (about 4 percent).  The 
gap for black women grows by 4 percent at the 10th quantile, grows by 1-3 percent at 
quantiles 20-60, and grows by 4-5 percent at quantiles 70-90.  Most of the estimates on 
the Hispanic coefficient for women are imprecisely estimated at quantiles at or below the 
median.  For Hispanic women above the median the wage gap does not change or widens 
by 1-3 percent.   
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show quantile regressions estimated on the time-averaged data.  
Table 2.7 includes locus of control while Table 2.8 includes self-esteem.  Still, cognitive 
skills are responsible for most of the reduction in the wage gap for men and women.  
Figure 2.3, like Figure 2.2, shows the change in the wage gap after adding noncognitive 
skills.  At most quantiles locus of control influences the wage gap for black and Hispanic 
men usually by a reduction of 1-2 percent.  For black women locus of control lowers the 
gap by 1-2 percent at lower quantiles (10-60) and by 3-6 percent at higher quantiles (70-
90).  Locus of control for Hispanic women has a negligible effect on the gap.  Including 
self-esteem widens the wage gap at most quantiles for black men but lowers the gap at 
most quantiles for Hispanic men by 2-7 percent.  Like black men black women 
experience a wider gap when including self-esteem at most quantiles with the largest 
differences at the upper quantiles (70-90) (3-10 percent).  Self-esteem does not impact 
Hispanic women as most Hispanic coeffients are imprecisely estimated.   
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 plot each quantile coefficient and its 95% confidence band for 
specifications 4 and 8 from Tables 2.5-2.8.  These specifications control for both 
cognitive and noncognitive measures and give a sense of how the wage gaps and return to 
cognitive and noncognitive skills vary over the wage distribution.  Figure 2.4 is based on 
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pooled data, and Figure 2.5 is based on time-averaged data.  Panels 1 (locus of control) 
and 2 (self-esteem) of Figure 2.4 show the specifications for locus of control by gender.  
These panels show differing effects on the black wage gap.  The gap remains relatively 
flat and persists across the wage distribution for men and locus of control.  Black women 
earn more than white women at the lowest quantile of the distribution (9.0 percent more) 
and continue to earn more until they earn less at the 90th quantile (3.6 percent less).  
Hispanic men earn less than their white counterparts at the 10th quantile (about 7 percent 
less) until the 60th quantile when they earn more for the remaining portions of the wage 
distribution.23  Hispanic women, on the other hand, always earn more than white women 
across the wage distribution.24  The profiles for AFQT and Rotter indicate a larger return 
to cognitive skills than noncognitive skills.25  Using self-esteem as the noncognitive 
measure does not qualitatively change the trends.  The wage gap persists for black men.  
Black women earn more than white women at the lower quantiles of the distribution and 
earn less at higher quantiles.  Hispanic men face an upward sloping wage gap profile, and 
Hispanic women always earn more.  Similarly, the return to cognitive skills exceeds the 
return to self-esteem across the entire distribution.  These trends do not change with time-
averaged data (Figure 2.5).26   
2.6.3 Robustness 
  Tables 2.9-2.14 offer specifications that replace AFQT with components of AFQT 
and interact race with cognitive skills and noncognitive skills to allow for differing 
                                                            
23 A joint hypothesis test on the equality of the Hispanic coefficient for men across quantiles is rejected at 
the 1 percent significance level. 
24 A joint hypothesis test on the equality of the Hispanic coefficient for women across quantiles is rejected 
at the 5 percent significance level. 
25 A joint hypothesis test on the equality of AFQT and Rotter coefficients for each gender across quantiles 
is rejected at the 1 percent significance level. 
26 A joint hypothesis test on the equality of Hispanic coefficients for men and women cannot be rejected at 
the 10 percent significance level. 
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returns by race.  Tables 2.9-2.12 follow Table 2.3 in using pooled data but replace the 
composite AFQT score with each section that comprises it: word knowledge (Table 2.9), 
arithmetic reasoning (Table 2.10), paragraph comprehension (Table 2.11), and numerical 
operations (Table 2.12).27  Overall, replacing the AFQT score with its components still 
dramatically reduces the magnitude of the negative coefficient on black men (column 2).  
The largest reduction occurs with the Word Knowledge score, and the smallest reduction 
occurs with the Numerical Operations score.  None of these reductions are greater than 
the reduction when including the AFQT score.  For black women using components of 
the AFQT produces large reductions too.  The Hispanic coefficient on men falls and 
switches signs for women, qualitatively matching the results when using AFQT.  After 
controlling for each section of the AFQT and locus of control, there still exists a return to 
locus of control for men and women.  More external individuals earn less with the largest 
effect for Numerical Operations and Paragraph Comprehension.  After controlling for 
each section of the AFQT and self-esteem, men and women with higher self-esteem 
receive higher wages later in life.  The largest return occurs with Arithmetic Reasoning 
and Numerical Operations for men and women. The return to self-esteem for women still 
exceeds the return for men when using the components.   
 Tables 2.13 and 2.14 report specifications that interact race with AFQT and 
noncognitive skills to allow for varying returns by race.  Like Table 2.3 both tables use 
pooled data.  Table 2.13 shows the specification with locus of control, and Table 2.14 
shows the specification with self-esteem.  When controlling for both sets of skills, these 
specifications suggest no differential returns in men by race for locus of control or self-
                                                            
27 Each section score is normalized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
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esteem (column 4).  The specifications do suggest differential returns for women only in 
self-esteem.  When controlling for AFQT and self-esteem, black and Hispanic women 
earn more than their white counterparts (column 8). 
 Tables 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17 report specifications that control for region of 
residence where individuals lived as a teen in 1979.  Table 2.15 adds a region dummy 
variable for South to each specification and controls for the large black population 
residing in the South.  Individuals who lived in the South as teens earn lower wages later 
in life, regardless of which noncognitive skill is examined.  The black coefficient in 
column 1 falls by about 3 percent compared to the black coefficient in column 1 of Table 
2.3 which does not include a region control.  Comparing the AFQT and locus of control 
coefficients in Table 2.15 and Table 2.3 shows very little change.  Though the 
magnitudes of the black and Hispanic coefficients are smaller than in Table 2.3, the 
qualitative results do not change after controlling for region.  Tables 2.16 and 2.17 
interact the South dummy variable with cognitive and noncognitive skills to allow for 
differing returns by the region where individuals lived as a teen.  Both tables show a 
higher return to AFQT for women living in the South in 1979.  Table 2.17 shows a 
nonlinear effect on self-esteem for women living in the South.    
2.7 Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter investigates the role of noncognitive skills in explaining racial gaps 
in wages.  Noncognitive skills are added to a parsimonious wage regression from Neal 
and Johnson (1996) to examine their effect on the wage gap.  The analysis extends the 
wage gap and noncognitive skills literatures by studying the effect of noncognitive skills 
on wage gaps across the entire wage distribution.  Using data from the National 
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Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 spanning 1991-2006 this chapter estimates wage 
regressions based on three estimators: a pooled estimator, a between estimator, and a 
quantile estimator.  The wage regressions take advantage of the timing of when 
noncognitive skills and wages are measured.  The wage regressions relate cognitive and 
noncognitive skills measured at the beginning of the NLSY before individuals enter the 
labor market or begin post secondary schooling to wages measured later in life.  The 
various model specifications capture the separate and simultaneous effects of cognitive 
and noncognitive skills on the wage gap.   
Model estimates based on the pooled and between estimators confirm the finding 
in the wage gap literature that cognitive skills consistently account for much of the male 
black-white wage gap measured at the mean of the wage distribution.  These model 
estimates also confirm a finding in the noncognitive literature that noncognitive skills 
cannot account for the male black-white wage gap measured at the mean of the wage 
distribution.  While the pooled and between estimators suggest significant returns exist to 
noncognitive skills even after controlling for cognitive skills, the rank ordering of these 
returns between genders differs by estimator.  Quantile regressions of the specification 
controlling for cognitive and noncognitive skills have different implications on the black-
white wage gap.  The black-white male wage gap persists at all points of the wage 
distribution.  The black-white female wage gap exists at the highest portion of the wage 
distribution.   The Hispanic-white wage gap profiles also differ by gender.  After 
controlling for cognitive and noncognitive skills, Hispanic men earn less than white men 
at lower quantiles but earn more at higher quantiles.  After controlling for cognitive and 
noncognitive skills, Hispanic women earn more than white women at all quantiles.  The 
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return to cognitive skills is greater than the return to noncognitive skills at all quantiles 
after controlling for both sets of skills.   
Noncognitive skills have generally been found to determine wage levels in the 
general population and across both genders (Heckman 2006).  The noncognitive literature 
has emphasized the importance of connecting the development of these skills in early 
childhood to adult outcomes.  In this context, the finding in this chapter that noncognitive 
skills cannot affect or close some racial wage gaps presents a puzzle to the noncognitive 
literature.  On one hand, these skills are important for wage levels; on the other hand, 
they do not seem to be important for wage gaps.  It is possible that the specific 
noncognitive skills examined do not dramatically differ by race as depicted by their 
density functions.  It is also possible that other noncognitive skills that are more direct 
measures of work ethic and motivation may be better determinants of relative wages.   
 Future work relating noncognitive skills to the racial wage gap should address a 
few issues, most notably an adjustment for sample selection, alternative measures of 
noncognitive skills, and an investigation into using the AFQT as a proxy variable for 
premarket human capital.  Chandra (2003) and Neal (2004) show ignoring labor force 
withdrawal biases estimates of the racial wage gap.   Chandra (2003) and Neal (2004) 
implement variations of a matching estimator to impute wages for individuals with 
missing wage data.  Similar procedures should be implemented on the wage regressions 
in this chapter to account for the influence of missing wages on the wage gap.  Given the 
wide classification of a noncognitive skill, many alternative measures are available in the 
NLSY79.  Weinberger (2008a and 2008b) and Rouse (2008) use sports and leadership 
participation as a measure of noncognitive skills which motivates an alternative measure 
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as participation in extracurricular activities. In 1984 the NLSY79 asked questions about 
high school participation in sports, student government, student publications, performing 
arts, and clubs.  Krueger and Schkade (2008) develop a measure of gregariousness based 
on time diary information to gauge how sociability impacts selection into jobs.  In 1985 
individuals in the NLSY79 self report the degree to which he or she is shy or outgoing as 
a measure of sociability.  Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov (2005) use the behavior 
problems index to measure noncognitive skills in children of the NLSY79 cohort.  A 
series of questions in 1980 surveying school discipline problems related to suspension 
and expulsion could serve as a similar measure for the NLSY79 cohort.  A set of 
questions about risk and impatience in the most recent survey, 2006, can be used to 
determine degree of risk aversion.  Bollinger (2003) shows the measurement error 
associated with using the AFQT as a proxy variable for human capital accumulation may 
bias the racial coefficients in the specification.  Future work should investigate the 
severity of this bias in this context where proxy variables for cognitive and noncognitive 
skills are used.   
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Table 2.1 Sample Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Entire Sample (n=25,085)     
     Male 0.53 0.50 0 1 
     Female 0.47 0.50 0 1 
     Black 0.29 0.45 0 1 
     Hispanic 0.19 0.39 0 1 
     White 0.52 0.50 0 1 
     AFQT 0.01 0.82 -2.33 1.65 
     Rotter 0.18 1.00 -2.32 3.37 
     Rosenberg 0.18 0.94 -2.49 1.90 
     Age 33.67 4.72 26.00 43.00 
     Wage (2009 dollars)  16.72 10.20 1.00 74.75 
Black Sample (n=7,311)     
     Male 0.52 0.50 0 1 
     Female 0.48 0.50 0 1 
     AFQT -0.45 0.68 -2.33 1.50 
     Rotter 0.29 1.06 -2.32 3.37 
     Rosenberg -0.06 0.92 -2.49 1.90 
     Age 33.77 4.72 26.00 43.00 
     Wage (2009 dollars)  13.99 8.50 1.02 73.07 
Hispanic Sample (n=4,822)     
     Male 0.50 0.50 0 1 
     Female 0.50 0.50 0 1 
     AFQT -0.21 0.74 -2.33 1.50 
     Rotter 0.23 0.99 -2.32 3.37 
     Rosenberg -0.30 0.93 -2.49 1.90 
     Age 33.62 4.72 26.00 43.00 
     Wage (2009 dollars)  16.42 9.93 1.00 74.75 
White Sample (n=12,952)     
     Male 0.54 0.50 0 1 
     Female 0.46 0.50 0 1 
     AFQT 0.32 0.77 -2.33 1.65 
     Rotter 0.10 -0.95 2.32 3.37 
     Rosenberg -0.20 -0.95 2.23 1.90 
     Age 33.63 4.72 26.00 43.00 
     Wage (2009 dollars)  18.37 10.82 1.00 73.53 
 
  
Table 2.2 Sample Summary Statistics By Gender and Race 
Men 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Black (n=3,772)     
     AFQT -0.53 0.69 -2.33 1.40 
     Rotter 0.22 1.12 -2.32 3.37 
     Rosenberg -0.09 0.94 -2.23 1.90 
     Age 33.61 4.69 26.00 42.00 
     Wage (2009 dollars)  14.83 9.13 1.02 73.07 
Hispanic (n=2,424)     
     AFQT -0.27 0.78 -2.33 1.37 
     Rotter 0.25 1.01 -2.32 3.37 
     Rosenberg -0.32 0.90 -2.49 1.90 
     Age 33.46 4.72 26.00 43.00 
     Wage (2009 dollars)  17.51 10.48 1.10 74.12 
White (n=7,039)     
     AFQT 0.26 0.81 -2.33 1.65 
     Rotter 0.09 0.95 -2.32 3.37 
     Rosenberg -0.16 0.93 -2.23 1.90 
     Age 33.61 4.71 26.00 42.00 
     Wage (2009 dollars)  20.35 11.30 1.08 73.12 
     
Women 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Black (n=3,539)     
     AFQT -0.37 0.65 -2.33 1.50 
     Rotter 0.38 1.00 -2.32 3.37 
     Rosenberg -0.04 0.89 -2.49 1.90 
     Age 33.93 4.73 26.00 43.00 
     Wage (2009 dollars)  13.10 7.66 1.08 67.60 
Hispanic (n=2,398)     
     AFQT -0.14 0.68 -2.33 1.50 
     Rotter 0.21 0.97 -2.32 3.37 
     Rosenberg -0.28 0.96 -2.23 1.90 
     Age 33.78 4.72 26.00 42.00 
     Wage (2009 dollars)  15.33 9.22 1.00 74.75 
White (n=5,913)     
     AFQT 0.39 0.71 -2.33 1.62 
     Rotter 0.12 0.96 -2.32 3.37 
     Rosenberg -0.23 0.98 -2.23 1.90 
     Age 33.65 4.72 26.00 43.00 
     Wage (2009 dollars)  16.01 9.71 1.00 73.53 
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Table 2.3 Log Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Locus of Control and Self-Esteem 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.119*** -0.317*** -0.123*** -0.180*** 0.0502* -0.157*** 0.0522** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Hispanic -0.155*** -0.0170 -0.148*** -0.0173 -0.0341 0.133*** -0.0250 0.131*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.00289 0.0270** 0.00146 0.00244 -0.00493 -0.00533 -0.00876 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
AFQT  0.259***  0.255***  0.294***  0.281*** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
AFQT2  0.0643***  0.0616***  0.0643***  0.0622*** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Rotter   -0.0522*** -0.0224**   -0.0812*** -0.0425*** 
   (0.011) (0.010)   (0.014) (0.012) 
Rotter2   0.00423 0.00737   0.00416 0.00355 
   (0.0078) (0.0069)   (0.0088) (0.0079) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 
R2 0.11 0.22 0.12 0.22 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.16 79  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.119*** -0.331*** -0.139*** -0.180*** 0.0502* -0.207*** 0.0160 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
Hispanic -0.155*** -0.0170 -0.139*** -0.0203 -0.0341 0.133*** -0.0281 0.123*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.00289 0.0149 -0.00247 0.00244 -0.00493 -0.00517 -0.00841 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
AFQT  0.259***  0.240***  0.294***  0.269*** 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
AFQT2  0.0643***  0.0600***  0.0643***  0.0605*** 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
Rosenberg   0.111*** 0.0527***   0.114*** 0.0611*** 
   (0.011) (0.011)   (0.012) (0.012) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00928 -0.00516   -0.0177 -0.0117 
   (0.010) (0.0097)   (0.012) (0.011) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 
R2 0.11 0.22 0.14 0.23 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.17 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses correct for the longitudinal structure of the NLSY by accounting for repeated observations of individuals 
over time.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 Log Wage Regression Using Time-Averaged Data with Locus of Control and Self-Esteem 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.367*** -0.151*** -0.361*** -0.157*** -0.163*** 0.0624** -0.139*** 0.0659** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
Hispanic -0.187*** -0.0333 -0.179*** -0.0343 -0.0424 0.120*** -0.0322 0.118*** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Age 0.0151* 0.00852 0.0148* 0.00849 -0.00773 -0.0154* -0.0111 -0.0168* 
 (0.0079) (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0086) 
AFQT  0.279***  0.270***  0.287***  0.274*** 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
AFQT2  0.0643***  0.0604***  0.0574***  0.0548*** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Rotter   -0.0662*** -0.0353***   -0.0777*** -0.0406*** 
   (0.013) (0.012)   (0.015) (0.014) 
Rotter2   0.00230 0.00510   -0.00333 -0.00505 
   (0.010) (0.0097)   (0.0100) (0.0092) 
Observations 1675 1675 1671 1671 1588 1588 1580 1580 
R2 0.09 0.23 0.11 0.23 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.16 80  
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.367*** -0.151*** -0.378*** -0.182*** -0.163*** 0.0624** -0.185*** 0.0343 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) 
Hispanic -0.187*** -0.0333 -0.163*** -0.0374 -0.0424 0.120*** -0.0346 0.111*** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Age 0.0151* 0.00852 0.0120 0.00757 -0.00773 -0.0154* -0.0109 -0.0165* 
 (0.0079) (0.0074) (0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0086) 
AFQT  0.279***  0.248***  0.287***  0.266*** 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
AFQT2  0.0643***  0.0566***  0.0574***  0.0538*** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Rosenberg   0.138*** 0.0767***   0.105*** 0.0514*** 
   (0.013) (0.013)   (0.014) (0.014) 
Rosenberg2   -0.0114 -0.00655   -0.0158 -0.0112 
   (0.012) (0.011)   (0.014) (0.013) 
Observations 1675 1675 1674 1674 1588 1588 1587 1587 
R2 0.09 0.23 0.15 0.25 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2.5 Quantile Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Locus of Control 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, 1991-2006 (10th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.238*** -0.116*** -0.246*** -0.121*** -0.0572*** 0.0882*** -0.0619*** 0.0904*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0149) (0.0139) (0.0189) (0.0163) (0.0197) (0.0150) (0.0181) 
Hispanic -0.156*** -0.0661*** -0.164*** -0.0697*** -0.0179 0.0935*** -0.0356* 0.0902*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0201) (0.0184) (0.0224) 
Age 0.0157* -0.00477 0.0134* -0.00651 -0.00153 -0.00826 -0.00644 -0.00809 
 (0.00898) (0.00796) (0.00737) (0.00884) (0.00636) (0.0103) (0.00775) (0.00992) 
AFQT  0.187***  0.186***  0.211***  0.206*** 
  (0.0118)  (0.0133)  (0.0146)  (0.0145) 
AFQT2  0.0232**  0.0224*  0.0449***  0.0478*** 
  (0.0111)  (0.0120)  (0.0130)  (0.0119) 
Rotter   -0.0317*** -0.00511   -0.0445*** -0.0245*** 
   (0.00681) (0.00818)   (0.00594) (0.00916) 
Rotter2   0.000910 0.00484   0.00664 0.00865 
   (0.00454) (0.00445)   (0.00424) (0.00591) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 81 Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, 1991-2006 (20th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.144*** -0.316*** -0.149*** -0.138*** 0.0622*** -0.124*** 0.0665*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0130) (0.0154) (0.0148) (0.0130) (0.0160) (0.0121) (0.0141) 
Hispanic -0.176*** -0.0793*** -0.177*** -0.0822*** -0.0242 0.110*** -0.0334* 0.105*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0202) (0.0176) (0.0205) (0.0198) (0.0152) (0.0180) (0.0181) 
Age 0.0249*** -0.000352 0.0273*** -0.000181 0.00374 -0.0119* 0.00246 -0.0122* 
 (0.00760) (0.00683) (0.00718) (0.00673) (0.00695) (0.00687) (0.00761) (0.00646) 
AFQT  0.249***  0.246***  0.257***  0.253*** 
  (0.00891)  (0.0102)  (0.0101)  (0.0108) 
AFQT2  0.0505***  0.0500***  0.0680***  0.0709*** 
  (0.00942)  (0.00943)  (0.00798)  (0.00729) 
Rotter   -0.0280*** -0.0156**   -0.0618*** -0.0350*** 
   (0.00769) (0.00687)   (0.00835) (0.00796) 
Rotter2   -0.000995 0.0123***   0.0111* 0.0108** 
   (0.00443) (0.00394)   (0.00566) (0.00421) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2.5 (continued) 
 Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, 1991-2006 (30th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.371*** -0.157*** -0.375*** -0.163*** -0.167*** 0.0705*** -0.148*** 0.0736*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0136) (0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0138) 
Hispanic -0.205*** -0.0551*** -0.209*** -0.0614*** -0.0100 0.148*** -0.00749 0.149*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0174) (0.0184) (0.0172) (0.0192) (0.0142) (0.0270) (0.0161) 
Age 0.0263*** 0.00379 0.0226*** 0.00275 -0.00444 -0.0164*** -0.0121* -0.0162** 
 (0.00651) (0.00596) (0.00672) (0.00588) (0.00711) (0.00558) (0.00707) (0.00654) 
AFQT  0.272***  0.269***  0.301***  0.289*** 
  (0.00876)  (0.00808)  (0.00901)  (0.00972) 
AFQT2  0.0536***  0.0529***  0.0770***  0.0752*** 
  (0.00835)  (0.00741)  (0.00610)  (0.00844) 
Rotter   -0.0419*** -0.0222***   -0.0719*** -0.0341*** 
   (0.00649) (0.00543)   (0.00828) (0.00752) 
Rotter2   0.00843* 0.00986***   0.0113* 0.00303 
   (0.00470) (0.00350)   (0.00627) (0.00422) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 82 Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, 1991-2006 (40th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.374*** -0.137*** -0.369*** -0.144*** -0.170*** 0.0611*** -0.150*** 0.0623*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0149) (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0148) (0.0172) 
Hispanic -0.170*** -0.0238 -0.163*** -0.0182 0.00447 0.144*** 0.0105 0.143*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0152) (0.0185) (0.0122) (0.0165) (0.0154) (0.0176) (0.0160) 
Age 0.0345*** 0.00700 0.0316*** 0.00692 -0.00447 -0.00777 -0.00883 -0.0131* 
 (0.00688) (0.00631) (0.00635) (0.00516) (0.00693) (0.00646) (0.00703) (0.00715) 
AFQT  0.283***  0.278***  0.319***  0.306*** 
  (0.00716)  (0.00682)  (0.00864)  (0.00878) 
AFQT2  0.0553***  0.0493***  0.0771***  0.0747*** 
  (0.00613)  (0.00701)  (0.00660)  (0.00631) 
Rotter   -0.0499*** -0.0226***   -0.0833*** -0.0365*** 
   (0.00634) (0.00590)   (0.00905) (0.00819) 
Rotter2   0.0123*** 0.0106**   0.0104* 0.00325 
   (0.00428) (0.00465)   (0.00584) (0.00511) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 2.5 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, 1991-2006 (50th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.362*** -0.132*** -0.356*** -0.132*** -0.194*** 0.0482*** -0.168*** 0.0551*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0132) (0.0150) (0.0138) (0.0151) (0.0143) (0.0151) (0.0136) 
Hispanic -0.172*** -0.00920 -0.167*** -0.00751 -0.0192 0.135*** -0.0115 0.134*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0146) (0.0244) (0.0149) (0.0165) (0.0153) (0.0180) (0.0148) 
Age 0.0440*** 0.0146*** 0.0382*** 0.0119* -0 0.00126 -0.0152** -0.00316 
 (0.00580) (0.00548) (0.0119) (0.00632) (0.00712) (0.00587) (0.00773) (0.00557) 
AFQT  0.283***  0.282***  0.331***  0.317*** 
  (0.00678)  (0.00724)  (0.00748)  (0.00864) 
AFQT2  0.0556***  0.0504***  0.0754***  0.0711*** 
  (0.00583)  (0.00691)  (0.00688)  (0.00723) 
Rotter   -0.0516*** -0.0247***   -0.0998*** -0.0453*** 
   (0.00677) (0.00494)   (0.00764) (0.00703) 
Rotter2   0.00825 0.0106***   0.0149*** 0.00454 
   (0.0100) (0.00362)   (0.00469) (0.00455) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 83 Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, 1991-2006 (60th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.360*** -0.114*** -0.348*** -0.118*** -0.241*** 0.0536*** -0.202*** 0.0622*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0136) (0.0196) (0.0134) (0.0174) (0.0127) (0.0167) (0.0198) 
Hispanic -0.166*** -0.000908 -0.159*** 0.00463 -0.0583*** 0.130*** -0.0347** 0.124*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0147) (0.0286) (0.0143) (0.0191) (0.0173) (0.0155) (0.0157) 
Age 0.0410*** 0.0152** 0.0392** 0.0113** 0.00122 -0.000428 -0.00458 0.000442 
 (0.00518) (0.00597) (0.0190) (0.00525) (0.00825) (0.00646) (0.00772) (0.00628) 
AFQT  0.287***  0.286***  0.341***  0.328*** 
  (0.00706)  (0.00744)  (0.00777)  (0.0155) 
AFQT2  0.0628***  0.0581***  0.0713***  0.0687*** 
  (0.00688)  (0.00743)  (0.00696)  (0.0157) 
Rotter   -0.0580*** -0.0264***   -0.112*** -0.0575*** 
   (0.00660) (0.00536)   (0.00771) (0.0123) 
Rotter2   0.00814 0.0117***   0.0160*** 0.0113* 
   (0.00839) (0.00373)   (0.00436) (0.00669) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
Table 2.5 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, 1991-2006 (70th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.354*** -0.0972*** -0.333*** -0.0972*** -0.264*** 0.0379** -0.218*** 0.0471*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0128) (0.0153) (0.0142) (0.0148) (0.0174) (0.0148) (0.0169) 
Hispanic -0.173*** 0.0189 -0.158*** 0.0197 -0.0808*** 0.136*** -0.0667*** 0.138*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0145) (0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0174) (0.0186) (0.0167) (0.0203) 
Age 0.0426*** 0.0114** 0.0369*** 0.0104 0.0157** 0.0106 0.00911 -0.00112 
 (0.00674) (0.00570) (0.00658) (0.00676) (0.00725) (0.00763) (0.00725) (0.00686) 
AFQT  0.296***  0.291***  0.335***  0.323*** 
  (0.00699)  (0.00743)  (0.00905)  (0.00820) 
AFQT2  0.0697***  0.0676***  0.0617***  0.0624*** 
  (0.00755)  (0.00661)  (0.00740)  (0.00771) 
Rotter   -0.0656*** -0.0243***   -0.0956*** -0.0694*** 
   (0.00673) (0.00555)   (0.00830) (0.00677) 
Rotter2   0.00352 0.00790*   0.00404 0.0112*** 
   (0.00387) (0.00415)   (0.00549) (0.00430) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 84 Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, 1991-2006 (80th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.336*** -0.0899*** -0.328*** -0.0921*** -0.267*** 0.0132 -0.216*** 0.0231 
 (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0142) (0.0222) (0.0194) (0.0182) (0.0181) 
Hispanic -0.163*** 0.0230 -0.146*** 0.0278 -0.0905*** 0.129*** -0.0631*** 0.125*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0170) (0.0214) (0.0171) (0.0192) (0.0177) (0.0225) (0.0199) 
Age 0.0404*** 0.00294 0.0329*** 0.00540 0.0136 0.00981 0.00356 0.00599 
 (0.00655) (0.00643) (0.00755) (0.00759) (0.00905) (0.00763) (0.00733) (0.00755) 
AFQT  0.287***  0.280***  0.332***  0.316*** 
  (0.00866)  (0.00785)  (0.0114)  (0.0103) 
AFQT2  0.0829***  0.0788***  0.0569***  0.0583*** 
  (0.00900)  (0.00908)  (0.00903)  (0.00806) 
Rotter   -0.0706*** -0.0256***   -0.0927*** -0.0592*** 
   (0.00785) (0.00532)   (0.00683) (0.00631) 
Rotter2   0.00189 0.00605**   -0.00203 0.00153 
   (0.00516) (0.00244)   (0.00461) (0.00402) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 2.5 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, 1991-2006 (90th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.300*** -0.0946*** -0.291*** -0.101*** -0.237*** -0.0324* -0.211*** -0.0364* 
 (0.0191) (0.0240) (0.0202) (0.0199) (0.0168) (0.0182) (0.0168) (0.0200) 
Hispanic -0.0947*** 0.0353 -0.0834*** 0.0404* -0.0616*** 0.0956*** -0.0383 0.0944*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0254) (0.0197) (0.0212) (0.0232) (0.0189) (0.0274) (0.0232) 
Age 0.0408*** -0.00684 0.0320*** -0.000755 0.0210** 0.00946 0.0106 0.000189 
 (0.0101) (0.00777) (0.00808) (0.00925) (0.00825) (0.00920) (0.0117) (0.0108) 
AFQT  0.243***  0.233***  0.300***  0.272*** 
  (0.0114)  (0.00935)  (0.0132)  (0.0169) 
AFQT2  0.0932***  0.0841***  0.0748***  0.0696*** 
  (0.0112)  (0.00999)  (0.0125)  (0.0141) 
Rotter   -0.0787*** -0.0415***   -0.0821*** -0.0392*** 
   (0.00841) (0.0101)   (0.00959) (0.00780) 
Rotter2   0.00501 0.00271   -0.0105** -0.00908* 
   (0.00555) (0.00621)   (0.00525) (0.00478) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 85 Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
  
 
 
Table 2.6 Quantile Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Self-Esteem 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, 1991-2006 (10th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.238*** -0.116*** -0.258*** -0.137*** -0.0572*** 0.0882*** -0.0963*** 0.0648*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0160) (0.0180) (0.0134) (0.0198) 
Hispanic -0.156*** -0.0661*** -0.118*** -0.0772*** -0.0179 0.0935*** -0.00648 0.0958*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0180) (0.0225) (0.0155) (0.0194) (0.0216) (0.0154) (0.0224) 
Age 0.0157* -0.00477 0.00432 -0.00890 -0.00153 -0.00826 -0.00415 -0.00694 
 (0.00868) (0.00851) (0.00860) (0.00800) (0.00747) (0.00880) (0.00749) (0.00824) 
AFQT  0.187***  0.177***  0.211***  0.196*** 
  (0.0124)  (0.0121)  (0.0137)  (0.0139) 
AFQT2  0.0232**  0.0228**  0.0449***  0.0431*** 
  (0.0106)  (0.0105)  (0.0122)  (0.0124) 
Rosenberg   0.0782*** 0.0297***   0.0638*** 0.0400*** 
   (0.00781) (0.00879)   (0.00766) (0.00701) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00584 -0.00350   -0.0266*** -0.0172** 
   (0.00846) (0.00764)   (0.00800) (0.00837) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 
86 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, 1991-2006 (20th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.144*** -0.326*** -0.161*** -0.138*** 0.0622*** -0.146*** 0.0377*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0140) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.00987) (0.0164) (0.0119) (0.0142) 
Hispanic -0.176*** -0.0793*** -0.168*** -0.0854*** -0.0242 0.110*** 0.00370 0.104*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0186) (0.0177) (0.0206) (0.0193) (0.0146) (0.0166) (0.0175) 
Age 0.0249*** -0.000352 0.0216*** -0.00151 0.00374 -0.0119* -0.00447 -0.0143** 
 (0.00720) (0.00769) (0.00770) (0.00793) (0.00713) (0.00640) (0.00683) (0.00660) 
AFQT  0.249***  0.230***  0.257***  0.239*** 
  (0.00982)  (0.0110)  (0.0111)  (0.0101) 
AFQT2  0.0505***  0.0453***  0.0680***  0.0682*** 
  (0.00894)  (0.00914)  (0.00938)  (0.00739) 
Rosenberg   0.0886*** 0.0393***   0.0866*** 0.0491*** 
   (0.00748) (0.00714)   (0.00704) (0.00715) 
Rosenberg2   0.00307 0.00285   -0.0209*** -0.0149** 
   (0.00704) (0.00645)   (0.00650) (0.00670) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 2.6 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, 1991-2006 (30th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.371*** -0.157*** -0.374*** -0.173*** -0.167*** 0.0705*** -0.174*** 0.0450*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0147) (0.0123) (0.0158) (0.0122) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0152) 
Hispanic -0.205*** -0.0551*** -0.174*** -0.0572*** -0.0100 0.148*** 0.000640 0.146*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0184) (0.0155) (0.0204) (0.0184) (0.0137) (0.0162) (0.0159) 
Age 0.0263*** 0.00379 0.0184*** 0.00128 -0.00444 -0.0164*** -0.00805 -0.0154** 
 (0.00711) (0.00655) (0.00507) (0.00607) (0.00779) (0.00634) (0.00529) (0.00629) 
AFQT  0.272***  0.256***  0.301***  0.279*** 
  (0.00843)  (0.00994)  (0.00790)  (0.0102) 
AFQT2  0.0536***  0.0523***  0.0770***  0.0744*** 
  (0.00789)  (0.00710)  (0.00641)  (0.00703) 
Rosenberg   0.104*** 0.0410***   0.110*** 0.0578*** 
   (0.00611) (0.00634)   (0.00672) (0.00669) 
Rosenberg2   0.00615 0.00241   -0.0259*** -0.0138** 
   (0.00681) (0.00546)   (0.00558) (0.00542) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 87 Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, 1991-2006 (40th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.374*** -0.137*** -0.386*** -0.150*** -0.170*** 0.0611*** -0.195*** 0.0371*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0157) (0.0139) (0.0166) (0.0153) (0.0128) (0.0148) (0.0142) 
Hispanic -0.170*** -0.0238 -0.159*** -0.0181 0.00447 0.144*** 0.0157 0.144*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0153) (0.0167) (0.0147) (0.0152) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0146) 
Age 0.0345*** 0.00700 0.0238*** 0.00399 -0.00447 -0.00777 -0.00746 -0.00929 
 (0.00573) (0.00530) (0.00602) (0.00584) (0.00637) (0.00538) (0.00683) (0.00574) 
AFQT  0.283***  0.268***  0.319***  0.294*** 
  (0.00622)  (0.00882)  (0.00803)  (0.00845) 
AFQT2  0.0553***  0.0529***  0.0771***  0.0784*** 
  (0.00635)  (0.00718)  (0.00666)  (0.00596) 
Rosenberg   0.105*** 0.0416***   0.123*** 0.0675*** 
   (0.00556) (0.00583)   (0.00650) (0.00540) 
Rosenberg2   -0.000434 0.00136   -0.0207*** -0.0159*** 
   (0.00558) (0.00513)   (0.00706) (0.00591) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
Table 2.6 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, 1991-2006 (50th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.362*** -0.132*** -0.378*** -0.142*** -0.194*** 0.0482*** -0.227*** 0.0154 
 (0.0155) (0.0137) (0.0171) (0.0131) (0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0140) (0.0150) 
Hispanic -0.172*** -0.00920 -0.163*** -0.0122 -0.0192 0.135*** -0.0232 0.127*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0148) (0.0297) (0.0127) (0.0163) (0.0183) (0.0151) (0.0142) 
Age 0.0440*** 0.0146*** 0.0242* 0.00688 -0 0.00126 -0.00315 -0.00404 
 (0.00657) (0.00540) (0.0136) (0.00556) (0.00757) (0.00636) (0.00697) (0.00568) 
AFQT  0.283***  0.266***  0.331***  0.307*** 
  (0.00679)  (0.00744)  (0.00798)  (0.00800) 
AFQT2  0.0556***  0.0518***  0.0754***  0.0723*** 
  (0.00553)  (0.00559)  (0.00734)  (0.00572) 
Rosenberg   0.117*** 0.0473***   0.140*** 0.0693*** 
   (0.00599) (0.00540)   (0.00712) (0.00643) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00121 -0.00595   -0.0214*** -0.0103 
   (0.00919) (0.00526)   (0.00600) (0.00627) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 88 Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, 1991-2006 (60th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.360*** -0.114*** -0.354*** -0.134*** -0.241*** 0.0536*** -0.265*** -0.00900 
 (0.0140) (0.0134) (0.0376) (0.0132) (0.0173) (0.0143) (0.0155) (0.0151) 
Hispanic -0.166*** -0.000908 -0.145*** -0.00382 -0.0583*** 0.130*** -0.0549*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0142) (0.0329) (0.0131) (0.0212) (0.0171) (0.0180) (0.0169) 
Age 0.0410*** 0.0152** 0.0274 0.00758 0.00122 -0.000428 0.00107 0.00253 
 (0.00532) (0.00665) (0.225) (0.00567) (0.00772) (0.00618) (0.00711) (0.00653) 
AFQT  0.287***  0.267***  0.341***  0.302*** 
  (0.00708)  (0.00825)  (0.00756)  (0.00911) 
AFQT2  0.0628***  0.0603***  0.0713***  0.0635*** 
  (0.00620)  (0.00640)  (0.00613)  (0.00666) 
Rosenberg   0.123 0.0534***   0.151*** 0.0816*** 
   (0.652) (0.00720)   (0.00714) (0.00706) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00115 -0.00166   -0.0166** -0.0107* 
   (0.806) (0.00582)   (0.00739) (0.00638) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 2.6 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, 1991-2006 (70th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.354*** -0.0972*** -0.348*** -0.125*** -0.264*** 0.0379** -0.303*** -0.0317* 
 (0.0172) (0.0124) (0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0168) 
Hispanic -0.173*** 0.0189 -0.138*** 0.00617 -0.0808*** 0.136*** -0.0795*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0148) (0.0203) (0.0148) (0.0167) (0.0174) (0.0182) (0.0181) 
Age 0.0426*** 0.0114* 0.0216*** 0.00529 0.0157** 0.0106 0.00606 0.00516 
 (0.00632) (0.00597) (0.00737) (0.00718) (0.00665) (0.00753) (0.00809) (0.00661) 
AFQT  0.296***  0.269***  0.335***  0.292*** 
  (0.00725)  (0.00704)  (0.00771)  (0.0101) 
AFQT2  0.0697***  0.0640***  0.0617***  0.0554*** 
  (0.00761)  (0.00860)  (0.00860)  (0.00759) 
Rosenberg   0.128*** 0.0605***   0.152*** 0.0934*** 
   (0.00624) (0.00666)   (0.00710) (0.00843) 
Rosenberg2   -0.0127** -0.000641   -0.0221*** -0.00645 
   (0.00643) (0.00556)   (0.00771) (0.00635) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 89 Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, 1991-2006 (80th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.336*** -0.0899*** -0.344*** -0.115*** -0.267*** 0.0132 -0.320*** -0.0547*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0158) (0.0125) (0.0225) (0.0179) (0.0147) (0.0176) 
Hispanic -0.163*** 0.0230 -0.150*** 0.0182 -0.0905*** 0.129*** -0.0970*** 0.0917*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0180) (0.0166) (0.0161) (0.0186) (0.0165) (0.0193) (0.0175) 
Age 0.0404*** 0.00294 0.0181*** -0.00551 0.0136 0.00981 0.00692 -0.00210 
 (0.00623) (0.00736) (0.00691) (0.00746) (0.00997) (0.00833) (0.00768) (0.00720) 
AFQT  0.287***  0.259***  0.332***  0.290*** 
  (0.00791)  (0.00786)  (0.0104)  (0.0119) 
AFQT2  0.0829***  0.0749***  0.0569***  0.0486*** 
  (0.00933)  (0.00872)  (0.00819)  (0.00804) 
Rosenberg   0.131*** 0.0657***   0.138*** 0.0879*** 
   (0.00729) (0.00653)   (0.00838) (0.00799) 
Rosenberg2   -0.0191*** -0.00979   -0.00868 -0.00434 
   (0.00606) (0.00599)   (0.00732) (0.00606) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 2.6 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, 1991-2006 (90th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.300*** -0.0946*** -0.290*** -0.121*** -0.237*** -0.0324* -0.290*** -0.0696*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0183) (0.0200) (0.0204) (0.0165) (0.0181) (0.0212) (0.0210) 
Hispanic -0.0947*** 0.0353 -0.106*** 0.0226 -0.0616*** 0.0956*** -0.0937*** 0.0911*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0242) (0.0226) (0.0191) (0.0172) (0.0228) 
Age 0.0408*** -0.00684 0.0176** -0.0186* 0.0210** 0.00946 -1.59e-05 0.00213 
 (0.00947) (0.00827) (0.00883) (0.0102) (0.00972) (0.00882) (0.0105) (0.00953) 
AFQT  0.243***  0.220***  0.300***  0.278*** 
  (0.0104)  (0.0117)  (0.0153)  (0.0130) 
AFQT2  0.0932***  0.0868***  0.0748***  0.0736*** 
  (0.0114)  (0.00943)  (0.0149)  (0.0132) 
Rosenberg   0.124*** 0.0796***   0.123*** 0.0564*** 
   (0.00667) (0.00898)   (0.00873) (0.00851) 
Rosenberg2   -0.0366*** -0.0196***   0.00314 -0.00411 
   (0.00598) (0.00679)   (0.00923) (0.00907) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 90 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 
Table 2.7 Quantile Wage Regression Using Time-Averaged Data with Locus of Control 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (10th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.282*** -0.162*** -0.273*** -0.199*** -0.0635 0.0893 -0.0842 0.0675 
 (0.0365) (0.0418) (0.0351) (0.0445) (0.0414) (0.0583) (0.0553) (0.0632) 
Hispanic -0.189*** -0.117** -0.192*** -0.117** -0.0742 -0.0184 -0.0685 -0.0194 
 (0.0568) (0.0491) (0.0488) (0.0518) (0.0787) (0.0829) (0.0656) (0.0817) 
Age 0.0125 0.0120 0.0129 0.0164 0.00426 0.00873 0.00187 0.00495 
 (0.0156) (0.0133) (0.0152) (0.0132) (0.0179) (0.0139) (0.0200) (0.0169) 
AFQT  0.209***  0.207***  0.177***  0.171*** 
  (0.0319)  (0.0358)  (0.0482)  (0.0518) 
AFQT2  0.0109  0.0271  -0.0129  -0.00576 
  (0.0316)  (0.0303)  (0.0631)  (0.0721) 
Rotter   -0.0597*** -0.0402**   -0.0406 -0.0281 
   (0.0219) (0.0174)   (0.0291) (0.0341) 
Rotter2   0.00425 0.00923   4.20e-05 0.00306 
   (0.0191) (0.0136)   (0.0225) (0.0172) 
Observations 1675 1675 1671 1671 1588 1588 1580 1580 91    Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (20th Quantile) 
 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.319*** -0.149*** -0.321*** -0.160*** -0.0748** 0.0947* -0.0585 0.0715 
 (0.0461) (0.0324) (0.0382) (0.0388) (0.0379) (0.0539) (0.0397) (0.0465) 
Hispanic -0.209*** -0.0678 -0.203*** -0.0858 -0.0173 0.109* -0.0103 0.128* 
 (0.0520) (0.0539) (0.0417) (0.0615) (0.0475) (0.0631) (0.0495) (0.0652) 
Age 0.0164 0.0135* 0.0162 0.0124 -0.00267 -0.0143 -0.00403 -0.0110 
 (0.0107) (0.00815) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0146) (0.0131) (0.0152) (0.0135) 
AFQT  0.260***  0.252***  0.251***  0.230*** 
  (0.0195)  (0.0186)  (0.0340)  (0.0366) 
AFQT2  0.0444**  0.0498***  0.0596**  0.0579** 
  (0.0174)  (0.0184)  (0.0283)  (0.0230) 
Rotter   -0.0561*** -0.0250   -0.0528** -0.0326** 
   (0.0156) (0.0156)   (0.0206) (0.0166) 
Rotter2   0.00249 0.00848   -0.00566 0.00102 
   (0.0110) (0.0116)   (0.0136) (0.0103) 
Observations 1675 1675 1671 1671 1588 1588 1580 1580 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2.7 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (30th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.382*** -0.142*** -0.373*** -0.158*** -0.117*** 0.0790** -0.110*** 0.0639** 
 (0.0326) (0.0354) (0.0337) (0.0364) (0.0348) (0.0343) (0.0282) (0.0309) 
Hispanic -0.220*** -0.0680 -0.215*** -0.0737* 0.0107 0.144*** -0.00146 0.136*** 
 (0.0500) (0.0464) (0.0517) (0.0397) (0.0486) (0.0404) (0.0372) (0.0341) 
Age 0.0143 0.0218** 0.0111 0.0174** -0.0134 -0.0175 -0.0115 -0.0219* 
 (0.00970) (0.00899) (0.0103) (0.00853) (0.0130) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0116) 
AFQT  0.271***  0.260***  0.263***  0.245*** 
  (0.0243)  (0.0252)  (0.0215)  (0.0218) 
AFQT2  0.0482***  0.0418**  0.0651***  0.0601*** 
  (0.0186)  (0.0171)  (0.0209)  (0.0192) 
Rotter   -0.0531*** -0.0295**   -0.0607*** -0.0356** 
   (0.0154) (0.0141)   (0.0184) (0.0156) 
Rotter2   0.00353 0.00180   -0.00409 -0.00559 
   (0.0132) (0.0113)   (0.0156) (0.0106) 
Observations 1675 1675 1671 1671 1588 1588 1580 1580 92 Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (40th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.412*** -0.144*** -0.420*** -0.144*** -0.142*** 0.0646** -0.120*** 0.0717** 
 (0.0302) (0.0395) (0.0264) (0.0424) (0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0291) (0.0286) 
Hispanic -0.214*** -0.0515 -0.206*** -0.0547 0.000327 0.127*** 0.00292 0.130*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0409) (0.0402) (0.0396) (0.0386) (0.0284) (0.0449) (0.0378) 
Age 0.00963 0.0132 0.00931 0.0126 -0.0145 -0.0181** -0.0134 -0.0201** 
 (0.00854) (0.00984) (0.00790) (0.00839) (0.00909) (0.00862) (0.0106) (0.00992) 
AFQT  0.289***  0.285***  0.277***  0.271*** 
  (0.0239)  (0.0224)  (0.0211)  (0.0196) 
AFQT2  0.0479**  0.0474**  0.0727***  0.0683*** 
  (0.0210)  (0.0185)  (0.0147)  (0.0133) 
Rotter   -0.0516*** -0.0258   -0.0545*** -0.0325* 
   (0.0134) (0.0164)   (0.0176) (0.0170) 
Rotter2   0.00482 0.0117   -0.00177 -0.00447 
   (0.0119) (0.0132)   (0.0153) (0.0118) 
Observations 1675 1675 1671 1671 1588 1588 1580 1580 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2.7 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (50th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.415*** -0.131*** -0.404*** -0.128*** -0.159*** 0.0469 -0.137*** 0.0745** 
 (0.0300) (0.0385) (0.0340) (0.0414) (0.0336) (0.0356) (0.0330) (0.0376) 
Hispanic -0.188*** -0.0311 -0.180*** -0.0313 0.0283 0.121*** 0.0204 0.118*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0383) (0.0319) (0.0392) (0.0435) (0.0356) (0.0441) (0.0348) 
Age 0.0134* 0.0119 0.0113 0.0104 -0.0171 -0.0199* -0.0203* -0.0167 
 (0.00701) (0.00826) (0.00834) (0.00805) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0116) (0.0124) 
AFQT  0.296***  0.304***  0.309***  0.299*** 
  (0.0204)  (0.0202)  (0.0249)  (0.0223) 
AFQT2  0.0579***  0.0545***  0.0743***  0.0712*** 
  (0.0173)  (0.0153)  (0.0154)  (0.0166) 
Rotter   -0.0491*** -0.0267*   -0.0836*** -0.0398** 
   (0.0132) (0.0161)   (0.0174) (0.0172) 
Rotter2   0.0121 0.0169   0.00460 -0.0113 
   (0.0112) (0.0120)   (0.0118) (0.0112) 
Observations 1675 1675 1671 1671 1588 1588 1580 1580 93 Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (60th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.415*** -0.127*** -0.384*** -0.147*** -0.196*** 0.0586* -0.183*** 0.0805*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0395) (0.0452) (0.0394) (0.0354) (0.0352) (0.0467) (0.0306) 
Hispanic -0.190*** 0.0124 -0.178*** -0.00840 -0.00351 0.176*** -0.00537 0.165*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0497) (0.0377) (0.0487) (0.0453) (0.0576) (0.0532) (0.0474) 
Age 0.0186** 0.0128* 0.0167* 0.0118 -0.0173* -0.0161 -0.0218* -0.0198 
 (0.00903) (0.00770) (0.00903) (0.00808) (0.0105) (0.0126) (0.0113) (0.0131) 
AFQT  0.306***  0.295***  0.336***  0.331*** 
  (0.0173)  (0.0216)  (0.0180)  (0.0271) 
AFQT2  0.0559***  0.0552***  0.0883***  0.0824*** 
  (0.0162)  (0.0177)  (0.0175)  (0.0230) 
Rotter   -0.0605*** -0.0181   -0.0976*** -0.0400 
   (0.0169) (0.0150)   (0.0297) (0.0324) 
Rotter2   0.0149 0.0102   0.0124 -0.00764 
   (0.0133) (0.0108)   (0.0164) (0.0135) 
Observations 1675 1675 1671 1671 1588 1588 1580 1580 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2.7 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (70th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.376*** -0.116*** -0.374*** -0.125*** -0.275*** 0.0564 -0.211*** 0.0580 
 (0.0396) (0.0357) (0.0428) (0.0371) (0.0501) (0.0343) (0.0488) (0.0377) 
Hispanic -0.205*** 0.0173 -0.168*** 0.00968 -0.0649 0.182*** -0.0465 0.157*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0340) (0.0462) (0.0384) (0.0541) (0.0419) (0.0429) (0.0449) 
Age 0.0124 0.0126 0.00777 0.0153* -0.0118 -0.0270** -0.0184* -0.0288*** 
 (0.00979) (0.00929) (0.00908) (0.00842) (0.0119) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0101) 
AFQT  0.306***  0.299***  0.354***  0.347*** 
  (0.0220)  (0.0195)  (0.0202)  (0.0232) 
AFQT2  0.0630***  0.0582***  0.0916***  0.0855*** 
  (0.0151)  (0.0193)  (0.0188)  (0.0190) 
Rotter   -0.0723*** -0.0263**   -0.108*** -0.0486** 
   (0.0151) (0.0127)   (0.0181) (0.0221) 
Rotter2   0.0121 0.00885   0.0145 -0.000528 
   (0.00936) (0.00885)   (0.0114) (0.0109) 
Observations 1675 1675 1671 1671 1588 1588 1580 1580 94 Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (80th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.330*** -0.122*** -0.366*** -0.129*** -0.272*** 0.0523 -0.242*** 0.0748* 
 (0.0437) (0.0306) (0.0394) (0.0370) (0.0422) (0.0436) (0.0546) (0.0383) 
Hispanic -0.170*** 0.0244 -0.172*** 0.00331 -0.107** 0.148*** -0.113** 0.174*** 
 (0.0572) (0.0476) (0.0503) (0.0465) (0.0447) (0.0470) (0.0459) (0.0480) 
Age 0.0108 0.00326 0.0143 0.00467 -0.0112 -0.0251** -0.0130 -0.0238** 
 (0.0120) (0.00874) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0135) (0.0121) 
AFQT  0.302***  0.296***  0.376***  0.345*** 
  (0.0211)  (0.0210)  (0.0246)  (0.0225) 
AFQT2  0.0792***  0.0733***  0.0766***  0.0768*** 
  (0.0218)  (0.0200)  (0.0221)  (0.0242) 
Rotter   -0.0746*** -0.0361**   -0.0911*** -0.0615*** 
   (0.0191) (0.0176)   (0.0192) (0.0171) 
Rotter2   0.00342 0.0119   -0.00487 -0.00669 
   (0.0119) (0.00799)   (0.00986) (0.0105) 
Observations 1675 1675 1671 1671 1588 1588 1580 1580 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2.7 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rotter Locus of Control, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (90th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.352*** -0.116** -0.348*** -0.115** -0.210*** 0.0282 -0.179*** 0.0366 
 (0.0490) (0.0503) (0.0583) (0.0501) (0.0554) (0.0509) (0.0555) (0.0643) 
Hispanic -0.140** 0.0267 -0.122 0.0344 -0.132** 0.146*** -0.0875 0.106 
 (0.0668) (0.0578) (0.0873) (0.0490) (0.0560) (0.0474) (0.0738) (0.0657) 
Age 0.0209* -0.00372 0.0134 0.000833 -0.000870 -0.0143 -0.0152 -0.0160 
 (0.0127) (0.0136) (0.0119) (0.0128) (0.0138) (0.00966) (0.0151) (0.0119) 
AFQT  0.277***  0.274***  0.362***  0.338*** 
  (0.0278)  (0.0258)  (0.0343)  (0.0349) 
AFQT2  0.108***  0.0946***  0.0754**  0.0588* 
  (0.0290)  (0.0259)  (0.0362)  (0.0344) 
Rotter   -0.0634*** -0.0481**   -0.0705** -0.0507** 
   (0.0243) (0.0214)   (0.0289) (0.0243) 
Rotter2   0.00508 0.00244   -0.0207 -0.0160 
   (0.0176) (0.0117)   (0.0139) (0.0122) 
Observations 1675 1675 1671 1671 1588 1588 1580 1580 95 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 
Table 2.8 Quantile Wage Regression Using Time-Averaged Data with Self-Esteem 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (10th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.282*** -0.162*** -0.291*** -0.199*** -0.0635 0.0893 -0.0588 0.0616 
 (0.0386) (0.0401) (0.0489) (0.0499) (0.0444) (0.0647) (0.0506) (0.0659) 
Hispanic -0.189*** -0.117** -0.116** -0.109* -0.0742 -0.0184 -0.0367 0.0119 
 (0.0567) (0.0516) (0.0520) (0.0578) (0.0662) (0.0952) (0.0866) (0.0887) 
Age 0.0125 0.0120 0.00675 0.0127 0.00426 0.00873 0.000963 0.00590 
 (0.0159) (0.0117) (0.0137) (0.0150) (0.0154) (0.0165) (0.0186) (0.0160) 
AFQT  0.209***  0.185***  0.177***  0.167*** 
  (0.0307)  (0.0455)  (0.0576)  (0.0528) 
AFQT2  0.0109  0.0164  -0.0129  0.00135 
  (0.0288)  (0.0326)  (0.0613)  (0.0573) 
Rosenberg   0.120*** 0.0510**   0.0415 0.0200 
   (0.0209) (0.0247)   (0.0282) (0.0231) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00584 -0.0131   -0.0365 -0.0300 
   (0.0185) (0.0206)   (0.0240) (0.0234) 
Observations 1675 1675 1674 1674 1588 1588 1587 1587 96 Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (20th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.319*** -0.149*** -0.336*** -0.168*** -0.0748* 0.0947** -0.0917*** 0.0329 
 (0.0439) (0.0350) (0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0390) (0.0476) (0.0319) (0.0449) 
Hispanic -0.209*** -0.0678 -0.171*** -0.0693 -0.0173 0.109* 0.0400 0.0856 
 (0.0569) (0.0475) (0.0477) (0.0492) (0.0452) (0.0627) (0.0502) (0.0562) 
Age 0.0164 0.0135 0.0182* 0.0144 -0.00267 -0.0143 -0.00282 -0.00502 
 (0.0111) (0.00838) (0.00949) (0.00979) (0.0130) (0.0143) (0.0131) (0.0108) 
AFQT  0.260***  0.249***  0.251***  0.210*** 
  (0.0204)  (0.0253)  (0.0332)  (0.0284) 
AFQT2  0.0444***  0.0554***  0.0596**  0.0547*** 
  (0.0171)  (0.0171)  (0.0234)  (0.0200) 
Rosenberg   0.113*** 0.0496**   0.0703*** 0.0484*** 
   (0.0207) (0.0198)   (0.0175) (0.0149) 
Rosenberg2   0.000855 -0.00124   -0.0297** -0.0308** 
   (0.0196) (0.0175)   (0.0143) (0.0141) 
Observations 1675 1675 1674 1674 1588 1588 1587 1587 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table 2.8 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (30th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.382*** -0.142*** -0.396*** -0.178*** -0.117*** 0.0790** -0.156*** 0.0450 
 (0.0356) (0.0390) (0.0305) (0.0378) (0.0319) (0.0330) (0.0268) (0.0339) 
Hispanic -0.220*** -0.0680 -0.180*** -0.0497 0.0107 0.144*** 0.00478 0.137*** 
 (0.0496) (0.0440) (0.0452) (0.0425) (0.0450) (0.0356) (0.0494) (0.0427) 
Age 0.0143 0.0218** 0.0179 0.0164 -0.0134 -0.0175 -0.0156 -0.0134 
 (0.0104) (0.00918) (0.0112) (0.0106) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0112) (0.0109) 
AFQT  0.271***  0.257***  0.263***  0.247*** 
  (0.0236)  (0.0245)  (0.0228)  (0.0236) 
AFQT2  0.0482**  0.0522**  0.0651***  0.0612*** 
  (0.0214)  (0.0230)  (0.0176)  (0.0217) 
Rosenberg   0.116*** 0.0534***   0.0849*** 0.0429*** 
   (0.0154) (0.0121)   (0.0168) (0.0138) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00970 -0.0112   -0.0352** -0.0326** 
   (0.0171) (0.0127)   (0.0143) (0.0143) 
Observations 1675 1675 1674 1674 1588 1588 1587 1587 97 Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (40th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.412*** -0.144*** -0.395*** -0.160*** -0.142*** 0.0646** -0.154*** 0.0364 
 (0.0301) (0.0417) (0.0284) (0.0371) (0.0312) (0.0322) (0.0339) (0.0327) 
Hispanic -0.214*** -0.0515 -0.185*** -0.0249 0.000327 0.127*** 0.0249 0.132*** 
 (0.0491) (0.0388) (0.0413) (0.0435) (0.0403) (0.0317) (0.0382) (0.0329) 
Age 0.00963 0.0132 0.00986 0.0123 -0.0145 -0.0181** -0.0161 -0.0186** 
 (0.00981) (0.00922) (0.00798) (0.00848) (0.00954) (0.00800) (0.0119) (0.00896) 
AFQT  0.289***  0.269***  0.277***  0.261*** 
  (0.0257)  (0.0208)  (0.0218)  (0.0208) 
AFQT2  0.0479**  0.0458***  0.0727***  0.0700*** 
  (0.0196)  (0.0156)  (0.0165)  (0.0163) 
Rosenberg   0.122*** 0.0650***   0.0983*** 0.0445** 
   (0.0166) (0.0147)   (0.0185) (0.0190) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00468 -0.00323   -0.0270 -0.0228 
   (0.0148) (0.0145)   (0.0177) (0.0168) 
         
Observations 1675 1675 1674 1674 1588 1588 1587 1587 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table 2.8 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (50th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.415*** -0.131*** -0.440*** -0.156*** -0.159*** 0.0469 -0.155*** 0.0706* 
 (0.0277) (0.0369) (0.0298) (0.0359) (0.0367) (0.0403) (0.0321) (0.0383) 
Hispanic -0.188*** -0.0311 -0.184*** -0.0258 0.0283 0.121*** 0.0399 0.134*** 
 (0.0372) (0.0416) (0.0383) (0.0367) (0.0484) (0.0392) (0.0352) (0.0359) 
Age 0.0134 0.0119 0.0124 0.00878 -0.0171* -0.0199** -0.0214* -0.0170 
 (0.00841) (0.00872) (0.0109) (0.00757) (0.0101) (0.00976) (0.0115) (0.0108) 
AFQT  0.296***  0.275***  0.309***  0.301*** 
  (0.0183)  (0.0219)  (0.0246)  (0.0287) 
AFQT2  0.0579***  0.0564***  0.0743***  0.0817*** 
  (0.0152)  (0.0156)  (0.0188)  (0.0206) 
Rosenberg   0.119*** 0.0634***   0.121*** 0.0488*** 
   (0.0152) (0.0152)   (0.0173) (0.0178) 
Rosenberg2   0.00285 0.00815   -0.0294** -0.0151 
   (0.0146) (0.0160)   (0.0150) (0.0160) 
Observations 1675 1675 1674 1674 1588 1588 1587 1587 98 Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (60th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.415*** -0.127*** -0.403*** -0.199*** -0.196*** 0.0586** -0.213*** 0.00926 
 (0.0364) (0.0353) (0.0313) (0.0416) (0.0314) (0.0283) (0.0391) (0.0287) 
Hispanic -0.190*** 0.0124 -0.171*** -0.0284 -0.00351 0.176*** 0.00480 0.142*** 
 (0.0411) (0.0493) (0.0460) (0.0440) (0.0414) (0.0499) (0.0417) (0.0381) 
Age 0.0186* 0.0128 0.0148 0.00792 -0.0173 -0.0161 -0.0185* -0.0159 
 (0.00981) (0.00807) (0.00925) (0.00789) (0.0119) (0.0112) (0.0102) (0.0109) 
AFQT  0.306***  0.266***  0.336***  0.302*** 
  (0.0185)  (0.0211)  (0.0194)  (0.0229) 
AFQT2  0.0559***  0.0518***  0.0883***  0.0857*** 
  (0.0168)  (0.0169)  (0.0175)  (0.0162) 
Rosenberg   0.136*** 0.0728***   0.143*** 0.0732*** 
   (0.0174) (0.0205)   (0.0172) (0.0168) 
Rosenberg2   0.0119 0.00200   -0.0279* -0.0196 
   (0.0179) (0.0154)   (0.0151) (0.0158) 
Observations 1675 1675 1674 1674 1588 1588 1587 1587 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table 2.8 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (70th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.376*** -0.116*** -0.387*** -0.143*** -0.275*** 0.0564 -0.302*** 0.00467 
 (0.0426) (0.0364) (0.0353) (0.0335) (0.0486) (0.0370) (0.0413) (0.0425) 
Hispanic -0.205*** 0.0173 -0.160*** -0.0120 -0.0649 0.182*** -0.0689 0.140*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0339) (0.0464) (0.0369) (0.0490) (0.0436) (0.0441) (0.0386) 
Age 0.0124 0.0126 0.0143 0.0183** -0.0118 -0.0270** -0.00893 -0.0241* 
 (0.0114) (0.00803) (0.00874) (0.00723) (0.0126) (0.0110) (0.00952) (0.0128) 
AFQT  0.306***  0.281***  0.354***  0.324*** 
  (0.0197)  (0.0213)  (0.0190)  (0.0260) 
AFQT2  0.0630***  0.0533***  0.0916***  0.0813*** 
  (0.0188)  (0.0153)  (0.0192)  (0.0161) 
Rosenberg   0.143*** 0.0606***   0.159*** 0.0660*** 
   (0.0163) (0.0141)   (0.0194) (0.0178) 
Rosenberg2   0.00609 -0.00212   -0.00481 -0.00583 
   (0.0154) (0.0119)   (0.0218) (0.0186) 
Observations 1675 1675 1674 1674 1588 1588 1587 1587 99 Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (80th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.330*** -0.122*** -0.346*** -0.147*** -0.272*** 0.0523 -0.342*** -0.0205 
 (0.0417) (0.0326) (0.0396) (0.0314) (0.0468) (0.0398) (0.0534) (0.0482) 
Hispanic -0.170*** 0.0244 -0.150*** 0.0116 -0.107** 0.148*** -0.131*** 0.123** 
 (0.0449) (0.0495) (0.0475) (0.0403) (0.0440) (0.0404) (0.0447) (0.0496) 
Age 0.0108 0.00326 0.0110 0.00531 -0.0112 -0.0251** -0.0179 -0.0212** 
 (0.0126) (0.00952) (0.00938) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0105) 
AFQT  0.302***  0.274***  0.376***  0.338*** 
  (0.0189)  (0.0198)  (0.0233)  (0.0309) 
AFQT2  0.0792***  0.0655***  0.0766***  0.0757*** 
  (0.0222)  (0.0230)  (0.0214)  (0.0232) 
Rosenberg   0.161*** 0.0762***   0.156*** 0.0810*** 
   (0.0167) (0.0198)   (0.0201) (0.0211) 
Rosenberg2   -0.0105 -0.00697   -0.0201 0.00570 
   (0.0160) (0.0137)   (0.0210) (0.0204) 
Observations 1675 1675 1674 1674 1588 1588 1587 1587 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table 2.8 (continued) 
Quantile Wage Regression With Rosenberg Self-Esteem, Between Estimator 1991-2006 (90th Quantile) 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.352*** -0.116** -0.359*** -0.161*** -0.210*** 0.0282 -0.311*** -0.0306 
 (0.0528) (0.0489) (0.0384) (0.0511) (0.0533) (0.0552) (0.0551) (0.0698) 
Hispanic -0.140** 0.0267 -0.169*** -0.00113 -0.132*** 0.146*** -0.136*** 0.0923 
 (0.0689) (0.0544) (0.0564) (0.0468) (0.0410) (0.0531) (0.0492) (0.0600) 
Age 0.0209** -0.00372 0.0258** -0.00156 -0.000870 -0.0143 -0.0102 -0.0173 
 (0.0103) (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0129) (0.0155) (0.0112) (0.0136) (0.0137) 
AFQT  0.277***  0.231***  0.362***  0.320*** 
  (0.0286)  (0.0299)  (0.0359)  (0.0379) 
AFQT2  0.108***  0.0827***  0.0754**  0.0688* 
  (0.0265)  (0.0215)  (0.0311)  (0.0361) 
Rosenberg   0.153*** 0.0980***   0.135*** 0.0695*** 
   (0.0156) (0.0166)   (0.0249) (0.0236) 
Rosenberg2   -0.0327* -0.0207   0.00976 0.00500 
   (0.0168) (0.0193)   (0.0240) (0.0225) 
Observations 1675 1675 1674 1674 1588 1588 1587 1587 100 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 bootstrap replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table 2.9 Log Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Word Knowledge, Locus of Control, and Self-Esteem 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.130*** -0.317*** -0.135*** -0.180*** 0.0243 -0.157*** 0.0261 
 (0.0241) (0.0257) (0.0243) (0.0258) (0.0266) (0.0273) (0.0265) (0.0271) 
Hispanic -0.155*** -0.0376 -0.148*** -0.0379 -0.0341 0.111*** -0.0250 0.109*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0290) (0.0299) (0.0290) (0.0310) (0.0303) (0.0307) (0.0302) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.0135 0.0270** 0.0116 0.00244 -0.00840 -0.00533 -0.0124 
 (0.0115) (0.0107) (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0116) 
Word Know  0.203***  0.198***  0.222***  0.211*** 
  (0.0148)  (0.0149)  (0.0164)  (0.0164) 
Word Know2  0.0120  0.00971  -0.0122  -0.0144 
  (0.0104)  (0.0104)  (0.0122)  (0.0125) 
Rotter   -0.0522*** -0.0280***   -0.0812*** -0.0472*** 
   (0.0113) (0.0107)   (0.0136) (0.0129) 
Rotter2   0.00423 0.00979   0.00416 0.00709 
   (0.00777) (0.00731)   (0.00880) (0.00815) 
Observations 13163 12981 13137 12955 11819 11640 11765 11586 
R2 0.111 0.200 0.119 0.203 0.048 0.142 0.065 0.146 101  
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.130*** -0.331*** -0.154*** -0.180*** 0.0243 -0.207*** -0.0144 
 (0.0241) (0.0257) (0.0235) (0.0260) (0.0266) (0.0273) (0.0261) (0.0279) 
Hispanic -0.155*** -0.0376 -0.139*** -0.0413 -0.0341 0.111*** -0.0281 0.0985*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0290) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0310) (0.0303) (0.0295) (0.0297) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.0135 0.0149 0.00718 0.00244 -0.00840 -0.00517 -0.0116 
 (0.0115) (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0113) 
Word Know  0.203***  0.184***  0.222***  0.198*** 
  (0.0148)  (0.0153)  (0.0164)  (0.0166) 
Word Know2  0.0120  0.0119  -0.0122  -0.0113 
  (0.0104)  (0.0105)  (0.0122)  (0.0120) 
Rosenberg   0.111*** 0.0567***   0.114*** 0.0663*** 
   (0.0111) (0.0111)   (0.0125) (0.0125) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00928 -0.00535   -0.0177 -0.0136 
   (0.0104) (0.00991)   (0.0121) (0.0117) 
Observations 13163 12981 13153 12971 11819 11640 11809 11630 
R2 0.111 0.200 0.144 0.209 0.048 0.142 0.084 0.153 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses correct for the longitudinal structure of the NLSY by accounting for repeated observations of 
individuals over time.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 2.10 Log Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Arithmetic Reasoning, Locus of Control, and Self-Esteem 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.143*** -0.317*** -0.147*** -0.180*** 0.0105 -0.157*** 0.0141 
 (0.0241) (0.0252) (0.0243) (0.0254) (0.0266) (0.0285) (0.0265) (0.0285) 
Hispanic -0.155*** -0.0369 -0.148*** -0.0370 -0.0341 0.0962*** -0.0250 0.0938*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0291) (0.0299) (0.0291) (0.0310) (0.0304) (0.0307) (0.0303) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.0113 0.0270** 0.00940 0.00244 0.000564 -0.00533 -0.00422 
 (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0127) (0.0118) (0.0126) (0.0118) 
Arith Reason  0.189***  0.185***  0.216***  0.203*** 
  (0.0121)  (0.0123)  (0.0147)  (0.0147) 
Arith Reason2  -0.00296  -0.00224  -0.00349  -0.00285 
  (0.0107)  (0.0108)  (0.0139)  (0.0138) 
Rotter   -0.0522*** -0.0286***   -0.0812*** -0.0505*** 
   (0.0113) (0.0103)   (0.0136) (0.0126) 
Rotter2   0.00423 0.0101   0.00416 0.00511 
   (0.00777) (0.00713)   (0.00880) (0.00817) 
Observations 13163 12981 13137 12955 11819 11640 11765 11586 
R2 0.111 0.200 0.119 0.203 0.048 0.131 0.065 0.136 102  
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.143*** -0.331*** -0.166*** -0.180*** 0.0105 -0.207*** -0.0286 
 (0.0241) (0.0252) (0.0235) (0.0253) (0.0266) (0.0285) (0.0261) (0.0286) 
Hispanic -0.155*** -0.0369 -0.139*** -0.0387 -0.0341 0.0962*** -0.0281 0.0868*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0291) (0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0310) (0.0304) (0.0295) (0.0295) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.0113 0.0149 0.00402 0.00244 0.000564 -0.00517 -0.00448 
 (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0107) (0.0127) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0115) 
Arith Reason  0.189***  0.170***  0.216***  0.193*** 
  (0.0121)  (0.0124)  (0.0147)  (0.0147) 
Arith Reason2  -0.00296  0.000900  -0.00349  -0.00187 
  (0.0107)  (0.0107)  (0.0139)  (0.0135) 
Rosenberg   0.111*** 0.0654***   0.114*** 0.0807*** 
   (0.0111) (0.0111)   (0.0125) (0.0121) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00928 -0.00705   -0.0177 -0.0103 
   (0.0104) (0.00996)   (0.0121) (0.0115) 
Observations 13163 12981 13153 12971 11819 11640 11809 11630 
R2 0.111 0.200 0.144 0.211 0.048 0.131 0.084 0.148 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses correct for the longitudinal structure of the NLSY by accounting for repeated observations of 
individuals over time.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
Table 2.11 Log Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Paragraph Comprehension, Locus of Control, and Self-Esteem 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.163*** -0.317*** -0.167*** -0.180*** 0.0101 -0.157*** 0.0146 
 (0.0241) (0.0251) (0.0243) (0.0252) (0.0266) (0.0268) (0.0265) (0.0267) 
Hispanic -0.155*** -0.0444 -0.148*** -0.0442 -0.0341 0.100*** -0.0250 0.0986*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0299) (0.0295) (0.0310) (0.0295) (0.0307) (0.0293) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.0107 0.0270** 0.00843 0.00244 -0.00330 -0.00533 -0.00811 
 (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0115) 
Parag Comp  0.186***  0.182***  0.225***  0.213*** 
  (0.0138)  (0.0139)  (0.0147)  (0.0147) 
Parag Comp 2  0.0134  0.0125  0.0191  0.0151 
  (0.00987)  (0.00989)  (0.0123)  (0.0124) 
Rotter   -0.0522*** -0.0318***   -0.0812*** -0.0523*** 
   (0.0113) (0.0106)   (0.0136) (0.0128) 
Rotter2   0.00423 0.0127*   0.00416 0.00409 
   (0.00777) (0.00718)   (0.00880) (0.00836) 
Observations 13163 12981 13137 12955 11819 11640 11765 11586 
R2 0.111 0.197 0.119 0.200 0.048 0.146 0.065 0.151 
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 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.163*** -0.331*** -0.185*** -0.180*** 0.0101 -0.207*** -0.0251 
 (0.0241) (0.0251) (0.0235) (0.0252) (0.0266) (0.0268) (0.0261) (0.0272) 
Hispanic -0.155*** -0.0444 -0.139*** -0.0470 -0.0341 0.100*** -0.0281 0.0910*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0287) (0.0292) (0.0310) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0289) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.0107 0.0149 0.00418 0.00244 -0.00330 -0.00517 -0.00734 
 (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0107) (0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0113) 
Parag Comp  0.186***  0.169***  0.225***  0.204*** 
  (0.0138)  (0.0143)  (0.0147)  (0.0148) 
Parag Comp 2  0.0134  0.0139  0.0191  0.0209* 
  (0.00987)  (0.00986)  (0.0123)  (0.0122) 
Rosenberg   0.111*** 0.0607***   0.114*** 0.0708*** 
   (0.0111) (0.0112)   (0.0125) (0.0123) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00928 -0.00650   -0.0177 -0.00913 
   (0.0104) (0.0100)   (0.0121) (0.0115) 
Observations 13163 12981 13153 12971 11819 11640 11809 11630 
R2 0.111 0.197 0.144 0.206 0.048 0.146 0.084 0.159 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses correct for the longitudinal structure of the NLSY by accounting for repeated observations of 
individuals over time.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 2.12 Log Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Numerical Operations, Locus of Control, and Self-Esteem 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.188*** -0.317*** -0.190*** -0.180*** -0.0577** -0.157*** -0.0468* 
 (0.0241) (0.0246) (0.0243) (0.0247) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0265) (0.0267) 
Hispanic -0.155*** -0.0689** -0.148*** -0.0672** -0.0341 0.0388 -0.0250 0.0409 
 (0.0298) (0.0285) (0.0299) (0.0285) (0.0310) (0.0297) (0.0307) (0.0295) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.00944 0.0270** 0.00753 0.00244 -0.00316 -0.00533 -0.00943 
 (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0126) (0.0119) 
Num Oper  0.181***  0.176***  0.176***  0.168*** 
  (0.0123)  (0.0123)  (0.0125)  (0.0124) 
Num Oper2  -0.0106  -0.0113  -0.0249**  -0.0247** 
  (0.00902)  (0.00902)  (0.0107)  (0.0106) 
Rotter   -0.0522*** -0.0321***   -0.0812*** -0.0637*** 
   (0.0113) (0.0105)   (0.0136) (0.0130) 
Rotter2   0.00423 0.00606   0.00416 0.00152 
   (0.00777) (0.00728)   (0.00880) (0.00831) 
Observations 13163 12981 13137 12955 11819 11640 11765 11586 
R2 0.111 0.200 0.119 0.203 0.048 0.120 0.065 0.129 104  
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.188*** -0.331*** -0.207*** -0.180*** -0.0577** -0.207*** -0.0913*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0246) (0.0235) (0.0246) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0261) (0.0266) 
Hispanic -0.155*** -0.0689** -0.139*** -0.0684** -0.0341 0.0388 -0.0281 0.0358 
 (0.0298) (0.0285) (0.0287) (0.0281) (0.0310) (0.0297) (0.0295) (0.0287) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.00944 0.0149 0.00248 0.00244 -0.00316 -0.00517 -0.00819 
 (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0107) (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0116) 
Num Oper  0.181***  0.164***  0.176***  0.157*** 
  (0.0123)  (0.0127)  (0.0125)  (0.0124) 
Num Oper2  -0.0106  -0.00867  -0.0249**  -0.0219** 
  (0.00902)  (0.00898)  (0.0107)  (0.0106) 
Rosenberg   0.111*** 0.0635***   0.114*** 0.0866*** 
   (0.0111) (0.0111)   (0.0125) (0.0121) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00928 -0.00534   -0.0177 -0.0141 
   (0.0104) (0.00995)   (0.0121) (0.0116) 
Observations 13163 12981 13153 12971 11819 11640 11809 11630 
R2 0.111 0.200 0.144 0.211 0.048 0.120 0.084 0.140 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses correct for the longitudinal structure of the NLSY by accounting for repeated observations of 
individuals over time.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.13 Log Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Locus of Control and Race Interactions 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.0806** -0.306*** -0.0732** -0.180*** 0.0602* -0.170*** 0.0521 
 (0.0241) (0.0317) (0.0300) (0.0348) (0.0266) (0.0310) (0.0325) (0.0350) 
Hispanic -0.155*** 0.00592 -0.177*** -0.0162 -0.0341 0.0974*** -0.0278 0.100** 
 (0.0298) (0.0359) (0.0374) (0.0415) (0.0310) (0.0363) (0.0372) (0.0404) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.00259 0.0274** 0.00173 0.00244 -0.00688 -0.00496 -0.00999 
 (0.0115) (0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0107) (0.0127) (0.0112) (0.0126) (0.0112) 
AFQT  0.248***  0.243***  0.258***  0.248*** 
  (0.0168)  (0.0172)  (0.0207)  (0.0207) 
AFQT x Black  0.0529  0.0499  0.111***  0.0996** 
  (0.0486)  (0.0487)  (0.0413)  (0.0425) 
AFQT x Hispanic  -0.0210  -0.0151  0.0718*  0.0732* 
  (0.0421)  (0.0426)  (0.0412)  (0.0411) 
AFQT2  0.0836***  0.0799***  0.0659***  0.0622*** 
  (0.0167)  (0.0171)  (0.0167)  (0.0162) 
AFQT2 x Black  -0.0272  -0.0269  0.00659  0.00677 
  (0.0434)  (0.0431)  (0.0350)  (0.0358) 
AFQT2 x Hispanic  -0.0500  -0.0442  0.0560  0.0576 
  (0.0415)  (0.0413)  (0.0477)  (0.0477) 
Rotter   -0.0667*** -0.0255*   -0.0778*** -0.0414** 
   (0.0160) (0.0138)   (0.0191) (0.0174) 
Rotter x Black   0.0235 0.00643   -0.0272 -0.00475 
   (0.0238) (0.0212)   (0.0328) (0.0311) 
Rotter x Hispanic   0.0327 0.00936   0.0137 0.00450 
   (0.0375) (0.0347)   (0.0339) (0.0302) 
Rotter2   0.00302 0.00807   -0.00151 0.00216 
   (0.0120) (0.0101)   (0.0132) (0.0119) 
Rotter2 x Black   -0.0106 -0.0111   0.0213 0.00794 
   (0.0163) (0.0147)   (0.0211) (0.0192) 
Rotter2 x Hispanic   0.0222 0.0160   2.42e-05 -0.00583 
   (0.0264) (0.0245)   (0.0216) (0.0200) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 
R2 0.111 0.224 0.121 0.226 0.048 0.166 0.066 0.168 
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Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses correct for the longitudinal structure of the NLSY 
 by accounting for repeated observations of individuals over time.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
 
Table 2.14 Log Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Self-Esteem and Race Interactions 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.322*** -0.0806** -0.335*** -0.103*** -0.180*** 0.0602* -0.226*** 0.0208 
 (0.0241) (0.0317) (0.0320) (0.0374) (0.0266) (0.0310) (0.0363) (0.0395) 
Hispanic -0.155*** 0.00592 -0.0859** 0.0580 -0.0341 0.0974*** -0.0366 0.0845* 
 (0.0298) (0.0359) (0.0406) (0.0425) (0.0310) (0.0363) (0.0406) (0.0437) 
Age 0.0305*** 0.00259 0.0152 -0.00231 0.00244 -0.00688 -0.00715 -0.0118 
 (0.0115) (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0105) (0.0127) (0.0112) (0.0121) (0.0109) 
AFQT  0.248***  0.238***  0.258***  0.246*** 
  (0.0168)  (0.0175)  (0.0207)  (0.0213) 
AFQT x Black  0.0529  0.0360  0.111***  0.0902** 
  (0.0486)  (0.0504)  (0.0413)  (0.0419) 
AFQT x Hispanic  -0.0210  -0.0698  0.0718*  0.0259 
  (0.0421)  (0.0461)  (0.0412)  (0.0412) 
AFQT2  0.0836***  0.0787***  0.0659***  0.0640*** 
  (0.0167)  (0.0167)  (0.0167)  (0.0168) 
AFQT2 x Black  -0.0272  -0.0299  0.00659  0.0101 
  (0.0434)  (0.0422)  (0.0350)  (0.0343) 
AFQT2 x Hispanic  -0.0500  -0.0645*  0.0560  0.0488 
  (0.0415)  (0.0391)  (0.0477)  (0.0444) 
Rosenberg   0.0989*** 0.0421***   0.0739*** 0.0246 
   (0.0150) (0.0144)   (0.0183) (0.0171) 
Rosenberg  x Black   0.00713 -0.00165   0.0719*** 0.0624** 
   (0.0252) (0.0251)   (0.0277) (0.0264) 
Rosenberg  x Hispanic   0.0441 0.0498   0.0957*** 0.0921*** 
   (0.0318) (0.0337)   (0.0323) (0.0309) 
Rosenberg 2   -0.000698 0.00273   -0.0364** -0.0272* 
   (0.0147) (0.0134)   (0.0175) (0.0161) 
Rosenberg 2 x Black   0.00643 0.00379   0.0327 0.0154 
   (0.0231) (0.0222)   (0.0280) (0.0261) 
Rosenberg 2 x Hispanic   -0.0451 -0.0434   0.0337 0.0311 
   (0.0288) (0.0273)   (0.0294) (0.0272) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 
R2 0.111 0.224 0.146 0.233 0.048 0.166 0.090 0.179 
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Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses correct for the longitudinal structure of the NLSY 
 by accounting for repeated observations of individuals over time.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table 2.15 Log Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Locus of Control, Self-Esteem, and South 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.292*** -0.107*** -0.287*** -0.111*** -0.145*** 0.0724*** -0.122*** 0.0744*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0257) (0.0282) (0.0273) (0.0278) (0.0272) 
Hispanic -0.158*** -0.0199 -0.151*** -0.0201 -0.0315 0.133*** -0.0222 0.131*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0286) (0.0298) (0.0286) (0.0308) (0.0291) (0.0306) (0.0289) 
Age 0.0303*** 0.00311 0.0268** 0.00168 0.00230 -0.00495 -0.00541 -0.00878 
 (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0126) (0.0111) (0.0125) (0.0111) 
South -0.0892*** -0.0420** -0.0888*** -0.0424** -0.105*** -0.0756*** -0.104*** -0.0765*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0208) (0.0234) (0.0208) (0.0258) (0.0229) (0.0252) (0.0227) 
AFQT  0.256***  0.252***  0.290***  0.277*** 
  (0.0139)  (0.0141)  (0.0162)  (0.0162) 
AFQT2  0.0641***  0.0613***  0.0639***  0.0618*** 
  (0.0137)  (0.0137)  (0.0146)  (0.0145) 
Rotter   -0.0518*** -0.0225**   -0.0814*** -0.0432*** 
   (0.0113) (0.0100)   (0.0135) (0.0123) 
Rotter2   0.00349 0.00697   0.00486 0.00408 
   (0.00773) (0.00693)   (0.00875) (0.00793) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 
R2 0.116 0.223 0.124 0.225 0.055 0.166 0.072 0.169 
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 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.292*** -0.107*** -0.304*** -0.127*** -0.145*** 0.0724*** -0.176*** 0.0375 
 (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0250) (0.0258) (0.0282) (0.0273) (0.0279) (0.0280) 
Hispanic -0.158*** -0.0199 -0.142*** -0.0232 -0.0315 0.133*** -0.0260 0.123*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0283) (0.0308) (0.0291) (0.0295) (0.0285) 
Age 0.0303*** 0.00311 0.0149 -0.00224 0.00230 -0.00495 -0.00510 -0.00834 
 (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0126) (0.0111) (0.0120) (0.0108) 
South -0.0892*** -0.0420** -0.0794*** -0.0413** -0.105*** -0.0756*** -0.0883*** -0.0691*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0208) (0.0228) (0.0207) (0.0258) (0.0229) (0.0252) (0.0227) 
AFQT  0.256***  0.237***  0.290***  0.266*** 
  (0.0139)  (0.0147)  (0.0162)  (0.0166) 
AFQT2  0.0641***  0.0598***  0.0639***  0.0602*** 
  (0.0137)  (0.0133)  (0.0146)  (0.0144) 
Rosenberg   0.109*** 0.0525***   0.111*** 0.0594*** 
   (0.0110) (0.0110)   (0.0125) (0.0118) 
Rosenberg2   -0.00836 -0.00478   -0.0155 -0.0101 
   (0.0103) (0.00971)   (0.0120) (0.0111) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 
R2 0.116 0.223 0.148 0.231 0.055 0.166 0.089 0.175 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses correct for the longitudinal structure of the NLSY by accounting for repeated observations of individuals over time.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2.16 Log Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Locus of Control and South Interactions 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.292*** -0.116*** -0.303*** -0.115*** -0.145*** 0.0576** -0.146*** 0.0650** 
 (0.0257) (0.0254) (0.0249) (0.0256) (0.0282) (0.0273) (0.0275) (0.0274) 
Hispanic -0.158*** -0.0189 -0.148*** -0.0195 -0.0315 0.126*** -0.0246 0.125*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0289) (0.0299) (0.0288) (0.0308) (0.0290) (0.0306) (0.0289) 
Age 0.0303*** 0.00267 0.0258** 0.000826 0.00230 -0.00515 -0.00639 -0.00949 
 (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0115) (0.0107) (0.0126) (0.0111) (0.0126) (0.0111) 
South -0.0892***    -0.105***    
 (0.0236)    (0.0258)    
AFQT  0.253***  0.249***  0.258***  0.249*** 
  (0.0165)  (0.0167)  (0.0205)  (0.0206) 
AFQT x South  0.0204  0.0183  0.0947***  0.0859*** 
  (0.0266)  (0.0271)  (0.0296)  (0.0304) 
AFQT2  0.0661***  0.0602***  0.0692***  0.0634*** 
  (0.0148)  (0.0154)  (0.0174)  (0.0177) 
AFQT2 x South  -0.00214  0.00832  -0.00440  0.00762 
  (0.0236)  (0.0252)  (0.0236)  (0.0244) 
Rotter   -0.0532*** -0.0230*   -0.0663*** -0.0335** 
   (0.0146) (0.0129)   (0.0179) (0.0167) 
Rotter x South   0.00530 0.00324   -0.0366 -0.0194 
   (0.0224) (0.0203)   (0.0269) (0.0246) 
Rotter2   0.0165* 0.0144   0.0102 0.00928 
   (0.00959) (0.00881)   (0.0111) (0.0105) 
Rotter2 x South   -0.0350*** -0.0197   -0.0158 -0.0165 
   (0.0132) (0.0127)   (0.0155) (0.0146) 
Observations 13163 13163 13137 13137 11819 11819 11765 11765 
R2 0.116 0.222 0.122 0.224 0.055 0.166 0.067 0.169 
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Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses correct for the longitudinal structure of the NLSY by accounting for repeated observations of 
individuals over time.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
 Men (1-4) Women (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Black -0.292*** -0.116*** -0.318*** -0.134*** -0.145*** 0.0576** -0.190*** 0.0354 
 (0.0257) (0.0254) (0.0242) (0.0256) (0.0282) (0.0273) (0.0265) (0.0277) 
Hispanic -0.158*** -0.0189 -0.141*** -0.0225 -0.0315 0.126*** -0.0245 0.119*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0285) (0.0308) (0.0290) (0.0294) (0.0282) 
Age 0.0303*** 0.00267 0.0150 -0.00237 0.00230 -0.00515 -0.00467 -0.00812 
 (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0126) (0.0111) (0.0120) (0.0108) 
South -0.0892***    -0.105***    
 (0.0236)    (0.0258)    
AFQT  0.253***  0.235***  0.258***  0.232*** 
  (0.0165)  (0.0173)  (0.0205)  (0.0208) 
AFQT x South  0.0204  0.0166  0.0947***  0.102*** 
  (0.0266)  (0.0275)  (0.0296)  (0.0298) 
AFQT2  0.0661***  0.0573***  0.0692***  0.0525*** 
  (0.0148)  (0.0150)  (0.0174)  (0.0181) 
AFQT2 x South  -0.00214  0.0107  -0.00440  0.0311 
  (0.0236)  (0.0261)  (0.0236)  (0.0247) 
Rosenberg   0.108*** 0.0557***   0.1000*** 0.0559*** 
   (0.0138) (0.0136)   (0.0160) (0.0153) 
Rosenberg  x South   0.00146 -0.0102   0.0309 0.00608 
   (0.0226) (0.0226)   (0.0253) (0.0231) 
Rosenberg2   0.00440 0.00177   0.00566 0.0145 
   (0.0119) (0.0114)   (0.0144) (0.0140) 
Rosenberg2 x South   -0.0370** -0.0195   -0.0521*** -0.0616*** 
   (0.0167) (0.0181)   (0.0185) (0.0178) 
Observations 13163 13163 13153 13153 11819 11819 11809 11809 
R2 0.116 0.222 0.146 0.230 0.055 0.166 0.089 0.180 
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Standard errors in parentheses correct for the longitudinal structure of the NLSY by accounting for repeated observations of 
individuals over time.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2.17 Log Wage Regression Using Pooled Data with Self-Esteem and South Interactions 
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Figure 2.1 Kernel Density Estimation of AFQT, Rotter, and Rosenberg Scores 
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Figure 2.1 (continued) 
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Figure 2.1 (continued) 
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Figure 2.2 Change in Wage Gap, Pooled Data 
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Figure 2.3 Change in Wage Gap, Time-Averaged Data 
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Figure 2.4 Coefficients From Quantile Wage Regression, Pooled Data 
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Figure 2.4 (continued) 
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Figure 2.5 Coefficients From Quantile Wage Regression, Time-Averaged Data 
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Figure 2.5 (continued)
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3 AN EXPLORATION INTO THE EFFECTS OF NONCOGNITIVE SKILLS 
ON HEALTH AND HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 The burgeoning literature on the economics of noncognitive skills has established 
the importance of these skills on wages, employment, smoking, crime, teen pregnancy, 
and tests of achievement (Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006; Borghans, Duckworth, 
Heckman, and ter Weel 2008).  Noncognitive skills also have an important role in 
determining human capital accumulation in the form of schooling choices (Coleman and 
DeLeire 2003; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006; Cebi 2007; Urzua 2008).  The health 
literature has extensively documented the positive correlation between health and 
education (Grossman 2000; Grossman 2006).  Both literatures discuss the need to 
incorporate noncognitive skills and health into one framework (Heckman 2007; Cuhna 
and Heckman 2007; Kaestner 2009).  In an extended model of human capability 
formation Heckman (2008) suggests cognitive, noncognitive and health capabilities 
together contribute to various socioeconomic and adult outcomes. These literatures have 
just begun to address the effects of noncognitive skills on health and human capital 
accumulation, in the form of education (Kaestner 2009; Conti, Heckman, and Urzua 
2010; Chiteji 2010).  Both literatures remain silent about the effect of noncognitive skills 
on health and another form of human capital, human capital acquired on the job.  One 
model of on-the-job human capital accumulation allows individuals to obtain human 
capital through a learning-by-doing technology that relies on hours of work (Shaw 1989; 
Imai and Keane 2004).  Noncognitive skills such as locus of control and self-esteem 
affect hours of work (Urzua 2008).  If noncognitive skills influence hours of work, then 
on-the-job human capital accumulation may depend on noncognitive skills.  
 
 This chapter puts the idea of health capital and on-the-job human capital from 
Chapter 1 together with the idea of noncognitive skills from Chapter 2 to explore the 
influence of these skills on human capital and health capital formation in adult life.  A 
stock of noncognitive skills measured by the degree of future orientation, self-efficacy, 
trust-hostility, and aspirations is incorporated into a learning-by-doing model that allows 
for endogenous human capital and health capital accumulation.  This stock of 
noncognitive skills exogenously enters the production of human capital and health 
capital.  Individuals in this lifecycle model choose hours worked, medical consumption, 
nonmedical consumption subject to a budget constraint, a healthy time constraint, and the 
production functions for health and human capital.  Exogenous health shocks directly 
affect sick time which then affect the choice of consumption and leisure.  Estimation of 
the model’s structural parameters follows a two-step procedure.  The first step estimates 
the human capital and health capital production functions, allowing for noncognitive 
skills.  The second step incorporates the production function parameters into the 
estimation of the utility parameters using a nonlinear generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator that comes directly from the solution to the individual’s optimization 
problem.   
The model uses data on working male head of households found in the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  The sample of men covering survey years 1989-
2003 are between the ages of 37 and 60.  The model relies on annual sick time and self-
reported health status as measures of healthy time and the health stock.  Measures of 
noncognitive skills come from questions asked 1968-1972.  Medical out-of-pocket 
 
expenditures are imputed from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and enter the 
production of health.   
The major findings show noncognitive skills do affect on-the-job human capital 
and but not health capital accumulation.  Individuals with higher self-efficacy earn higher 
future wages.  Since the wage represents the stock of human capital, individuals with 
higher self-efficacy produce higher levels of human capital.  Individuals with higher 
trust-hostility earn lower future wages.  None of the noncognitive skills exhibit any 
statistically significant relationship with future health.  Utility parameter estimates 
support utility theory by suggesting diminishing returns to leisure and substitutability 
between consumption and leisure.  In a specification with heterogeneity in education and 
demographics marginal utility of consumption is positive when evaluated at sample 
means.  In addition, the mean value of -1.03 for the intertemporal substitution elasticity 
for consumption implies a 1 percent equiproportionate increase in all prices leads to a 
1.03 percent reduction in consumption.  Compared to a model without noncognitive skills 
in human capital or health production presented in Chapter 1, the results diminish the role 
of current health on future health. 
3.2 Literature On Noncognitive Skills and Health 
  The noncognitive literature discusses the need to incorporate noncognitive skills 
and health into one framework (Heckman 2007; Cuhna and Heckman 2008).  Heckman 
(2008) extends a conceptual model of human capability formation to include cognitive, 
noncognitive and health capabilities, suggesting these capabilities together contribute to 
various socioeconomic and adult outcomes.  In this context these capabilities are 
complementary, that is, noncognitive capabilities can help the development of health and 
 
cognitive capabilities and vice versa.  Noncognitive skills can help the formulation of 
human capital and health capital by affecting self regulation and choices (Cunha and 
Heckman 2007).  One example is the rate of time preference.  The rate of time preference 
can affect an individual’s choice of healthy or unhealthy behaviors and investment in 
schooling.28  Kaestner (2009) is one study about the effect of noncognitive and cognitive 
skills on health.  Kaestner examines the association between cognitive skills and 
noncognitive skills measured at the end of childhood (age of 14 or 15) with adult health 
measured at the age of 41 in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979.  Kaestner 
measures cognitive skills with the AFQT score and noncognitive skills with self-esteem, 
locus of control, church attendance, history of stealing, and drug use.  Kaestner considers 
the effect of these skills on self-reported physical health and mental health by gender.  
For men and women adolescent cognitive ability and one noncognitive ability, self-
esteem, are significantly associated with better health in adulthood.  For men the 
magnitude of the direct associations is similar for cognitive ability and self-esteem. For 
women, though, the magnitude of the direct association is higher for self-esteem than 
cognitive ability.   
 Conti, Heckman, and Urzua (2010) study health disparities across education 
groups accounting for early cognitive, noncognitive, and health endowments.  They 
estimate a structural model of schooling choice and its affect on post-schooling health, 
allowing for early cognitive, noncognitive, and health endowments to influence schooling 
choice and health.  In this way, they can identify the true causal effect of education on 
health and estimate the entire distribution of this effect.  They estimate the model with 
                                                            
28 Fuchs (1982) proposed this time preference hypothesis.  Fuchs argues individuals who are more future 
oriented, or have a higher degree of time preference, make larger investments in health and schooling. 
 
data from the 1970 British Cohort Study, relating endowments at the age of 10 to labor 
market and health disparities at the age of 30. Noncognitive  factors are measured with 
locus of control, perseverance, cooperativeness, completeness of tasks, attentiveness, and 
persistence.  Cognitive factors are measured with tests on language comprehension, math, 
and reading. The health outcomes they consider include self-reported overall health, 
obesity, and depression, and the health behaviors they consider include smoking, 
exercise, and drug use.  They find noncognitive factors substantially diminish the role of 
cognitive factors in predicting health outcomes, suggesting noncognitive factors are 
relatively more important in promoting health and healthy behaviors.  Education plays a 
more important causal role for men than women in accounting for gaps in obesity rates 
and exercise.  Furthermore, the effect of education on health varies by level of cognitive 
and noncognitve abilities.  On most health outcomes for men, the benefit of education is 
much larger at the lower end of the noncognitive distribution and at the higher end of the 
cognitive distribution. 
 Chiteji (2010) also studies the relationship between noncognitive skills and 
healthy behavior, but instead uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to 
ascertain the effect of self-efficacy and being future oriented on alcohol consumption and 
exercising.  Self-efficacy is measured by a scale developed by the PSID and describes the 
evaluation of one’s ability to effectively perform tasks necessary to achieve a goal.  
Being future oriented comes from a question asking the length of the individual’s time 
horizon and characterizes an individual’s rate of time preference.  Both self-efficacy and 
time horizon are collected in 1972.  Chiteji estimates logit models that relate 
noncognitive skills to alcohol consumption in 1972 and exercising in 1999.  The results 
 
suggest individuals who are future oriented are less likely to drink and more likely to 
exercise.  These effects are consistent with the idea that more patient individuals are less 
likely to engage in unhealthy behaviors and invest in health production.  Self-efficacy has 
similar effects.  Individuals with higher levels of self-efficacy face a lower likelihood of 
drinking and higher likelihood of exercising. 
 This chapter contributes to this literature by assessing the effect of noncognitive 
skills measured early in life on adult health.  In addition, this chapter also assesses the 
effect of noncognitive skills on on-the-job human capital accumulation.  The model 
presented in the next section allows noncognitive skills to simultaneously affect the 
production of human capital and health capital.  
3.3 Model of Noncognitive Skills, Human Capital Accumulation, and Health 
Capital Accumulation 
The model draws on elements from the health and labor literatures by combining 
health capital with human capital through a learning-by-doing technology.  It allows 
health to enter utility directly and act as a constraint on behavior. Noncognitive skills 
enter the model in the same way as education enters the Grossman (1972) model.  Like 
education noncognitive skills are taken as exogenous.  In this model noncognitive skills 
enter the production of health and human capital.  An individual maximizes a standard 
utility function that is additively separable over time and is defined over leisure ( ), 
nonmedical consumption ( ), and the stock of health ( ). In each period,  
, ,  
 
Income comes from two sources, asset income ( ) and labor income ( ). 
This income can be spent on nonmedical consumption and used to purchase medical 
services ( ) at the price . Putting income and expenditures together gives the 
following intertemporal budget constraint: 
1   Asset Accumulation  
The observed wage ( ) is the product of a human capital stock ( ) and the 
unobserved rental rate on human capital ( ), so unlike the standard labor supply model 
the wage is endogenous.  
  Wage Equation  
In each period an individual inherits a stock of human capital which depreciates at 
rate . Human capital evolves in a similar way as health capital. Next period's human 
capital is the previous period's stock less depreciation plus new investment. New 
investment occurs on the job through learning-by-doing that depends on hours worked, 
the levels of human and health capital, and the exogenously determined stock of 
noncognitive skills, , , ; .  In this context noncognitive skills can raise 
the efficiency of human capital production.   is a stock of noncognitive skills 
characterized by personality traits that describe an individual’s time horizon, self-
efficacy, trust and hostility, and aspirations.  Human capital evolves according to  
1 , , ;
, , ;   Human Capital Accumulation  
 
In each period an individual inherits a stock of health capital ( ) which 
depreciates at rate  and can be replenished by devoting time to health,  (e.g. 
exercise), and purchasing medical services.  Leisure and medical services enter a health 
production function, , .  The same stock of noncognitive skills that enter 
human capital production also enter health production exogenously and can raise 
the efficiency of health production, so  , ; .  Health capital then evolves 
according to  
1 , ;
, , ; Health Capital Accumulation  
Individuals also have healthy time ( ) which can be allocated across two 
activities: leisure ( ) and work ( ). The healthy time constraint becomes 
 (Healthy Time Constraint) 
In addition, total time (T) is the sum of healthy time ( ) and sick time ( ), so  
  Total Time Constraint  
The individual’s optimization problem can be represented in a dynamic 
programming framework with state variables, , , , and choice variables 
, , . 
, , max
, ,
, , , ,  
. . 1   Asset Accumulation  
 
  Wage Equation  
, , ;   Human Capital Accumulation  
, , ; Health Capital Accumulation  
  Healthy Time Constraint  
  Total Time Constraint  
Like other life cycle labor supply models the source of uncertainty in this model 
comes from unknown future realizations of tastes, prices, wages, and interest rates 
(MaCurdy 1983).  This model does not make assumptions about the form of the 
distributions generating the uncertainty.  Unlike other models of life cycle labor supply, 
this model adds uncertain health shocks through sick time.   also follows a distribution 
of unknown form.  The individual in this model does not know when she will be sick.   
characterizes acute illnesses that an individual cannot anticipate such as the common 
cold, food poisoning, and the flu.29  acts as an exogenous shock to the total time and 
healthy time constraints.30   
The optimization problem can be simplified by substituting the wage equation and 
time constraints. With choice variables ,, , and   the optimization problem can now 
be written as 
, , max
, ,
, , , ,  
. . 1   Asset Accumulation  
, , ;   Human Capital Accumulation  
                                                            
29 Gilleskie (20 ) also considers acute illnesses.   10
30 This idea of   affecting the time constraint is similar in spirit to the literature on fixed time costs and 
labor supply (Cogan 1981).   
 
, , ; Health Capital Accumulation  
The first order conditions with respect to , , and  : 
:  , 1 0    1  
:  , 1 , , 0   2  
: 1 , 0   3  
A subscript represents a partial derivative with respect to that variable at time t. For 
example, ,  and , .   Equations 1 and 2 are most similar to conditions 
in life cycle labor supply models.  Equation 1 is the standard Euler equation for 
consumption and describes the optimal consumption over time. Equation 2 shows the 
effect of endogenous human capital and health capital accumulation in the last two terms.  
Without endogenous human capital and health capital accumulation, these terms are zero, 
and Equation 2 reduces to a condition similar to the standard labor-leisure condition from 
the static labor supply model where  is replaced by .  Equation 3 describes the 
optimal amount of medical consumption.  Noncognitive skills, suppressed to simplify 
notation, enter the model’s first order conditions through the marginal utility and 
marginal product functions.  The first order conditions can be combined with envelope 
conditions for the state variables , ,  to solve the optimization problem. The 
following equilibrium condition characterizes the solution to the optimization problem.31 
                                                            
31 See Appendix for derivation of solution to the optimization problem. With exogenous noncognitive skills 
the analytic solution to the model does not change.  Only the specification of health and human capital 
production changes (discussed in section on Econometric Specification). 
 
, , 1 , ,
,
,
,  
,
,
,
, ,
,
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, 0   4  
Under rational expectations, eq(4) has zero expectation at time period t, so realizations of 
future variables imply 
, , 1 , ,
,
,
,  
,
,
,
, ,
,
,
,   5  
where  is the forecast error at time t.  Rational expectations implies 0, so 
any information at time t is not useful in forecasting future variables.  This orthogonality 
between  and the information at time t will be exploited to estimate the structural 
parameters of the model. 
3.4 Econometric Specification 
A two step estimation strategy is used to estimate the structural parameters of the 
model. In the first step quadratic human capital and health production function 
parameters are estimated with ordinary least squares, allowing for noncognitive skills. 
The second step incorporates these production function parameters in a nonlinear 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation of the equilibrium condition (5) to 
identify utility parameters.   
 
The specification for the human capital production function, 
, , ; , is quadratic in its arguments. The quadratic specification 
represents the concave nature of earnings over the life-cycle: 
, , ;  
,  
 The vector , , , , , , , ,  contains the structural 
parameters of the human capital production function.  Noncognitive skills enter the 
specification through varying slope parameters, so  
  0,1,3,… ,6 
Education and demographics enter similarly.  D is a vector of education, demographic, 
and noncognitive skills, so D={education, nonwhite, horizon, self-efficacy, trust-hostility, 
and aspirations}.   is an exogenous time-specific growth rate of human capital common 
to all individuals, and ,  is an individual-specific component of human capital growth. 
As written, the human capital production function can not be directly estimated since the 
stock of human capital, , is not observed.  Wages are observed, so the specification can 
be rewritten in terms of wages using the relationship, . Making the substitution 
 gives a specification that can be estimated 
         
  ,  
 
This specification of the wage equation relates future discounted wages to current hours 
worked, current discounted wages, current health, and the stock of noncognitive skills.  It 
is estimated using ordinary least squares, setting 1  .   
The marginal product of hours worked ( , ), marginal product of human capital 
stock ( , ), and the marginal product of health capital stock ( , ) come from 
differentiating the quadratic human capital production function 
,   2  
, 2   
, 2  
Health capital production, , , ; , follows a quadratic 
specification similar to human capital production. The health capital production is 
specified as 
, , ;  
,  
where the vector , , , , , , , ,  represents the structural parameters 
of health capital production.  Noncognitive skills, education, and demographics enter the 
specification in a way similar to human capital production by varying slope parameters, 
so  
  0,1,3, … ,6 
 
 is an exogenous time-specific growth rate of health capital common to all individuals, 
and ,  is an individual-specific component of health capital growth. The corresponding 
marginal product of medical expenditures ( , ), leisure ( , ), and health stock ( , ) are 
, 2  
, 2  
, 2  
The specification of the utility function follows a translog form. The translog 
utility function is quadratic in its arguments and represents a local second-order 
approximation to any utility function. It also does not impose the restrictions of additivity 
or homothecity associated with other common utility functions, such as CES or Cobb-
Douglas (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau 1975). The exact specification is 
, , ln ln ln ln ln ln  
ln ln ln ln ln ln  
The vector , , , , , , , ,  represents the structural 
parameters of the utility function. Identification of these parameters requires a 
normalization, so 1.  Due to the form of the equilibrium condition (5)  and  can 
not be identified so are set to zero.  Differentiating the translog utility function gives the 
marginal utility of leisure ( , ) and the marginal utility of nonmedical consumption 
( , ) as 
,
1 ln 2 ln ln
 
 
,
ln 2 ln ln
 
Substituting the corresponding marginal utility and marginal product functions 
into the equilibrium condition produces a highly nonlinear equation that can be 
parameterized by Γ , , , . Γ is the vector of unknown population parameters. 
 and  are estimated from the human capital and health capital production functions in 
the first step, and  is set to .95, leaving the utility parameters to be estimated in the 
second step. Let  be the vector of variables entering the ith individual's equilibrium 
condition in period t. The ith individual's equation can be represented by 
, ; , ,  
Rational expectations implies information in the information set Ω  is not useful 
in forecasting future variables, so 
, ; , , · 0 
where  contains elements of Ω .   The orthogonality between , ; , ,  and  
is exploited to estimate  in a GMM estimator.  With panel data of T years for each 
individual population orthogonality conditions are derived by averaging over time, 
1
, ; , , , , ; , , 0 
The sample analogs of these population conditions are constructed by averaging over a 
random sample of N individuals, so  
 
1
, , ; , ,  
The GMM estimator of  minimizes the quadratic form  or  
argmin  
where the   is a symmetric positive definite weighting matrix.  is unknown so is 
replaced by  constructed from the residuals of a nonlinear two stage least squares 
(NL2SLS) procedure, allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity. 
3.5 Data Construction 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) serves as the main data source for 
estimating the structural model with noncognitive skills.  The PSID offers the advantage 
of covering a representative sample of U.S. individuals during the working portion of the 
life cycle.  The PSID started with 4,800 families in 1968 and with efforts to follow all 
family members now contains over 7,000 families.  Interviews occur annually for 1968-
1996 and biennially for 1997-2007.  The PSID consists of three samples: the original 
Survey Research Center (SRC) sample, the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) 
sample, and the Latino sample.  The original SRC sample represents the U.S. population 
while the SEO sample serves as a supplementary low income subsample.  The Latino 
sample, added in 1990, accounts for the changing nature of immigration in the U.S.  This 
chapter excludes the SEO and Latino samples.  Individuals are drawn from the SRC 
sample from 1989-2003 who meet the following criteria: (1) in family at time of 
interview; (2) head of household; (2) male; (3) not self-employed; (4) employed; (5)work 
at least 3 years; (6) age between 37 and 60; (7) real annual food consumption between 
 
$520 and one-third of real annual family income; (8) annual hours worked at least 100; 
and (9) real hourly wage between $2/hour and $200/hour.  Limiting the sample to male 
head of households of working age avoids issues with labor force nonparticipation and 
joint labor supply decisions.  The sample selection criteria produce an unbalanced panel.  
This analysis treats the panel as continuous for the period 1989-2003 (ignoring biennial 
interruptions) and considers missing person-year observations as missing conditionally at 
random.   
The PSID collects a variety of information on the labor market and 
socioeconomic characteristics of each household.  Questions about annual family income 
and annual hours worked refer to the previous calendar year.32  Food consumption also 
refers to the previous calendar year.  Total annual food consumption includes food at 
home, food delivered to the home, eating out, and the value of food stamps.  Total food 
consumption, deflated by the food component of the Consumer Price Index (2008 base 
year), is the consumption measure in the model. The PSID collects food consumption 
each survey year with the exception of survey years 1988 and 1989.  For survey years 
after 1993, the PSID stopped reporting annual values for food at home, food delivered, 
eating out, and the value of food stamps.  For these years annual amounts were created by 
annualizing the amount reported according to the reporting period (daily, weekly, 
biweekly, monthly, and monthly).     
The hourly wage rate depends on whether the worker is hourly or salaried.  For 
hourly workers the PSID gives the reported wage rate.  For salaried workers the PSID 
                                                            
32 Annual family income with negative values after 1993 is set to 1 to match the PSID bottom coding of 
family income in previous years. 
 
reports an hourly rate that depends on the salary and the pay period (weekly, biweekly, or 
monthly).  For these workers the PSID constructs a wage adjusted for a fixed number of 
hours each pay period instead of using the actual hours worked.  For example, a salaried 
worker paid weekly has an hourly rate that is the salary divided by 40 hours.  Salaried 
workers paid biweekly, monthly, and yearly have salaries divided by 80, 160, and 2,000 
hours, respectively.  All wage and income data are deflated by the personal consumption 
deflator using a 2008 base year.   
Questions about annual sick hours and self-rated health serve as measures of 
healthy time and the health stock, respectively.  PSID respondents report the amount of 
work missed due to own illness for the previous year.  Specifically, the PSID asks “Did 
you miss work because you were sick?  How much work did you miss?” The PSID 
calculates the annual sick hours as weeks ill times 8 hours for the first 8 weeks and times 
60 hours for any weeks thereafter.  Beginning in 1994 the PSID did not calculate annual 
sick hours, so annual sick hours are created by applying the same formula to the number 
of reported days, weeks, or months missed due to own sickness.  The PSID self-rated 
health question began in 1984 and asks “Would you say your health in general is 
excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?”33 These responses are converted to a four point 
scale in the following way: 1 (Fair or Poor); 2 Good; 3 Very Good; and 4 Excellent. 
The PSID collected a series of attitudinal questions from 1969-1972 that were 
later dropped from the survey.  The PSID reports indexes that cover four personality 
traits and represent the stock of noncognitive skills in the model: (1) horizon length, (2) 
                                                            
33 The self-rated health question in the PSID has been used in the recent health literature.  Fletcher and 
Sindelar (2009) and Fletcher, Sindelar, and Yamaguchi (2009) are examples. 
 
self-efficacy, (3) trust-hostility, and (4) aspirations.  Each trait is measured by an index 
comprised of questions asked to head of households.  The index value for each trait in the 
analysis is the average over the years 1969-1972.  The index for horizon length ranges 
from 0 to 8 and describes the degree of future orientation. It is based on the following 
statements: 
1. Is sure whether will or will not move 
2. Has explicit plans for children’s education 
3. Has plans for an explicit kind of new job 
4. Knows and mentions what kind of training new job requires 
5. Has substantial savings relative to income 
6. Has definite expectations that next few years will be better or worse 
7. Expects to have a child more than one year hence, or expects no more children 
and is doing something to limit the number of children 
The index for self-efficacy ranges from 0 to 7 and describes one’s ability to effectively 
perform tasks necessary to achieve a goal.  It is based on the following statements: 
1. Sure life would work out 
2. Plans life ahead 
3. Gets to carry out things 
4. Finishes things 
5. Rather save for future 
6. Has no limitations 
7. Thinks about things that might happen in future 
 
The index for trust-hostility ranges from 0 to 5 and is based on the following statements: 
1. Does not get angry easily 
2. Matters what others think 
3. Trusts most other people 
4. Believes life of average man getting better 
5. Believes not a lot of people have good things they don’t deserve 
The index for aspirations and ambition ranges from 0-8 and describes an individual’s 
degree of aspirations and ambition.  It is based on the following statements: 
1. Might make purposive move 
2. Wanted more work and/or worked >2500 hours 
3. Might quit a job because it was not challenging 
4. Prefers a job with chances for making more money even if dislikes job 
5. Spends time figuring out how to get more money 
6. Plans to get a new job, and knows what type of job, and knows what it might pay 
7. Plans for job regardless of details 
Other variables necessary for the model are the interest rate and medical out-of-
pocket expenditures.  The interest rate in the model reflects the after-tax annual 3-month 
Treasury bill interest rate based on a marginal federal tax rate from the NBER TAXSIM 
module.34  Medical out-of-pocket expenditures are imputed using data from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey. The appendix explains the imputation procedure for 
medical out-of-pocket expenditures. 
                                                            
34 The marginal federal tax rate comes from the NBER TAXSIM module using head of household, labor 
income, and number of children as input variables. 
 
  After applying the sample selection criteria, the analysis sample contains 2,525 
person-year observations and covers 1989-2003.  The questions for noncognitive skills 
asked in 1968-1972 limit the sample to head of households who are typically not from 
split-off families.  As a consequence, the sample will be considerably older and 
unhealthier than the analysis sample from Chapter 1.  Since instrument sets using t-2 
values are used in estimation, the sample size will also be considerably smaller.  Table 
3.1 displays summary statistics. The sample consists of males, who are mostly white and 
have completed almost 14 years of education.  These men earn an average hourly wage of 
$27.75/hour and work about 2,245 hours each year.  The average age is 49 years old, over 
10 years older than the average age in the sample from Chapter 1.  With an average 
health status at 2.82, health in the sample is almost “Very Good,” which is less than the 
average health reported in the sample from Chapter 1.  Individuals take almost 33 hours 
of sick time each year and spend over $3,300 on medical out-of-pocket expenditures.   
Tables 3.2 and Table 3.3 report average horizon, self-efficacy, trust-hostility, and 
aspiration scores by the main outcome variables, wage and health status.  In addition, 
Table 3.4 reports the average scores by education level.   Men in the lowest quartile of 
the wage distribution tend to have the shortest time horizon and the lowest levels of self-
efficacy and trust-hostility.  Men in the top quartile of the wage distribution report the 
longest time horizon and highest levels of self-efficacy and trust-hostility.  However, men 
in the bottom quarter of the wage distribution have the highest level of aspirations.  
Levels of aspiration decrease with the wage.  When moving from Poor or Fair health to 
Excellent health, health exhibits a positive relationship with each noncognitive skill, so 
men with excellent health have the longest time horizon and highest self-efficacy, trust-
 
hostility, and aspirations.   The same positive relationship holds with education for 
horizon, self-efficacy, and trust-hostility.  Men who have completed college or more 
exhibit the longest time horizon and highest self-efficacy and trust-hostility.  Education 
and aspiration do not follow this relationship.  The average aspiration score increases 
from less than high school to high school and college then falls with men who have 
completed college or more.   
  Several variables must be scaled to facilitate the computation of the model.  
Leisure, hours worked, and healthy time are divided by 1,000.  Total food consumption 
and medical out-of-pocket expenditures are divided by 10,000.  The hourly wage and age 
are divided by 100. 
3.6 Results 
Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show the estimation of the human capital and health 
capital production functions using ordinary least squares.  Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.  Columns 1 and 2 of each table provide parameter 
estimates for the base specifications without heterogeneity while columns 3 and 4 
introduce education, demographic, and noncognitive heterogeneity.  This interaction with 
education, nonwhite, each noncognitive skill allows shifts in the production functions. 
Only the specification without heterogeneity shows a concave relationship between 
current wages and future wages. Since the wage represents the human capital stock, the 
results show human capital production increases with the current stock of human capital 
at a decreasing rate, suggesting decreasing marginal productivity of human capital.  The 
specification without heterogeneity suggests for a given level of human capital, health 
improves human capital accumulation.  The specification with heterogeneity suggests for 
 
a given level of human capital, schooling augments the production of post-schooling 
human capital, or the two are complements.  The positive interaction with wage and 
hours of work suggests hours of work also improves human capital production, or hours 
of work and human capital are complements.  Among the noncognitive parameters of 
interest, only self-efficacy and trust-hostility exhibit a statistically significant relationship 
with the future wage through the current wage.  For a given level of the current wage, 
individuals with higher self-efficacy earn more, or produce higher levels of human 
capital.  The interaction with the quadratic wage suggests a concave relationship between 
self-efficacy and wage.  For a given level of the current wage, individuals with higher 
trust-hostility earn less at an increasing rate.  Aspirations have a negative effect through 
the quadratic wage.  Trust-hostility has a positive effect through health.    
The health capital specification without heterogeneity suggests future health 
capital stock is an increasing function of current health.  This relationship between 
current health and future health disappears after introducing heterogeneity.  In fact, none 
of the noncognitive skills exhibit any statistically significant relationship with future 
health.  For a given level of current leisure, being nonwhite lowers future health.     
Comparing the production parameter estimates from this model with noncognitive 
skills to the production parameter estimates from the model without noncognitive skills 
presented in Chapter 1 (Table 1.2 and Table 1.3) shows some differences.  The human 
capital production function with heterogeneity presented Table 1.2 exhibits diminishing 
returns to human capital while the human capital production function with noncognitive 
skills does not exhibit diminishing returns to human capital.  After adding noncognitive 
skills, education becomes statistically significant.  The health capital production function  
 
with heterogeneity in Table 1.3 shows the importance of current health for future health.  
The importance of current health for future health diminishes after adding noncognitive 
skills.   
Table 3.7 displays the nonlinear generalized method of moments estimation of 
utility parameters.  Columns 1 and 2 are based on the estimated production parameters 
without heterogeneity while columns 3 and 4 are based on production parameters that 
allow heterogeneity.  The coefficient on leisure is set to 1 for identification of the 
remaining parameters.  The instrument set used in the estimation includes time t, time t-1, 
and time t-2 values of leisure, food consumption, wage, health status, medical 
expenditures, the after-tax interest rate, age, education, region dummies, nonwhite, 
number of children, family size, horizon, self-efficacy, trust-hostility, aspirations, annual 
time dummies, interactions between leisure and food consumption, wage and health 
status, health status and leisure, medical expenditures and health status, leisure and 
medical expenditures, and age and education.  Squared values at time t, time t-1, and time 
t-2 of food consumption, wage, health status, medical expenditures, age, and leisure are 
also included.   
The specification without heterogeneity shows positive parameter estimates for 
consumption and leisure.  The negative sign on the interaction between consumption and 
leisure indicates they are substitutes in preferences.  When evaluated at the mean values 
of the data, marginal utility of consumption and leisure are negative which is possible 
with translog utility.35  Leisure exhibits strong diminishing returns.  The interaction 
                                                            
35 When evaluated at sample means, marginal utility of consumption is -0.001 and marginal utility of 
leisure is -0.006. 
 
between consumption and health suggest they are complements.  The test statistics for the 
Sargan test suggests the model specification without heterogeneity can be rejected at the 
10 percent level of significance, but the model specification with heterogeneity can not be 
rejected.  Adding education and demographic heterogeneity preserves all signs except the 
quadratic term for consumption, the interaction between health and leisure, and the 
interaction between health and consumption.  Marginal utility of consumption is positive, 
and marginal utility of leisure is negative when evaluated at the means of the data.36  
Education lowers utility through leisure and consumption.  The mean value of -1.03 
(without heterogeneity) for the intertemporal substitution elasticity for consumption 
implies a 1 percent equiproportionate increase in all prices leads to a 1.03 percent 
reduction in consumption.  
Comparing the utility parameter estimates from this model with  noncognitive 
skills in the production functions to the analogous model without noncognitive skills 
presented in Chapter 1 (Table 1.6) shows similarities and differences.  The specifications 
without heterogeneity in utility parameters are similar in signs with the exception of 
quadratic consumption and the interactions between health and leisure and health and 
consumption.  The specifications with demographic and education heterogeneity only 
differ in signs on the heterogeneity parameters for leisure and the and health and 
consumption interaction. 
3.7 Conclusion and Future Work 
  This chapter synthesizes the idea of health and on-the-job human capital 
accumulation from Chapter 1 with the idea of noncognitive skills in Chapter 2 to examine 
                                                            
36 When evaluated at sample means, marginal utility of consumption is 0.001 and marginal utility of leisure 
is -0.003. 
 
the influence of these skills on human capital accumulation and health capital 
accumulation in adult life.  While the interaction of noncognitive skills with health and 
education is just receiving attention, the interaction of noncognitive skills with health and 
on-the-job human capital has not been explored in the noncognitive, health, or human 
capital literatures.  This chapter presents an exploratory analysis by introducing 
noncognitive skills to a life cycle labor supply model with endogenous health and human 
capital accumulation.  Noncognitive skills, measured by degree of future orientation, self-
efficacy, trust-hostility, and aspirations, are allowed to exogenously affect human capital 
production and health production in the same way as education exogenously affects 
health production in the Grossman (1972) model of health.  The model’s structural 
parameters are estimated using nonlinear generalized method of moments.  The model 
takes advantage of noncognitive skills assessed in the early years of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics and relates these skills to health and human capital accumulation 
during adult life.   
 The main findings suggest a role for noncognitive skills on on-the-job human 
capital accumulation.  Self-efficacy positively affects future wages, or human capital 
accumulation.  Individuals with high self-efficacy receive higher future wages.  
Individuals with higher trust-hostility receive lower future wages.  Unlike the literature 
relating noncognitive skills to better health, this analysis does not find any evidence that 
noncognitive skills influence future health.  The finding that noncognitive skills aid the 
development of on-the-job human capital is new and underscores the importance of 
developing these skills during the early part of life. 
 
 Future work should explore other noncognitive measures in the PSID.  The 
current model incorporates a few of many attitudinal and personality questions available 
in the PSID.  Other information can be included in the model such as the K-6 
Psychological Distress Scale which measures emotional stability.  Individual components 
of the horizon, self-efficacy, trust-hostility, and aspirations indexes can be included in the 
model in place of each index for robustness.  Chapter 2 reports differences in wages by 
race and gender due to noncognitive skills.  An analysis by race and gender should be 
pursued.  The recent noncognitive literature suggests complementarities between 
cognitive and noncognitive skills.  Interactions between education, a measure of 
cognitive skills, and noncognitive skills can be included to test for any nonseparabilities 
between the two sets of skills.   
  
 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 1989-2003 
Variable (n=2,525) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Wage (2008 dollars)  27.75 16.81 2.38 145.84 
Work hours 2244.48 517.00 150 5436 
Sick hours  32.77 119.29 0 1980 
Leisure hours  6482.76 512.84 3276 8610 
Healthy hours  8727.23 119.29 6780 8760 
Health status  2.82 0.89 1 4 
Food Consumption (2008 dollars)  9591.87 4331.72 743.51 38989.45
Medical Out-of-pocket (2008 dollars)  3323.70 984.97 53.58 12959.17
After-tax interest rate  3.42 0.76 1.70 7.34 
Age  49.42 4.82 37 60 
Education (years)  13.95 2.41 6 17 
Number of children  0.59 0.90 0 5 
Family Size  2.91 1.19 1 8 
Northeast  0.17 0.37 0 1 
North Central  0.37 0.48 0 1 
South  0.29 0.45 0 1 
West  0.17 0.37 0 1 
White  0.93 0.25 0 1 
Nonwhite 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Married 0.88 0.33 0 1 
Horizon 4.98 0.88 2 7.25 
Self-Efficacy 4.06 1.25 0.50 7 
Trust-Hostility 2.60 1.07 0 5 
Aspirations 3.30 1.29 0.25 7.5 
 
   
 
Table 3.2 Average Noncognitive Skills by Wage Percentile 
Wage Horizon Self-Efficacy Trust-Hostility Aspirations 
Less than 25th percentile 4.79 3.63 2.38 3.34 
Between 25th and 75th percentiles 4.94 4.10 2.62 3.29 
Greater than 75th percentile 5.23 4.37 2.76 3.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Average Noncognitive Skills by Health Status 
Health Status Horizon Self-Efficacy Trust-Hostility Aspirations
Poor or Fair 4.67 3.54 2.26 3.17 
Good 4.97 3.95 2.60 3.35 
Very Good 5.00 4.07 2.63 3.24 
Excellent 5.06 4.35 2.66 3.37 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Average Noncognitive Skills by Education 
Education Horizon Self-Efficacy Trust-Hostility Aspirations
Less than high school 4.71 3.60 2.12 3.17 
High school and college 4.87 3.86 2.52 3.34 
Greater than college 5.19 4.44 2.82 3.28 
 
   
 
Table 3.5 Human Capital Production Parameters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
α0 (wt ) 0.883*** (0.220) 0.349 (0.297) 
α0 (wt) (educ)   0.0546*** (0.0178) 
α0 (wt) (nonwhite)   -0.186** (0.0738) 
α0 (wt) (horizon)   -0.0328 (0.0547) 
α0 (wt) (self-efficacy)   0.0757** (0.0330) 
α0 (wt) (trust-hostility)   -0.163*** (0.0411) 
α0 (wt) (aspirations)   0.0342 (0.0283) 
α1 (wt2) -0.680*** (0.102) -0.306 (0.352) 
α1 (wt2) (educ)   -0.0517** (0.0252) 
α1 (wt2)(nonwhite)   0.147* (0.0819) 
α1 (wt2)(horizon)   0.0718 (0.0743) 
α1 (wt2) (self-efficacy)   -0.117*** (0.0417) 
α1 (wt2) (trust-hostility)   0.267*** (0.0487) 
α1 (wt2) (aspirations)   -0.0657** (0.0331) 
α2 (wtNt) 0.144 (0.0895) 0.182*** (0.0403) 
α3 (Nt) 0.00518 (0.0247) 0.0894 (0.0673) 
α3 (Nt)(educ)   0.00356 (0.00353) 
α3 (Nt)(nonwhite)   -0.0284 (0.0182) 
α3 (Nt)(horizon)   -0.0143 (0.00965) 
α3 (Nt)(self-efficacy)   -0.00956 (0.0109) 
α3 (Nt) (trust-hostility)   -0.0125 (0.0116) 
α3 (Nt) (aspirations)   -0.00115 (0.00803) 
α4 (Nt2) -0.00295 (0.00361) -0.0229 (0.0148) 
α4 (Nt2)(educ)   -0.00148* (0.000861) 
α4 (Nt2)(nonwhite)   0.00473 (0.00380) 
α4 (Nt2)(horizon)   0.00476** (0.00213) 
α4 (Nt2) (self-efficacy)   0.00231 (0.00212) 
α4 (Nt2) (trust-hostility)   0.00205 (0.00247) 
α4 (Nt2) (aspirations)   0.000744 (0.00179) 
α5 (Ht) -0.00572 (0.0174) -0.0260 (0.0635) 
α5 (Ht)(educ)   -0.00570 (0.00348) 
α5 (Ht)(nonwhite)   0.0554*** (0.0212) 
α5 (Ht)(horizon)   0.00569 (0.00920) 
α5 (Ht)(self-efficacy)   0.00194 (0.00941) 
α5 (Ht)(trust-hostility)   0.0228** (0.00955) 
α5 (Ht)(aspirations)   0.000518 (0.00795) 
α6 (Ht2) 0.000207 (0.00276) 0.00549 (0.0121) 
α6 (Ht2)(educ)   0.000980 (0.000727) 
α6 (Ht2)(nonwhite)   -0.0107*** (0.00402) 
α6 (Ht2)(horizon)   -0.000545 (0.00179) 
α6 (Ht2)(self-efficacy)   -0.000510 (0.00168) 
α6 (Ht2)(trust-hostility)   -0.00341** (0.00174) 
α6 (Ht2)(aspirations)   -0.000819 (0.00152) 
α7 (HtNt) -0.00450 (0.00568) -0.00339 (0.00575) 
α8 (wtHt) 0.0732** (0.0349) 0.0115 (0.0297) 
Observations 2525  2525  
R-squared 0.920  0.932  
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1 Columns 3 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
 
 
Table 3.6 Health Capital Production Parameters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
θ0 (Ht )  0.498** (0.234) 0.443 (0.699) 
θ0 (Ht) (educ)   -0.0149 (0.0356) 
θ0 (Ht) (nonwhite)   0.334 (0.394) 
θ0 (Ht) (horizon)   0.0148 (0.0914) 
θ0 (Ht) (self-efficacy)   0.0490 (0.0754) 
θ0 (Ht) (trust-hostility)   0.0375 (0.0765) 
θ0 (Ht) (aspirations)   -0.0366 (0.0774) 
θ1 (Ht2)  -0.0169 (0.0168) 0.0314 (0.121) 
θ1 (Ht2)(educ)   0.00463 (0.00680) 
θ1 (Ht2)(nonwhite)   -0.0991 (0.0764) 
θ1 (Ht2)(horizon)   -0.00909 (0.0172) 
θ1 (Ht2)(self-efficacy)   -0.00749 (0.0139) 
θ1 (Ht2)(trust-hostility)   -0.0115 (0.0142) 
θ1 (Ht2)(aspirations)   -0.000158 (0.0141) 
θ2 (HtLt) 0.0241 (0.0312) 0.0347 (0.0338) 
θ3 (Lt)  -0.0982 (0.284) -0.864 (0.557) 
θ3 (Lt)(educ)    0.0164 (0.0246) 
θ3 (Lt)(nonwhite)   -0.401* (0.231) 
θ3 (Lt)(horizon)   0.0668 (0.0620) 
θ3 (Lt)(self-efficacy)   -0.00377 (0.0500) 
θ3 (Lt)(trust-hostility)   -0.0112 (0.0519) 
θ3 (Lt)(aspirations)   0.0363 (0.0462) 
θ4 (Lt2) -0.00349 (0.0212) 0.0635 (0.0562) 
θ4 (Lt2)(educ)   -0.00223 (0.00287) 
θ4 (Lt2)(nonwhite)   0.0487** (0.0247) 
θ4 (Lt2)(horizon)   -0.00707 (0.00687) 
θ4 (Lt2)(self-efficacy)   4.56e-05 (0.00501) 
θ4 (Lt2)(trust-hostility)   0.00160 (0.00554) 
θ4 (Lt2)(aspirations)   -0.00220 (0.00507) 
θ5 (Mt)  0.519 (1.776) 1.210 (6.179) 
θ5 (Mt)(educ)    0.0954 (0.274) 
θ5 (Mt)(nonwhite)   2.758 (3.242) 
θ5 (Mt)(horizon)   -0.574 (0.749) 
θ5 (Mt)(self-efficacy)   -0.117 (0.602) 
θ5 (Mt)(trust-hostility)   -0.0336 (0.538) 
θ5 (Mt)(aspirations)   -0.482 (0.509) 
θ6 (Mt2) -1.392** (0.580) -7.895 (8.482) 
θ6 (Mt2)(educ)   0.00558 (0.425) 
θ6 (Mt2)(nonwhite)   -4.855 (5.580) 
θ6 (Mt2)(horizon)   0.784 (1.043) 
θ6 (Mt2)(self-efficacy)   0.0876 (0.839) 
θ6 (Mt2)(trust-hostility)   -0.0552 (0.685) 
θ6 (Mt2)(trust-hostility)   1.064 (0.732) 
θ7 (HtMt)  0.259 (0.189) -0.0681 (0.233) 
θ8 (LtMt)  0.0984 (0.253) 0.466 (0.352) 
Observations 2525  2525  
R-squared 0.948  0.950  
Regressions include annual time dummy variables.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Columns 3 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
  
 
Table 3.7 Utility Parameters Using Time t, t-1, and t-2 Instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
γ0  (ln Lt )  1.00  1.00  
γ0  (ln Lt) (educ)   -0.0110*** (0.0007) 
γ0  (ln Lt) (nonwhite)   0.0314 (0.2171) 
γ1  (ln Ct)  0.0474*** (0.0045) 0.0115*** (0.0011) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (educ)   -0.0002*** (0.00001) 
γ1  (ln Ct) (nonwhite)   0.0003 (0.0024) 
γ2  (ln Lt ) (ln Ct)  -0.0274*** (0.0029) -0.0052*** (0.0006) 
γ3  (ln Lt ) 2  -0.2796*** (0.0123) -0.2296*** (0.0034) 
γ4  (ln Ct ) 2  0.0003 (0.0004) -0.0062 (0.0121) 
γ6  (ln Ht ) (ln Lt )  0.0039 (0.0335) -0.0143*** (0.0045) 
γ7  (ln Ht ) (ln Ct) 0.0030*** (0.0013) -0.0002*** (0.00004) 
ISE (mean)  -1.03  0.14  
ISE (median)  -0.77  -0.05  
Sargan test [df] 
 (p-value) 
120.14 
[100] (0.08)
 112.15[96] 
(0.12) 
 
Observations 2525  2525  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Columns 3 and 4 include observed heterogeneity. 
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Appendix: Derivation of Equilibrium Condition and Estimating Equation 
The individual's optimization problem is 
, , max
, ,
, , , ,  
. . 1   Asset Accumulation  
  Wage Equation  
1 , ,
, ,   Human Capital Accumulation  
1 , , , Health Capital Accumulation  
  Healthy Time Constraint  
  Total Time Constraint  
 
The Total Time Constraint is extraneous. The Total Time Constraint can be used to 
define , and the Wage Equation can be substituted into the Asset 
Accum izulation Equation. The optim ation problem can now be written as 
, , max
, ,
, , , ,  
. . 1   Asset Accumulation  
, ,   Human Capital Accumulation  
, , Health Capital Accumulation  
  Healthy Time Constraint  
 
Substi f th i ) gives tute or  from e Healthy T me Constraint (
, , max
, ,
, , , ,  
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,   :  , 1 , 0 7  
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Envelope conditions: 
:  1      (9)
:  1 ,   10  
 
Substitute eq(6) into eq(8) for ,  gives 
, , 0
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Substitute eq(8) into eq(7) for :  
, 1 ,
,
  , ,
0  
Substitute for  and  after updating envelope conditions (eq(9) and eq(10)) 
 
, 1 1  
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Update eq(6) to substitute for 1 ,  : 
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U te eq o  : pda (7) to solve f r 
, 1 , ,
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(14) 
Before solving for , substitute for   1 ,  and 
,
  ,
 in eq(14) 
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  , ,
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Substitute for  into eq(13) 
, , 1  
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,
,
,
,
  , ,
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, , 1  
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  , ,
,
,
,
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Zero expectation at time t implies the following estimating equation. 
, , 1 , ,
,
  , ,
 
 
,
,
,
, ,
,
  , ,
0  15  
Eq(15) is the estimating equation. 
  
 
Appendix: Consumption Imputation 
Consumption is imputed based on a procedure developed by Blundell, Pistaferri, 
and Preston (2006) that imputes nondurable expenditures in the PSID using data from the 
CE.  Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2006, 2008) estimate a demand equation for food 
at home in the CE that depends on demographics, food prices, and nondurable 
expenditures.  Their model specification follows: 
ln , , ln , ,  
where ,  is food at home expenditures and ,  is nondurable expenditures. In their 
estimation Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston instrument for nondurable expenditures to 
account for potential measurement error.  With estimates of  and  from the CE along 
with demographics and food expenditures from the PSID, nondurable consumption can 
be predicted in the PSID using 
ln ,
ln , ,  
As long as food at home expenditures are monotonic in nondurable expenditures, the 
estimates from the food demand equation,  and , are estimated consistently, and the 
trends in the variance of actual and imputed are similar, the imputation procedure will 
give consistent estimates of nondurable expenditures in the PSID.  For this chapter 
imputed consumption comes from a simpler version of Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 
(2006).  Nondurable expenditures are predicted using 
ln ,
ln , 3.6674 .5746 ln
. 4573  
 
Luigi Pistaferri kindly provided this estimation. 
  
 
Appendix: Medical Out-of-Pocket Expenditures Imputation 
Medical out-of-pocket expenditures (MOOP) are imputed using the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CE).  Conducted by the Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics the CE collects extensive information on the buying habits of American 
households since 1980.  The Census Bureau currently uses the CE to impute out-of-
pocket medical expenditures in the Current Population Survey for its experimental 
poverty measure (Betson 2001; O'Donnell and Beard 2009).37 The CE consists of two 
components: the weekly Diary Survey and the quarterly Interview Survey.  The Diary 
Survey follows households for two consecutive weeks and records expenditures on small, 
frequently purchased items such as food, personal care, and household supplies.  The 
Interview Survey follows households for five consecutive quarters and collects large 
expenditures on a quarterly basis, including property, automobiles, and appliances.  The 
Interview Survey also collects various medical expenditures, so it is used for the out-of-
pocket medical expenditure imputation.  Specifically, the Interview Survey records 
expenditures on six medical categories: (1) drug preparations; (2) ophthalmic products 
and orthopedic appliances; (3) physicians, dentists, and other medical professionals; (4) 
hospitals; (5) nursing homes; and (6) health insurance.  The Interview Survey sample is 
selected on a rotating panel basis each quarter.  Approximately 7,000 households that are 
a representative sample of the US population are  followed for five quarters (U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 2008). 
                                                            
37 The Census Bureau's two part model separately imputes MOOP for individuals with zero medical 
expenditures and individuals with positive medical expenditures.  The model draws on data from the 1996-
1997 CE and “ages” the imputed data using the Consumer Price Index.  The variables in the imputation 
include age, income as a percent of poverty, health insurance coverage, and family size (O'Donnell and 
Beard 2009). 
 
Ed Harris and John Sabelhaus of the Congressional Budget Office maintain CE 
extract files through the National Bureau of Economic Research.38  Harris and Sabelhaus 
provide “family-level” extract files that aggregate four quarterly records into an annual 
record for each family and collapse the hundreds of spending, income, and wealth 
categories into a consistent set of categories across all years (Harris and Sabelhaus 2000).  
Their out-of-pocket medical expenditure category sums the six medical spending 
categories. Because of the rotating panel design of the Interview Survey, each family's 
annual record covers the spending for the first quarter the family entered the sample and 
the following three quarters.  For example, a family entering the survey the first quarter 
of 1997 reports expenditures for the 1997 calendar year, January 1997 through December 
1997.  A family entering the survey the second quarter of 1997 reports expenditures for 
April 1997 through March 1998.  To match the calendar year timing of the PSID, only 
the quarter one CE extract files are used. 
Harris and Sabelhaus (2000) recommend selecting a usable CE sample that meet 
the following criteria.  First, the respondent must meet the BLS “complete income 
reporter” requirement.  Second, the household must have completed four quarterly 
interviews. Third, the household should not be a student household.  Additionally, to best 
match the PSID sample, the CE sample is limited to male head of households between the 
ages of 25 and 60.  These requirements produce a CE sample of 8,321 member 
observations covering 1980-2003.  
The imputation procedure involves estimating the following annual regression on 
CE variables that are also available in the PSID. 
                                                            
38 Available at http://www.nber.org/data/ces_cbo.html. 
 
_  
 
 is the sum of six medical spending categories.  is the age of the individual.  
 is family size. _  is the individual's years of education corrected to 
match the PSID definition of education.   is a broad family income measure that 
includes (1) wages and salaries; (2) self-employment income; (3) rent, interest, and 
dividends; (4) government transfers; and (5) rent received as pay. Negative values of 
 are set to 1 to match bottom coding of the PSID family income variable.  
, , and  are region dummy variables while  is a 
dummy variable. 
The imputation regressions omit the top one percent of medical expenditures to 
mitigate the effect of outliers.  The imputation regressions also omit 1988 because the 
education variable is zero for all observations in 1988.  After estimating the regression on 
CE data, the annual coefficients are applied to PSID data to predict out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures.  The predicted out-of-pocket medical expenditures are deflated using the 
medical component of the consumer price index with a 2008 base year. 
Table A.1 and the accompanying figures compare the actual medical expenditures 
in the CE to the imputed medical expenditures in the PSID before deflating.  Table A.1 
shows the average of the imputed variable exceeds the average of the actual variable 
while the variance of the imputed variable is smaller.  Comparing averages over time 
shows the imputed variable average seems to match the actual variable average over the 
sample period (Figure A.1, top panel). The standard deviation of the actual variable 
 
always exceeds the standard deviation of the imputed variable (Figure A.1, bottom 
panel).  Both standard deviation series exhibit similar trends over time. The kernel 
density figures show both variables have similar distributions (Figure A.2). 
  
 
 
Table A.1 CE and PSID Comparison of Medical Out-of-Pocket Expenditures 
(MOOP) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
CE MOOP  1350.41 1414.17 
PSID MOOP (Imputed) 1459.35 704.62 
 
 
  
 
Figure A.0.1 MOOP Trends 
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Figure A.0.2 MOOP Kernel Density 
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